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Critical voices have long pointed out that contemporary Western civilization has a 
twisted relationship with death. Many scholars seem to agree on one point: we are 
living in a culture of death denial, death phobia and death illiteracy. Death has the 
gravity to break the cultural hypnosis of living a life without limits; thus it plays a 
central cultural role in the meaning-making and identity-forming processes. 
However, the argument that a death-phobic culture has removed death from everyday 
life is not wholly accurate. At the same time that physical death has been removed 
from everyday life, representations of death have become pervasive in contemporary 
cultural representation, with seemingly endless depictions of graphic violence and 
death. This cultural phenomenon of death in the media brings into question the 
consensus that death denial is a central cultural attitude. Our relationship with death 
and violence and their interplay points to a schism between the private and public 
handling of death. Psychoanalytic theories of the death drive — or Thanatos — first 
introduced by Sigmund Freud and then further developed by scholars such as Herbert 
Marcuse and Jacques Lacan, offer an explanatory framework for understanding the 
ambivalent role of death and violence in our culture and how this cultural framework 
shapes identity.  
Building on the psychoanalytic theory of the death drive, I argue that this 
schism in our relationship with death produces a trait within the individual that is 
constituted by the inability to think about death, coupled with an obsessional 
relationship with violent death and an excessive materialism. The constant 
reciprocity of the anxious individual and a death-phobic society creates a status quo 
in which the absence of mortality contemplation accelerates selves that yearn to 
generate meaning through materialism and yet are unable to meet the existential 
limits of life and environment. I argue that consumerism is the prevalent death drive 
in contemporary culture and that it entails marginalizing authentic awareness of 
mortality for the sake of symbolic immortality. For Erich Fromm, the death drive is a 
character trait of malignant aggression, or what he calls necrophilia. In this thesis I 
put forward the idea of the necrophile self — the cultural trait of death phobia within 
the individual. I argue that the sense of self in late capitalist society is constituted by 
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Critical voices have long pointed out that contemporary Western civilization has a 
twisted relationship with death. As Zygmunt Bauman observes, death interrupts the 
meaning-making process of a person, because it has the gravity to break the cultural 
hypnosis in which we live our lives as if death does not exist. Death evokes the 
biggest riddles of existence and, as such, demands coping mechanisms that allow the 
order of daily life to continue uninterrupted. Many scholars seem to agree on one 
point: we are living in a culture of death denial. People in the West no longer live in 
a state in which bare survival and meeting essential needs are the first priorities. Too 
busy to negotiate between the miscellaneous layers of our daily life — career, family, 
self-development, and so on — and keen on avoiding unpleasurable feelings and 
experiences, people tend to avoid the essential challenges posed by the threat of 
death and loss. Death connotes vastness, violent nothingness, and the cold absence of 
meaning. Death feels like an abyss, because it involves losing the grip one has on the 
ground, on the earth, on life.  
Modernity has not only made most Western countries wealthier and extended 
the lifespan of their populations; it has also succeeded in removing death and dying 
from our private everyday experience (Kübler-Ross 1976; Ariès 1974; Kellehear 
2007; Becker 1973; Bauman 1992; Elias 1985). The death of a person no longer 
interrupts the experienced continuity of everyday matters. Ariès observed that in the 
twentieth century, it is as if no one dies anymore. 1.1 million people were murdered 
in Auschwitz in a period of less than five years (Memorial and Museum Auschwitz-
Birkenau 2017), while the wider social environment remained oblivious to this 
unspeakable mass-scale atrocity. Just as death camps, such as Auschwitz, were lethal 
spaces located outside the centres of the cities or rural towns, modern places that deal 
with end-of-life issues such as slaughterhouses, hospitals, and hospices are often 
located at the periphery of our cities, as if the grey continuity of everyday life cannot 
sustain an interface with anything outside the modern creed of speed, materialism, 
progress, and security.  
Once, if you wanted to die a good death, you hoped that you would have time 
to wrap up your earthly matters and say your goodbyes. Studies now indicate that 
modern people understand a good death to be sudden, painless, and unconscious 
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(Zirden 2007). When death comes, we do not want to know or feel it. We also try to 
prevent death occurring. There are prevention strategies, exercise, immunizations, 
screenings, diets, and supplements to be taken. There are toxins which can smooth 
out wrinkles and plastic fillings that put curves in the right corners. Insurance is our 
new guardian angel; plastic surgeons our new exorcists; doctors are our gods to help 
us, if we believe enough that their science can miraculously ward off death.  
Changes in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, transportation, and technology 
have had a profound effect on the social, economic, and cultural conditions, not only 
in the West, but also worldwide. Two hundred years ago, life expectancy at birth was 
forty years. It has now risen to almost ninety years for the citizens of Monaco who, 
according to the CIA World Factbook (2011), live the longest. Nowadays, around 85 
per cent of deaths occur after the age of fifty-five whereas, around 1900 in Europe, 
one third of deaths occurred before age five, another third happened before fifty-five 
and the remaining deaths were in “old age”. Thus, death now is viewed as the climax 
of old age (Hunt 2005: 205). 
Life expectancy has dramatically improved in the last two hundred years, but 
with this development chronic diseases have become more common. Despite medical 
progress, new diseases are cropping up, such as obesity, allergies and diabetes, which 
counteract increased life expectancy. Before the introduction of modern hygienic 
regimes, people died from extrinsic causes, diseases like the plague, diarrhea, and 
infections. Now over 70 per cent of people in the Western world die from new 
endemic problems, like heart disease, cancers, and stroke. These ailments are 
understood as failures of the body, but they are also endemic in contemporary 
society. 
 
Death and violence 
 
There is also a remarkable change in the relationship between death and violence. It 
was rather late in the day, after World War I, that Sigmund Freud questioned why 
humanity expresses vast destructive powers through war and atrocities, since he 
assumed that pleasure is the preferred individual experience. Ever since Freud’s 
Civilization and its discontents, the attempt to understand violence, aggression, and 
death is more than ever present in the arena of intellectual and emotional inquiry. But 
according to the experimental psychologist Steven Pinker, violence is in decline. In 
2011, Pinker published an almost eight-hundred-page work of quantitative history, 
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The better angels of our nature, in which he argues that violence is in decline, and 
the contemporary era is the most peaceful ever experienced. Pinker backs up this 
premise with an impressive amount of empirical data that makes it hard for the 
sceptic to refute his findings. Pinker traces the persistent historical trajectory of the 
decline of violence from wars, genocides, and the aggressive treatment of women, 
children, animals, and minority groups.  
Through various processes and over thousands of years, Pinker argues, humans 
emerged from their violent state of anarchic coexistence into a society that values the 
pacifying effects of states, governments, commerce, trading, and the right to remain 
physically unharmed. Humans came to realize that it was much more beneficial to 
cooperate than to feud. The newfound value placed in reason and the abandonment 
of superstition, together with better infrastructure and education, led one-on-one 
violence to plummet over the centuries. Another positive trend, he suggests, is that 
wars have become fewer and shorter, but, due to the changed nature of weaponry, the 
deadliness of war has steadily increased. Yet, from the 1950s (or after the end of 
World War II) to 2000, the duration, frequency, and damage done by war were at the 
lowest point in the five-hundred-year interval from 1500 (before then, the great 
powers used to be at war regularly). Pinker stresses that, historically, we are 
witnessing an unprecedented decline in interstate war (Pinker 2011: 294). 
Violence has declined profoundly, and unimaginable acts of cruelty are not 
typically part of the Western experience any longer, despite regular reports of 
horrific murder cases on television and the genocide in Bosnia, the “deadliest conflict 
in Europe since World War II”. In this conflict “from 1991–1999, about 140,000 
people lost their lives and about 4 million were displaced as political refugees” 
(Krkljes 2014). Pinker is convinced that the power of the state and institutions, 
combined with Enlightenment reasoning, are the key ingredients for a peaceful era 
(Pinker 2011: 680–2). He comes to this conclusion mostly through evaluating 
empirical data and considering various classic philosophic concepts. Pinker embraces 
Hobbes’ conception of the Leviathan (Pinker 2011: 680–2) and stresses the pacifying 
effects of a state and judicial system that has a monopoly over violence. In this view, 
the advantage of using violence as a way of solving problems is diminished. He also 
mentions the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace” in which democracy and trade, 
among other factors, change the incentive structures through which nations consider 
the option of war (Pinker 2011: 289).  
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However, Pinker does not engage in an in-depth conversation regarding the 
power of the state, current environmental issues like climate change, and the looming 
holocentric sixth mass extinction. He also does not consider how global capitalism is 
wreaking havoc in Third and Second World countries in order to maintain the West’s 
increasing needs for resources. His argument as to why violence is in decline is 
weakened further by his failure to engage with intellectuals like Adorno, Foucault, 
and Bauman. His curtailed understanding of violence is readily apparent when he 
dismisses, categorically, a broader understanding of violent relations: 
 
[T]he fact that Bill Gates has a bigger house than I do may be 
deplorable, but to lump it together with rape and genocide is to 
confuse moralization with understanding. Ditto for underpaying 
workers, undermining cultural traditions, polluting the ecosystem, and 
other practices that moralists want to stigmatize by metaphorically 
extending the term violence to them. It’s not that these aren’t bad 
things, but you can’t write a coherent book on the topic of “bad 
things”. (Pinker 2017) 
 
Instead of opening up a discussion about violence, Pinker closes the door to critical 
questions and thinking. Pinker might not be a stigmatizing moralist by his definition, 
yet he is an ideologue of a particular conception of rationality, which, I argue, keeps 
mortality awareness at a distance by circumventing existential issues. Through 
focusing merely on the direct material aspect of human experience, he ignores the 
intangible and systemic forces of destruction which drive contemporary culture. The 
decline of physical violence does not mean that the potential for destruction has 
lessened. Different, more obscure forms of violence with greater destructive power 
run as an undercurrent through our culture, and it is these undercurrents that I focus 
attention on in this thesis. 
I suggest we are witnessing a transformative shift away from violence as 
physical force that inflicts damage towards a form of violence that is different in its 
expression. As Michel Foucault (1975) argues, modernity is inseparable from the 
establishment of new forms of power and domination. Foucault rejects the ideology 
of the Enlightenment as evolutionary and progressive and the idea that knowledge 
necessarily entails intellectual liberation. For Foucault, knowledge is a power 
struggle in which institutions and governments aim to control and dominate 
individuals. In Discipline and punish (1975), he addresses the infiltration of systems 
of discipline and surveillance in all spheres of life through social reforms, legislation, 
and the manipulation of discourses. This “disciplinary power”, he argues, executes 
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hidden, monotonous, and invisible forces that at their core have the task to monitor, 
observe, and record the individual. For Foucault, the institutionalized demand to 
discipline the body and regulate desires and emotions is part of the rationalization of 
culture, evident in a variety of modern institutions such as mental asylums, schools, 
hospitals, the military and, of course, secret services. The policing of discourse by 
those in power is central to modern society, because it is through these very 
discourses that power relations are shaped and that the individual relates to a certain 
group or society in general. 
In late modernity, however, global capitalistic forces are interested in 
individuals who are predominantly consumers. The ever-evolving range of goods and 
technological advances not only urges people to keep up with the latest 
developments, but also seduces them to fulfil their unconscious desires. Take the 
company Apple, for example. Apple not only dominates the market due to clever 
marketing ploys, but also is notorious for its technical superiority, beautiful 
aesthetics, and constant reinvention of its gadgets. The excitement of owning and 
upgrading a new Apple device, however, occludes the back stories of those who 
manufacture the goods or extract the needed resources for production. Some of the 
important metals needed for manufacturing computers and mobile phones are so-
called conflict minerals that fuel the violence and destruction in central Africa. Yet 
the majority of people in the West remain oblivious to these issues and keep 
spending. Taking into account the deadliness and destructiveness of modern global 
capitalism and the way in which this status quo is maintained through the 
cooperation, ignorance, and spending power of the individual, one can point towards 
a symbolic death drive in its cultural expression. This deadly drive is executed 
through individual desire. 
The psychoanalytic theory of the death drive offers an explanatory framework 
for understanding the ambivalent role of death and violence in modernity. Contrary 
to Sigmund Freud’s early assumption that humans follow the lead of pleasure, or a 
so-called life force, in the essay Beyond the pleasure principle (1920), he argues that 
the death drive has the potential to hold a grip on our psyche and to express itself in 
repetitions of painful experiences and manifestations of emotional misery, as well as 
death, carnage, and destruction. The idea that a death drive could be innate within the 
individual was, and still is, very controversial. Yet, as Freud so rightly observes, the 
cultural realities, the belief systems, and the emotional environments of the modern 
world, in which individuals are immersed, are replete with death and destruction. In 
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Herbert Marcuse’s (1962 [1955]) post-Freudian death drive theory, he develops the 
concept of Thanatos as a destructive force meshed within our society. The building 
and maintaining of civilization prohibit following the lead of pleasure (or Eros), and 
thus lead to its repression, for the sake of prevalent cultural parameters. This creates 
a conflicted, alienated individual who is now forced to adhere to the creed of social 
progress, which gives way to socio-pathologic tendencies within society — the work 
of Thanatos. 
 
Death and consumption 
 
The modern individual, under the weight of our historical inheritance, finds him or 
herself deeply intertwined with capitalism, which corresponds directly to the modern 
idea of a self. Zygmunt Bauman (2007) argues that we live in a time when the 
pleasure principle is married to the reality principle, and, not unlike Foucault, he 
suggests that human desires are aligned with capitalistic demands and practices, 
which aim at the control of resources and individuals by economic and institutional 
forces, as well as control over the “self” and the body on an individual level. People 
are driven by consumer creeds that channel into the contemporary obsession with 
designing an identity that is preoccupied with fulfilling material desires which 
correspond to a modern sense of self (individualism). Bauman (1992) labels these 
mechanisms “immortality strategies”, which are methods of emotional survival that 
extend the meaning of an individual’s life beyond the individual self. In other words, 
it is a desperate attempt to give life meaning, while keeping mortality awareness at a 
distance, since it is an impossibility to define death in a secularized world.  
The undercurrent of violence or aggression within this modern consumerist 
creed has become the foundation of our contemporary culture and has now turned 
towards the planet and the self (Bauman 2007). The contemporary sense of self is 
maintained, permeated, fixated on, but also corroded and threatened by, these 
materialistic desires. I argue in this thesis that death denial coupled with materialism 
has taken over the subliminal manipulation of the individual, whose choices now fall 
in line with modern capitalistic practices.  
Erich Fromm (1973) conceived of malignant aggression as a form of 
necrophilia. In this thesis, I extend Fromm’s concept to understand mindless 
consumerism as at the base of what I call the necrophile self, since modern forms of 
material worship and human ambition can be seen as infatuation with dead things. 
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Thus, this kind of modern cultural necrophilia is a form of carnage, an attachment to 
modern control fantasies, disguised as a joyful carnival on the glossy backdrop of 
contemporary Western materialism. Consumer necrophilia is our prevalent death 
drive — the ultimate immortality strategy that marginalizes any authentic awareness 
of our mortality.  
 
Death and the media 
 
This development also reverberates within the contemporary media industry and an 
audience that is willing to be entertained by violence and gore. If, as Pinker argues, 
the immediate realities of war have been forgotten by the post-world-war 
generations, and if the threat of the Cold War evaporated with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, a proliferation of graphic images of violence has evolved as deadly conflict has 
retreated. In this thesis, I suggest that our contemporary relations with death and 
violence are more complex than many theorists allow. There is something more 
going on than the lack of traditional strategies for dealing with death. Yes, we lack 
comforting words for the ill, dying, and bereaved, or even comforting strategies for 
our own mourning. However, beyond this apparent lack of cultural rituals around 
death, a parallel curiosity has emerged. Modern life reveals a lust for blood and gore. 
Television channels are flooded with forensic teams analysing body parts, zombies 
and vampires munch on fresh human flesh, and bodies are tortured and blown apart. 
In action movies, thousands of people die, to be viewed in minute detail. Computer 
games invite their players to mutilate and shoot the heads off their opponents. The 
graphic intensity of violent death has never been so overwhelmingly real, nor has 
there ever been so much torture, bloodshed, or body parts scattered around for our 
entertainment.  
The author Kate Berridge captures this paradoxical relationship with death in 
her book Vigor mortis (2001). She notices: 
 
As in the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, we collaborate in the 
illusion of life without death, we suppress the instinct to expose the 
myth of invincibility. We collude and deny: carpe diem, not memento 
mori. We play our part in the elaborate hoax. We witness all manner 
of death as entertainment, as sound bites and soap opera, as a shoot-up 
computer game and a shoot-out in a movie, all conning us that we are 
getting up close to death, when in reality we have never been further 
away. Television is the main medium which delivers this paradoxical 
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perception of seeing things close up from a distance — an unreal 
reality. (Berridge 2001: 5) 
 
She also observes the clash between the private experience and public 
representations of death: 
 
This interplay between private and public experience confers a false 
sense that we are sharing the drama of death in other people’s lives, 
while in reality we are completely insulated from it. The zoom lens 
focusing in on relatives visiting the scene of the rail crash, interviews 
with body recovery teams, close-ups of the teddy bear shrine impart 
illusory intimacy. Proximity to impersonal experiences of death co-
exists with distance from personal experience. For although dramatic 
death defines the news and pretend death comprises an increasingly 
significant part of popular culture, the social context for discussion 
and consideration of death has eroded. Death no longer has a place in 
everyday life. In real life we pretend that death does not exist. 
(Berridge 2001: 5) 
 
While I agree with her statement regarding the schism between the private and public 
handling of death, stating that death no longer has a place in everyday life does not 
quite catch the current phenomenon of violence and death representations in mass 
media. In this image-obsessed culture, media entertainment is becoming increasingly 
violent and gory. The Parents Television Council (PTC), a US organization that is 
concerned about children being exposed to violent television entertainment, claims 
that between 1998 and 2006 violence increased during prime time by up to 167 per 
cent (PTC 2007: 1). The group issued a report in 2007 that traced the increase in 
representations of violence on US television.1 The conclusions of this study are 
alarming: 
 
• Nearly half (49%) of all episodes airing during the study period contained at 
least one instance of violence. 
• 56 per cent of all violence on prime time network television during the 2005–
2006 season was person-on-person violence. 
                                                
1 Their methodology was to analyse “prime time* entertainment programs on the major [US] 
broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC, UPN and the WB) from the first two 
weeks of the November, February and May sweeps during the 2003–2004, 2004–2005, and 
2005–2006 television seasons for a total of 1,187.5 programming hours. Television 




• During the 8:00 pm time slot, 66 per cent of violent scenes depicted a death. 
During the 9:00 and 10:00 pm time slots 68 per cent of violent scenes 
depicted a death. 
• Across the board, 54 per cent of violent scenes contained either a depiction of 
death (13%) or an implied death (41%) during the 2005–06 season. 
 
In their summation:  
 
Instead of popularity, the mechanisms of global marketing drive 
televised violence. Producers for global markets look for a dramatic 
formula that needs no translation, speaks “action” in any language, fits 
every culture. That formula is violence ... (PTC 2007: 14)  
 
There is another noteworthy development that creates a paradox in the face of 
increasing media violence for entertainment. In the past, newspapers published 
pictures of war and imminent death, while now the public feels uneasy about viewing 
such pictures (Zelizer 2010). Interestingly, this new cultural taboo has co-emerged 
with the easy availability of gruesome pictures, thanks to the fast development of 
modern technology. Through the vast spread of smartphones, quality pictures and 
videos can be made during any situation. Easy access to the Internet allows 
individuals to share their media content with the world immediately and without 
hesitation. It has become easier than ever to come across media containing real-world 
violence and death through the Internet. 
Thomas Macho observes that denial already consists of the return of the denied 
object. He argues in Die Neue Sichtbarkeit des Todes (2007) that, in the face of the 
increasing frequency of graphic violence, we can no longer talk about a denial of 
death. Does this mean that death has returned into our consciousness, or rather that 
the invisibility of death finds its completion with our consumption of it? I use the 
word consumption because it implies a zombie-like consumer culture in which the 
entertainment industry is a major agent. It implies the power of distraction used by 
the machinery of capitalism in the quest for profits. It might also imply that we feed 
on death in order to fill an existential hole we dare not face.  
This thesis seeks to explore the following: why is it that, in a time in which 
deadly violence is in decline and life expectancies are on the rise, a chasm has 
opened between the private experience of death and dying and a visual excess of 
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violence and death in popular media? This thesis explores this schism of death and 
its impact on our sense of self in contemporary society. 
In this thesis I ask: how do we (individuals in Western society) approach death, 
and how is the contemporary self intertwined with and affected by death? Could it be 
that the schism of death is generating a self that, due to his/her historical 
development, represents a fertile ground for the death drive to remain anchored in 
modern culture? The constant reciprocity of the anxious self and a death-denying 
society creates a status quo in which the absence of mortality contemplation 
accelerates the generation of meaning through materialism without touching the 
existential ground of our mortality and self-destruction. In this thesis I will argue that 
the schism of death produces a necrophile self. By this, I mean a self that is 
constituted by the inability to think about death coupled with an obsessional 
relationship to death. Thus, our sense of self is constituted by the very thing we deny 
and most fear. In some ways death (deadness) becomes us. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
When I talk of death and dying in this thesis, I am not only referring to the general 
definition of death as the “end of life” (‘Death’ 2017a) or more elaborately “the act 
of dying; […]; the total and permanent cessation of all the vital functions of an 
organism” (‘Death’ 2017b) as some common online dictionaries define it. I am also 
referring to the underlying, and more or less consciously acknowledged, existential 
angst which accompanies death awareness within the individual. Death illiteracy, a 
term coined by Kerrie Noonan, director and cofounder of the GroundSwell Project 
(2017) (an initiative to change the negative attitude towards death), highlights the 
contemporary failure to see death as an inevitable social process (Noonan, Horsfall, 
Leonard & Rosenberg 2016). In this thesis, I use the words death, dying, and 
mortality interchangeably and treat them as an existential issue in which the 
individual struggles with accepting mortality and also navigates the social detritus of 
a death-denying culture. 
My approach in this thesis is heuristically informed through the critical 
interpretation of the set problem through psychoanalysis, especially the theory of the 
death drive and its various interpretations. In order to dissect the various layers of 
contemporary madness, the psychoanalytic concept of the death drive presents itself 
as a valuable analytic tool. This helps to unravel the intangible forces that sit behind 
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the facades of our consumer culture that is obsessed with the imaginary of youth, 
beauty, and power. The idea of the necrophile self is my extension of the death drive 
theory. The necrophile self involuntarily and perpetually replicates death denial and 
its excesses in its negative cultural manifestations. 
I rely on existing data from various studies and scholarly discussions regarding 
the central problem and also draw from past experiences and memories of my time as 
an aged care worker and palliative care volunteer. With this, I hope to enhance an 
understanding of a complex area through discussing various ideas and concepts from 
sociology, psychoanalysis, palliative care, and through examples drawn from media 
and art. 
In the first chapter I introduce the most relevant discussions about death in the 
social sciences. I begin by looking at Phillipe Ariés’ historical account of changing 
attitudes towards death and dying. The discussion then moves to various scholars 
who claim that we are living in a death-denying or stigmatizing environment. I also 
discuss the current situations of death in institutions, attitudes towards grieving, and 
Zygmunt Bauman’s idea of immortality strategies, all of which are central to my 
work.  
Chapter 2 introduces the death drive theory in a historical framework and 
explores how psychoanalytic thinkers have further developed Freud’s ideas. I address 
how the self is driven to death and strategies for coping from a psychoanalytic point 
of view. I begin by discussing Freud, who introduced the idea of the death drive, and 
move on to thinkers such as Melanie Klein and the contemporary Otto Kernberg, 
who use and advance Freud’s concept. Importantly, I discuss Herbert Marcuse and 
Erich Fromm, who developed an analysis of the cultural repercussions of the death 
drive lodged within the social realm.  
Chapter 3 deepens the understanding of the death drive theory as an analytic 
tool for contemporary issues. Capitalism is able to maintain this all-encompassing 
influence, because it provides many modes of distraction and excitement for the 
death-anxious individual. In order to explain why consumerism is almost 
inescapable, I draw on Lacanian theory and Lacanian thinkers such as Julia Kristeva 
and Slavoj Žižek. This helps to explore how desire, as the very core of our being, 
constitutes an individual caught in a perpetual flux of attempting to still this 
yearning. Like a modern Sisyphus, people of the West are burdened by the endless 
loop of accomplishing the impossible, a motion which grinds away at freedom, 
health, and the health of the planet. The only crack in this loop is the uncanny, a 
 
 12 
reminder that another reality exists in which our disdained vulnerability shows its 
face through nightmarish encounters. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss how ideas of the self are constituted by historic forces 
and how the relationship between the individual and contemporary consumerism 
feeds into denial of, as well as obsession over, death. The psychoanalytic work I have 
laid out in the previous chapters highlights the individual’s bottomless desire and 
how it has become hijacked by modern modes of consumerism. The reciprocity 
between a death-denying consumer society and the psychic constitution of the 
individual causes deadness at the human centre, in which the vulnerability of a 
mortal human life has no space to unfold. I call this the necrophile self. 
Through an examination of various art works, exhibitions and media drawn 
from news and entertainment sources, I illuminate how the schism of death comes to 
be represented in these cultural forms. In Chapter 5, I discuss how the news and 
entertainment media associates death and dying with violence — a symptom of the 
current death illiteracy and cultural necrophilia. 
In Chapter 6, I discuss artists who work with the materiality of death ⎯ the 
abjection of the dead body. Their confrontational approach aims to loosen the taboo 
of what Kristeva calls the abject. In contrast, I also discuss artists whose work I 
interpret as occluding mortality, and thus as representing the necrophile self and the 
death illiteracy of our time. 
In the last chapter, I discuss how social institutions represent the cultural 
mismanagement of existential questions. Personal, cultural, and institutional death 
illiteracy has tremendous negative consequences for the individual. However, a very 
different approach to death and dying is emerging, which is capable of questioning 
modern creeds and allowing a needed space for vulnerability, grief, and sadness. 
Chapter 7 offers a look into this environment, which represents a stark contrast to a 
culture of death denial and looks directly up from the bottom of the abyss to seek 





Theories on death  
 
Denial versus anticipation: contemporary attitudes towards death 
 
This chapter will address the central issue of the thesis ⎯ the contemporary denial of 
death. Many scholars seem to agree that the current cultural sentiment towards death 
involves struggle and denial. First, I will discuss the Philippe Ariès’ classic account 
of how the denial of death emerged historically, and consider how sociologist Allan 
Kellehear’s view of death denial differs from prominent death researchers such as 
Ariès, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and Norbert Elias. Kellehear argues that we are not 
dealing with an issue of denial, but rather of stigmatization. Finally, I will discuss 
Ernest Becker and Zygmunt Bauman’s psychoanalytically informed theories that the 
denial of death is culture building, because it keeps individual mortality anxieties at 
bay and, at the same time, leaves the doorway open for pathological manifestations 
of death repression. 
 
A brief historical overview 
 
Philippe Ariès is one of the most cited scholars in debates concerning historical 
transformations in relation to death. In Western attitudes towards death (1974) and 
his later more comprehensive study, The hour of our death (1981 [1977]), he 
conceptualizes historical transformations in attitudes to death into four key concepts 
or epochs: tamed death, the death of self, the death of others, and finally the denial of 
death. Ariès describes “tamed death” as the prevalent mode of acceptance of fate that 
became dominant during the humanist Renaissance in the late 1400s. In Ariès thesis, 
a dominant mode of anticipating death can be identified for certain timeframes, 
although different ways of dealing with mortality often arise simultaneously and not 
in a linear fashion. He considers the literature of these centuries to present his 
argument that, in the past, people had a strong sense of when their death neared — a 
very common theme in literature. He also stresses the importance of this knowledge, 
because, at that time, one had to prepare for the end upon realizing that death was 
pending. Literary accounts commonly present the dying person spending the last 
hours on their deathbed, but this must not be interpreted as a passive state of 
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existence. The end of life for a person was a public ceremony with children present, 
in a ritual organized by the dying person herself (Ariès 1974: 11). Death was familiar 
and near, an attitude that lasted until the nineteenth century. 
Religious and spiritual beliefs played a fundamental role in the life of an 
individual. The immortal soul was at the centre of the personality or of individuality 
itself. The soul was understood to be safe from harm after the demise of the mortal 
body. Ariès refers to this as a “tamed” death, in that the anticipation of mortality was 
accompanied by the belief in a peaceful and subdued afterlife. This spiritual 
conviction helped people surrender to their fate. Death was tame in the sense that 
violations of routine through plagues, wars, and floods were perceived as normal, 
immutable, and inescapable. Zygmunt Bauman makes a similar observation in 
Mortality, immortality and other life strategies (1992). Before the Age of Reason, he 
argues, death was neither a secret nor an extraordinary event. It was present and 
unavoidable, and children were introduced to death’s ubiquity from an early age. 
Death was integrated into daily life. Identities were given, “everything was stuck to 
its place in the great chain of being and things ran their course by themselves” 
(Bauman 1992: 97). Or to put Ariès’ observation into a nutshell: tamed death, or the 
anticipation of mortality, is the oldest death there is, and people adapted to this fact, 
because it was “out of human control” (Ariès 1981: 29). 
Ariès points out that subtle changes in the perception of this traditional 
familiarity with death can be traced as far back as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
even before “tamed death” took hold as people’s prevalent mode of anticipating 
death. He stresses that this traditional familiarity with death implied a “collective 
notion of destiny” or, to quote him further:  
 
Familiarity with death is a form of acceptance which can be both 
naive, in day-to-day affairs, and learned, in astrological speculations. 
In death man encountered one of the great laws of the species, and 
he had no thought of escaping it or glorifying it. He merely accepted it 
with just the proper amount of solemnity due one of the important 
thresholds which each generation always had to cross. (Ariès 1974: 
28) 
 
During the twelfth to fifteenth centuries an important development in the individual’s 
perception of their environment and the role they played within it, took place; the 
individual started to gain a heightened sense of their biography. In The hour of our 
death, he emphasizes that, by looking at the history of burial practices, one can 
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observe a shift from anonymity towards the “desire to be oneself” or “the discovery 
of the individual, the discovery, at the hour of our death, of one’s own identity, one’s 
personal biography, in this world as in the next” (Ariès 1981: 293). During these 
centuries, more emphasis was placed on the idea of a Last Judgment Day, coinciding 
with the emergence of a passionate attachment to private possessions, supporting a 
heightened awareness of one’s individuality (Ariès 1974: 46). A person would no 
longer succumb to the collective destiny of the species, but “in the mirror of his own 
death each man would discover the secret of his individuality” (Ariès 1974: 51). 
Kellehear makes similar historical observations to Ariès. In his book A social 
history of dying (2007), he focuses on historical and archaeological material and 
texts, and points out that our experiences of dying have gone through tremendous 
changes over the course of human history. According to Kellehear (2007: 35), in the 
Stone Age death must have been an “otherworldly journey” since archaeological 
findings indicate that burial practices were based on religious beliefs about the 
afterlife. In the unpredictable world of the hunter and gatherer, death was sudden and 
unexpected. Reflection on mortality, much less preparing for one’s death, was out of 
the question. Dying was a displaced experience, an experience shifted into an 
afterlife and out of the individual’s control. One’s own dying became the task of 
other people and hence dispersed into the broader group’s identity. One could 
recognize death, but not anticipate it (Kellehear 2007: 25ff). 
Ever since humankind settled down and pursued agriculture, death increasingly 
arrived in the form of infectious diseases, famines, and warfare. As a result, so 
Kellehear argues, death became more predictable, leading to a new rapport with 
death and the evolution of a “participating self”. Kellehear’s idea of a “participating 
self” is very similar to Ariès’ notion of “tamed death”; the terminally ill person is in 
charge of the death ritual and engages in preparations for their own death, always in 
cooperation with family and community. This new awareness was seen as creating a 
“good death”. In Kellehear’s words the otherworldly journey starts in life itself and 
dying becomes “a living thing in this world” (2007: 86). Of course, the flipside of 
this development is the “bad death” which hits unawares, leaving no chance to make 
any preparation. In this sense, Kellehear’s “good death” expresses a similar idea to 
Ariès’ “tamed death”. 
What are the social dynamics that pushed death into our mental outskirts? A 
number of scholars argue that the eighteenth century brought forth a new attitude 
towards death. As Zygmunt Bauman aptly expresses it, death was “conceived as a 
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major scandal of the whole human adventure” (1992: 133). From the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, death had a new emphasis, which Ariès characterizes as the 
“death of the other”. With the dawn of Romanticism, death was embellished by 
melancholy and became admirable in its beauty; mourning took on an air of 
exaggeration. Suddenly, the death of the other became more feared than one’s own 
death (Ariès 1974: 68). This unwillingness to accept the demise of a loved one 
formed the basis of a new veneration, or cult, of the dead. In an era of increasing 
secularization, this cultivation of the memory of a loved one converged with the 
emergence of new beliefs concerning immortality that were no longer anchored in 
the religious belief in an afterlife. A new intolerance of death (of the other) took 
away the courage of friends and relatives to engage open heartedly with a terminally 
ill person’s condition. This new attitude soon led to another development, a major 
characteristic of modernity. In Ariès words: 
 
One must avoid, no longer for the sake of the dying person, but for 
society’s sake, for the sake of those close to the dying person — the 
disturbance and the overly strong and unbearable emotion caused by 
the ugliness of dying and by the very presence of death in the midst of 
a happy life, for it is henceforth given that life is always happy or 
should always seem to be so. (Ariès 1974: 87) 
 
Kellehear concurs with Ariès’ observation of a new intolerance towards death. 
According to him, with the Industrial Revolution, and the emergence of the middle 
classes, came the gentrification of the “good death”. The attitude that death was a 
natural event in life was replaced with anxiety and fear of death. However, differing 
from Ariès Ariès argument, in Kellehear’s account, neither the beauty of death nor a 
veneration or cult of the dead played a role in this process. Instead, he stresses that 
witnessing the agony of the dying brought on this shift. The loss of one’s dignity 
during a slow process of painful dying was at the core of the urban middle-class 
anxiety. In Kellehear’s words: 
 
Dying, from the perspective of the anxious middle classes, could no 
longer be viewed as “good” if the severity of suffering took every 
dignity from one before the end, if one lost some of the most 
important values integral to one’s identity: personal control, the ability 
to think and choose, even to arrange one’s affairs with a clear mind. 




The idea of a “good death” was replaced with the idea of a “well-managed death” in 
which professions such as official authorities and lawyers played a major role. The 
personal relationships of once tight-knit communities shifted to interactions that, in 
their nature, were more professional and reserved. Medical personnel became a part 
of the dying process; hence, awareness of death and the processes of dealing with it 
were removed bit by bit from the everyday life of the urban middle classes. Dying 
became increasingly privatized and sequestered from community involvement. An 
“individualist model” of the “good death” emerged in which the dying person 
assumed as much control as possible over their own death, in order to please their 
own individual desires. The power of the dying could now be translated into their 
spending capacity, which became their ability to manage a personal crisis through 
paying for services like insurance. In Kellehear’s words:  
 
Dying in hunter-gatherer societies was viewed as “unlucky”, 
malevolent or perhaps “mercifully quick” deaths for their 
communities. And among settler societies dying was viewed as 
morally “good” or “bad” for both individuals and communities. But 
among the urban middle classes all these moral prescriptions and 
judgments were transferred to themselves as individuals alone. ... 
Well-managed dying, then, is an individualist model of the good death 
forged and shaped by the equally individualist and occupationally 
specialised lifestyles of urban middle-class elites. (Kellehear 2007: 
152) 
 
Kellehear also emphasizes that with urbanization, increasing wealth, social power, 
education, and secularization, the belief in an afterlife was called into question. 
Death could no longer be a “good death”; it had become senseless, savage, 
incomprehensible, and thus seen as a threat. Similar to Ariès, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross 
noted the shifting attitudes in dealing with death. In On death and dying, she points 
out that, in the middle of the last century, the decline of religious imagination meant 
that suffering lost its meaning (Kübler-Ross 1976: 14). Death had to be brought 
under human control; it was no longer tame, and it had to be tamed. 
In the mid-twentieth century, death became largely anonymous, and dying 
people were often isolated from the rest of the society. More precisely, the dying 
were removed from everyday experience and taken into medical institutions like 
hospitals and nursing homes (Aiken 2001: 16). In pre-industrial societies, people 
removed themselves from contact with the dying individual after their death; in 
contemporary society, people retire before the individual dies, leaving the dying 
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person’s fate in the hands of medical personnel and specialized technologies. That 
which was once the domain of the church had now become the domain of medicine. 
Through this transition, so Elisabeth Kübler-Ross argues, dying lost its human 
dimension, and dealing with the chronically and terminally ill became mechanized, 
depersonalized, and dehumanized, a development that probably was especially felt 
after the Second World War (Kübler-Ross 1976: 12; Hunt 2005: 208).  
Contemporary mourning practices provide an example of this shift towards a 
severe unease in dealing with death. The time given for mourning a deceased relative 
has drastically diminished in the last century. Now, in the corporate reality of the 
United States, workers are given a mere 3 days of paid bereavement leave in most 
states, not enough to time for the bureaucracy and logistics involved in organizing 
and attending a funeral (Tahmincioglu 2008). Plus it is hard to imagine the emotional 
constraints that individuals suffer, grieving a death under these time constraints. This 
is not enough time to contemplate the personal meaning of somebody’s death or of 
death’s meaning within society, in a broader sense. It is not enough time to mourn, 
come back to one’s senses, or cope with one’s own mortality anxiety. Mourning is a 
great challenge since the bereaved have to deal with silence around the loss, or 
worse, are expected to carry on as if the death has never happened. For the mourner, 
a chasm opens between the internal experience of loss and an (work) environment in 
which death and grief does not have a place. 
Research about grief in contemporary society gives an interesting insight into 
how contemporary coping mechanisms support the idea of a culture of death denial. 
The death of the beloved other always provokes thoughts about one’s own mortality 
and the shaping of one’s belief systems. In Continuing bonds (1996), Klass, 
Silverman, and Nickman take a closer look at various studies about the subject of 
mourning. They argue that a meaningful life is achieved when there are meaningful 
bonds, intimacy, and a creative outlet. At worst, death can destroy these bonds we 
have with other people; at best, it redefines relationships with the deceased and 
provokes a transformation of one’s own identity. A daughter becomes an orphan; a 
husband becomes a widower. With these transformations, shifts within the emotional 
and psychological landscape emerge. Studies on grief and mourning are rich sources 
of insight into how much death shapes our attitudes and us. They also help with 





When we discuss the nature of the resolution of grief, we are at the 
core of the most basic questions about what it means to be human, for 
the meaning of the resolution of grief is tied to the meanings of bonds 
with significant people in our lives, the meaning of our membership in 
family and community, and the meaning we ascribe in our individual 
lives in the face of absolute proof of our own mortality. (1996: 22)  
 
Silverman and Klass stress that the twentieth-century model of grief was based on 
the belief that successful mourning means disengagement from the deceased and the 
shared past. To continue to maintain a relationship with the dead, they suggest, came 
to be seen as a form of pathology, hindering the individual’s ability to form new 
attachments. However, the researchers offer an alternative view centring on the idea 
of a continuous relationship with the deceased person. From their perspective, bonds 
with the deceased are maintained through memorializing and remembering, as well 
as a heightened awareness of a kind of everyday presence of the deceased that leaps 
into the inner life, as well as into outside interactions. 
Silverman and Klass suggest that the modern definition of grief seems to be 
aligned with predominant attitudes towards death. Here again, we find the idea of a 
death that needs to be tamed, and concurrently a loss that needs to be rationalized 
and worked through in order to get on with life (Silverman and Klass 1996: 3). They 
argue that people’s coping strategies indicate an actual adjustment or the anticipation 
of loss and death; thus, there is no necessity to cut the bonds of a former life. The 
experience of being a mother, daughter, and wife will not vanish with the loss of a 
beloved one; the survivors will always remain in a significant relationship with the 
deceased. Still, the death of a beloved involves a complex continuation and change in 
a person’s identity, because, additionally and predominantly, one becomes something 
else, too. Against the background of heightened mortality awareness, this 
anticipation of death in the shape of continuing bonds with the deceased is not only a 
transformation of a former relationship and thus one’s former identity, it also 
involves overcoming death anxiety and loss through the sincere anticipation of death. 
However, there are developments that suggest that these twentieth-century 
death attitudes are transforming in late modernity. People are increasingly beginning 
to interact with death and dying more personally through the gradual rise in home 
deaths. For a long time, the dying were entrusted to the care of institutions, but now 
this trend is reversing. Studies show that in Western countries the majority of people 
(64–84% depending on which country), when faced with their mortality (due to age, 
illness, or caring for a sick relative), prefer dying at home instead of dying in 
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institutions (Thönnes and Jakoby 2011; Gomes et al. 2012; van der Heide et al. 
2007). The Cicely Saunders Institute at King’s College conducted an extensive 
population survey of 9344 participants from England, Flanders, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. They found that almost two thirds of people have a 
strong wish to die at home if they should become terminally ill (Gomes et al. 2012). 
Gomes et al. argue that this development is influenced by an increased interest in 
having control over end-of-life decisions. People hope to be dying in their preferred 
place; they prioritize a positive attitude towards death and emphasize the 
involvement of family members in the case of incapacity to make their own 
decisions. Further, the preference for home death becomes more important for the 
oldest age cohort (Gomes et al. 2012: 2011). In another study undertaken in Britain, 
Gomes and her team observed a slow but steady increase in the numbers of deaths at 
home, from 18.3 per cent in 2004 to 20.8 per cent in 2010, a trend that is also 
observable in the United States and Canada (Gomes, Calanzani, & Higginson 2012: 
1). 
 
Death as stigma 
 
So do we anticipate death after all? During my research for this thesis, I have 
observed a shift towards an open acknowledgement of death in the form of websites 
or death cafes where people get together to talk about all things related to mortality 
(e.g. Death Cafe 2017). Also, very personal accounts of people talking about their 
loss and grief, and terminally ill people philosophizing about their end of life seem to 
have become more frequent in various media outlets (Richell 2015). Recently, Oliver 
Sacks (2015) wrote an article for the New York Times in which he disclosed that he 
had terminal cancer. Other well-known people who have recently spoken publicly 
about their mortality include Christopher Hitchens, Betty Churcher and Clive James. 
While one can certainly argue that these are endeavours embracing end-of-life issues, 
they are still breaching the norm of a death-denying culture.2 
Allan Kellehear argues that death was always anticipated and opposes the 
definition of death as radically opposed to life. Historically speaking, death has been 
a transformation and a continuation of life and, therefore, Kellehear doubts that death 
imposes such a big threat to people. He stresses that historically death was 
                                                
2 For media coverage of death cafes, see: Death Cafe (2017), Prichep (2013), Lloyd (2013), 
and Span (2013). 
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anticipated through religious traditions, and this mindset still prevails, even 
unconsciously (Kellehear 2007: 55). He argues: 
 
What produces more activity from a person: anticipation or 
ignorance? What produces greater anxiety in a person: anticipation or 
denial and ignorance? Can a people, any people, remain uninterested, 
complacent or passive in the face of a known threat that they have 
witnessed time and again? Does death move people? 
The answer to all these questions is that death motivates and 
activates people like little else because historically biological death 
has been viewed as no death at all, but rather, the most complicated 
and challenging part of living. [...] I have suggested that the challenge 
of anticipation might logically have played a crucial role in human 
living and dying by generating the following possible defensive 
anticipatory responses: a desire to predict the coming of death; the 
desire to ward it off; the desire to identify the risks of encountering it. 
(Kellehear 2007: 47) 
 
What could Kellehear mean by “defensive anticipatory responses”, and how does 
this construct differ from the previously discussed issue of death denial in 
modernity? Surprisingly, Kellehear’s main critique is directed against psychoanalytic 
thinking about death and mortality. Kellehear points out that followers of the 
psychoanalytic approach (e.g. Zygmunt Baumann and Ernest Becker) have little or 
no empirical support for their theory, since the idea of an unconsciously repressed 
fear of death is inaccessible to empirical investigation. Further, they also fail to 
acknowledge societies’ religious attempts to come to terms with human mortality 
(Kellehear 2007: 55–8). In Kellehear’s understanding, psychoanalysts are dismissive 
of historical, sociological, ethnographical, and biographical approaches to death, and 
the data these methods generate. He argues that the main psychoanalytic agenda is 
rational, materialist, and logical, and therefore incapable of grasping the existential 
side of mortality. I find Kellehear’s suspicion of psychoanalysts unfounded, 
especially since he dismisses the fact that psychoanalysts, such as Freud, Lacan, and 
Kristeva, came to their conclusions through working closely with patients. 
Psychoanalytic practice has always had an intense engagement with the emotional 
impact social constraints have on the individual. I argue throughout this thesis that 
psychoanalytic thinking is an exemplary tool to deepen the understanding of the 
contemporary struggle with mortality. As we will see, the modern assumption that 
death is outstandingly unnatural — a puzzle that one is unable to piece together — 
still lingers. The modern paradigm focuses on materialism, progress, and mastery 
over the unpredictable, the unavoidable, the unexpected, and the unknown. But as 
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death cannot be overpowered, it marks a moment of modernity’s failed promises, 
thus threatening everything modernity stands for. The denial of death is a logical, 
albeit desperate, answer to the landscape of modern expectations and hopes, and 
psychoanalysis can shed light on how fantasies of immortality sustain modern 
subjects. 
Religious study professor Oliver Krüger (2007) gives an extreme example of 
this development in the form of cryonics. The members of cryonic societies preserve 
their bodies after death — or, as a cheaper alternative, only their heads — at very 
low temperatures. They hope to be resurrected — which they believe is possible as 
long as the brain, the consciousness-producing machine and the seat of their selves 
and personality, is intact ⎯ in a time when science has advanced to full mastery over 
life and death (Cryonics Society 2012). They hope that any damage that has occurred 
during life (and storage) will be erased, and the disease that killed them in the first 
place will no longer have a place in their glorious future. They hope to once again be 
among their human fellows, no matter whether this scientific progress happens in ten 
years or a hundred thousand. (It is interesting to note that cryonics enthusiasts are 
mostly male atheists with a high rate of death anxiety (Krüger 2007).) 
Kellehear does, however, put forward an insightful thesis on the relationship 
between death denial and stigma. Kellehear’s modern take on the concept of stigma 
draws on Talcott Parsons’ theorization of the concept. For Parsons, illness does not 
only have mental-physical components, but also has an institutionalized, systemic 
side. The “sick role” is a role of deviance, so Parsons argues, because it interrupts 
social norms and conventions. In his words: 
 
I should regard deviance and social control as phenomena concerned 
with the integrative problems of a social system. Illness we may speak 
of as, at least in one primary aspect, an impairment of the sick 
person’s integration in solidary relationships with others, in family, 
job, and many other contexts. Seen in this perspective, therapy may be 
interpreted to be predominantly a reintegrative process. (Parsons 
1975: 260) 
 
Kellehear addresses the stigma surrounding the conditions of aging and AIDS/HIV, 
which kills people of any age cohort. Anticipation of death is transformed into an act 
of judgement of peoples’ lifestyles regarding a “good death” (implying a quick, 
uncomplicated death in old age), and its connection to modern values and morality. 
Kellehear stresses that stigmatizing the dying is rooted in the idea that, if one has not 
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lived one’s life properly (exercising, healthy diet, positive thinking, etc.), debilitating 
disease will occur, which reflects a modern attitude in which people are blamed for 
the state of their health. The social focus on the power of youth, well-being, and 
beauty serves as a mechanism to push death farther out of consciousness. The death 
of old people bears no relevance to the speed and creed of the modern lifestyle. 
Furthermore, humanity is challenged by new diseases like AIDS and the issue of 
over-aging societies in the West, all of which — so argues Kellehear — come with 
the stigmatism of shame. He observes: 
 
The sheer numbers of people who now do not have “good deaths” or 
“well-managed deaths” because of age or AIDS are instead dying in 
shameful ways. The shame comes from the projected attitude and 
behaviour of younger and non-infected people on older and infected 
groups but also the internalised emotional and social responses of 
those victimised by these other people. (Kellehear 2007: 210) 
 
In Kellehear’s view, old people are not taken seriously, and contemporary obsessions 
with beauty and youth leave no place for ill, old, disabled, and declining bodies 
(when therapy as a measure of re-integration has failed, in the Parsonian sense). 
Chronic sickness and a prolongation of the process of dying make a precise 
identification of the onset of dying difficult. These factors contribute to turning dying 
into a terrifying journey tainted with stigma that leaves the dying desolate and 
desperate (Kellehear 2007: 210–11). For the dying, anxiety and shame are involved 
with the process of illness and dying, and it influences their ability to receive the care 
they need. The greatest threat to experiencing a peaceful death at home is the fear of 
burdening relatives with home care duties (van der Heide et al. 2007: 1414). 
Strong fears of death and aging throughout one’s life course are related to and 
associated with the fear of losing one’s identity and sense of control ⎯ a common 
issue for the elderly (Aiken 2001: 287). Due to medical progress and the focus on 
youth, death is seen as the climax of old age, and perceived to be natural and 
therefore supposedly less threatening to the elderly. On the other hand, death in the 
young is met with shock, because it is not part of the social narrative of a supposedly 
natural life sequence. Research demonstrates that people of old age are less afraid to 
die than young people, and they tend to be more aware of their mortality (Aiken 
2001: 287). Other studies oppose these findings. The death researcher Glennys 
Howarth, for example, stresses that a culture of death denial leaves people helpless in 
regards to knowing how to die well. Old people might be confronted with mortality, 
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but are not necessarily well equipped to deal with it. They are left to their own 
devices in dealing with their end-of-life fears and anxieties (Howarth 1998: 687). 
Both researchers agree that there is a widespread assumption in Western society that 
the elderly accept death more easily than the young. Kellehear calls this development 
the erosion of awareness of dying. He emphasizes that there is not only an erosion of 
awareness, but also an erosion of support for the dying, in the sense that nursing 
homes have become another way of institutionalizing the elderly dying. Further, 
AIDS/HIV is mostly viewed as a public health problem, which excludes a 
consideration of how to attend to those who are dying from this debilitating disease 
(Kellehear 2007: 210–11). 
 
Strategies of immortality 
 
Zygmunt Bauman is another avid defender of the concept of contemporary death 
denial. Bauman argues that, in order to stay sane on a personal level and to avoid 
breaking the continuity of everyday life, the knowledge of death must be actively 
suppressed on a collective level. Bauman stresses that it is impossible to define 
death; it is the absolute contrast to being, it is non-existence, an unimaginable, 
“hovering beyond reach of communication”, and the end of all perception (Bauman 
1992: 2). However, one can perceive the death of others, and hence get an idea of 
one’s own mortality, and thus know that everything will die. The death of others is 
shattering and painful not because it affects the continuity of one’s own perception, 
but because it forces the subject to face the void that remains after the demise of the 
other. 
Contemporary society deconstructs mortality by staging a battle against health 
problems and diseases (Bauman 1992: 9). Nowadays, when people seek immortality, 
they attempt to create a social realm of security and stability. However, the power of 
humans is limited, and therefore the unavoidable nature of human finitude implies a 
threat to the social order. This is the reason why the dying, especially, need 
bystanders, but also why people avoid everything that reminds them of their 
mortality. Modern subjects attempt to die a tame death, noiselessly and hygienically, 
leaving no trace of the connections between life and death. 
As Bauman points out — and here he concurs with Kellehear — an awareness 
of mortality is the ultimate condition of cultural creativity as such. Culture is a 
“never stopping factory of permanence” and thus — and here both scholars differ 
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fundamentally — acts as a suppression of mortality awareness. Cultural structures 
allure us into engaging in tasks and projects (making money, gathering knowledge, 
etc.) with aims and goals reaching beyond our biological existence.  
Humans have always had strategies to deal with death, mechanisms which 
Bauman (1992) and Elias (1985) define as strategies of immortality, because they are 
methods which extend the meaning of an individual’s life beyond the individual self. 
Immortality relates to surviving, to getting beyond death, to denying it. Immortality 
strategies seek to remove the sinister and horrifying significance of death. 
Immortality is something we need to build ourselves, in order not to get caught up in 
the open loop of the ontological bleakness of our mortality: “immortality is not a 
mere absence of death; it is the defiance and denial of death” (Bauman 1992: 7). 
Bauman argues that, through the gigantic project of creating our culture, we become 
God-like, living a life that soars above the fact of human finitude to contain meaning 
and purpose. Through religion, identity, and community, we can feel a part of 
something bigger than ourselves. On the other hand, this meaningfulness cannot be 
generated or maintained without suppressing the awareness of death (Bauman 1992: 
8).  
Ernest Becker gives the “strategy of immortality” a face with his concept of the 
hero system. The denial of death (1973) addresses human heroism, which he sees as 
a reflex response to the terror of death. People pursue, or at least are fundamentally 
fascinated by, heroic actions or lifestyles. Behind this fascination, Becker argues, lies 
an urge towards immortality arising from the font of narcissism. Referring to Freud’s 
theory of narcissism, he explains the urge to be a hero as a narcissistic feeling that 
everyone is expendable except ourselves (Becker 1973: 2).  
 
In man a working level of narcissism is inseparable from self-esteem, 
from a basic sense of self-worth. […] his sense of self-worth is 
constituted symbolically, his cherished narcissism feeds on symbols, 
on an abstract idea of his own worth, an idea composed of sounds, 
words, and images, in the air, in the mind, on paper. And this means, 
that man’s natural yearning for organismic activity, the pleasures of 
incorporation and expansion, can be fed limitlessly in the domain of 
symbols and so into mortality. (Becker 1973: 3) 
 
But the human unconsciousness knows neither death nor time, and therefore the 
individual is always attracted by the warm spark of the inner immortal feeling. The 




He must desperately justify himself as an object of primary value in 
the universe; he must stand out, be a hero, make the biggest possible 
contribution to world life, show that he counts more than anything or 
anyone else. […] It is still a mythical hero system in which people 
serve in order to earn a feeling of primary value, of cosmic 
specialness, of ultimate usefulness to creation, of unshakable meaning. 
(Becker 1973: 4–5)  
 
Becker further points out that “society has always been a symbolic action system, a 
structure of statuses and roles, customs and rules of behaviours, designed to serve as 
a vehicle for earthly heroism” and thereby “every society is a religion” (Becker 1973: 
4–5). Thus heroism is an issue of self-esteem that seeks affirmation and recognition 
in the outside world. Furthermore heroism is a form of ideological justification that 
allows people to face death and to go on with life, because, paradoxically, it 
transforms the human fear of death into the illusion of self-perpetuation (Becker 
1973: 217). The human trait of selfishness acts in the shadow of self-preservation, 
which sets up a tight-knit structure of heroic outlets. People not only fight to gain 
control of at least one accepted heroic role, but also to pursue an identity in the name 
of heroism (an identity which underscores one’s own superiority in comparison with 
a competitor). “We” uplift ourselves into the realms of immortality by giving “our” 
lives a meaning that might outlive death. People, according to Becker, are divided 
into winners and losers by these social ideologies. Hence, a deep gap arises on the 
sharp edge of human interdependency and heavily influences how people self-sustain 
and self-express themselves as well as relate to each other.  
The fear of death is behind all our functions, which feeds the self-preservation 
drive, but this mechanism is also pushing us away from the intensity and depth — 
and hence greatness — that mortality bestows upon our lives. Humanity faces an 
existential paradox of having a dual nature, to be half animal and half symbolic. The 
individual is within and without nature through self-consciousness. From this double 
nature arises the vital lie of the human character. So humankind not only fears death, 
we also shy away from life in contemplation of our individuation and compelling life 
experiences. Becker observes: “We might call this existential paradox the condition 
of individuality within finitude. The individual has a symbolic identity outside of 
nature, a symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life and history” (1973: 26). And 
further: “all our meanings are built into us from the outside, from dealings with 
others. This is what gives us a ‘self’ and a superego. […] and we never feel we have 
authority to offer things on our own” (Becker 1973: 48). Thus, the excessive 
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demands of this world not only challenge us to become a hero or winner ourselves; 
ironically, we also shy away from “the all-consuming appetites of others” (Becker 
1973: 53). 
Repression, Becker suggests, is a protective response to this fear of death; and 
through repression and the promise of immortality modernity has disconnected 
heroism from the nature of death (Becker 1973: 11–12). But to deny the fact of our 
mortality by adopting the illusion of security and identity, we actually make 
ourselves vulnerable. Human heroism is a blind “driveness that burns people up” 
(Becker 1973: 6) which manifests in the weak spot of modern heroism and in its 
failure to account for a profound lack of self-esteem. To nourish this unconscious 
hunger for self-esteem, humanity chooses to make life valid by creating greatness 
through sacrifices, degradation, and destruction. This creates the back door, which 




Birth and death create the cycle of life for every living thing. The modern quest of 
invincibility has not managed to break this cycle; however, it has managed to put the 
once ever-present death under a clandestine blanket of unacceptance. As outlined in 
this chapter, death was commonplace in the past and came in the form of 
encountering the dying on their deathbeds, freak accidents, violence, high child 
mortality rates, and diseases for which no cure was available. These events all had 
their place in one’s daily life trajectory while the riddles of death were scrutinized 
through the lens of religious or spiritual belief systems. Ever since the Age of 
Reason, the new weight assigned to rationality has increasingly cleansed the modern 
world of traditional and spiritual tools that once assisted in coping with the tides of 
the life cycle. Death equated with non-existence ⎯ the total annihilation of one’s life 
and accomplishments ⎯ has become an unbearable thought for most people. 
However, modernity could not keep its promise to combat death. Even though 
leftover sentiments of this modern ideal can be found in groups like those who 
believe in cryonics, who still cling to the hope of future scientific advancements 
capable of breaking the cycle of birth and death, the vast majority of modern Western 
humans have drifted into the realm of a perceived gut-wrenching powerlessness in 
the face of death.  
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So do we anticipate death or deny it? The life cycle is an archetypal truth, an 
anchoring point around which our social currents flow. If a fundamental truth, like 
death, is denied, a society will generate certain strategies or systems that occlude this 
truth. Advances in modern medicine do not make dealing with death any easier. In 
Rethinking life and death (1994), Peter Singer elaborates on new ethical approaches 
towards life and death and observes that traditional views about the sanctity of life 
need to be revised. Besides the aforementioned threats to life, the border between the 
living and the dead is blurring as a result of techno-medical pressures for continuous 
progress and development. In a less medically developed past, signs of death were 
determined by the senses, through physical traits such as coldness, rigor mortis, and 
spots on the corpse’s skin. But, over time, a growing impatience has developed in 
regard to timing the moment of death. Today, brain death has to be determined 
professionally, which is impossible to do through merely sensory input. Complicated 
cases of anencephalic babies (cortically dead infants), patients in a vegetative state, 
and those who are medically declared brain dead show us that our definition of death 
no longer has clear and set criteria (Singer 1994: 191–2). Moreover, new 
developments in neurological research show that brain death, as a minimal criterion 
to prove death, is becoming obsolete, based as it is, on a centralistic idea of the 
human, in which the brain is the centre of the person. 
This is more than an “erosion of awareness of death”; this behaviour is an 
unconscious attempt to keep mortality awareness at a distance. Keeping death at a 
distance is a form of denial, especially if this void is filled with activities and belief 
systems — immortality strategies — that in the end provide no protocol on how to 
deal with death encountered in private or how to approach our own loss and 
mourning. This is one of the reasons why modern life has become a carnival of 
escapism. One might argue that culture necessarily equals escapism since in the past 
religion used to be a crutch to help people through their existential crisis.  
Death can only become a tangible gestalt within society if it sublimates the 
deceased, which means if death is overcome. For a secular society, we replay the 
same story of resurrection over and over again — the hero system. We are reminded 
that death is a brute reality in the spectacular deaths of celebrities like Princess Diana 
or John F. Kennedy. Celebrities of this magnitude resist the magnetic pull of death’s 
weight because — and here Becker’s hero system concept provides insight — they 
have created a legacy that outlasts their death. Becker’s heroes (these celebrities) 
have reached a state of power that is only possible through their wealth, 
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accomplishments, talents, and popularity plus they have a global, political, and social 
impact that makes them icons of power. They defy the cycle of life by confronting 
their survival fears and defence mechanisms; they overcome death through their 
legacy that survives them and thus have attained a status of immortality to the benefit 
of the whole of society. Iconic images of the likes of James Dean, Marylin Monroe, 
and Kurt Cobain are omnipresent in our society. They are surrounded by an air of 
mystery that speaks of something outside of human influence and our realm of 
experience ⎯ death. 
To gain deeper understanding in this regard, the inner workings of the 
individual need to be investigated. In the next chapter, I turn to the psyche and its 
reciprocal relationship with society, and the potential to understand the phenomenon 





Thanatos: death drive theories 
 
Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death drive  
 
Thus far, I have discussed the contemporary issue of death denial and the erosion of 
awareness of death. In this chapter the focus shifts towards destructive forces that are 
located within us at the level of the psyche. I engage with the question of the 
relationship between exterior violence, be it real or virtual, and the interior life of the 
individual. As outlined in the introduction, the climate of cultural death illiteracy 
makes coping with death privately harder while violent death in the media is 
overrepresented. Before I turn to discuss the manifestations and impact of this schism 
of death in this thesis, it is important to gain a deeper understanding of violence. 
Sigmund Freud was one of the first modern thinkers to propose that 
unconscious forces, which seemingly arise from nowhere, dictate daily actions, 
emotions, and thoughts. In this chapter, I turn to Freud’s dual drive theory and 
predominantly to his conceptualization of a competition between Eros (a drive 
towards love and life) and Thanatos (a drive towards destruction and death) to 
explore the relationship between psychic drives and the social sphere. I delve into his 
theorization of the development of the psyche with particular attention to the internal 
origins of outward violence and destruction. Freud’s drive theory can help us to 
deepen our understanding of how death functions as a symbolic threat to the 
individual’s psyche. Furthermore, his theories and their uptake by post-Freudian 
thinkers can provide insight into the disjuncture between the omnipresence of violent 
entertainment in the media and the destructive impact of Western capitalistic 




Freud’s Three essays on the theory of sexuality (2000 [1905]) explore the human 
potential for sensual pleasure and put forward what was, at the time, the new and 
shocking concept of autonomous infantile sexuality. The essays also explore the 
dominant emotional conflicts of early childhood that arise out of infantile sexual 
experience. Freud’s theorization of human psychosexual development focuses on 
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bodily interactions between the infant and the caregiver, which he saw as marking 
the genesis of desire. Meeting the child’s physical and emotional needs contributes to 
a sense of pleasure and attachment to the caregiver. However, infants experience 
pleasure independently from their physical needs and through many means. For 
Freud, the human sexual drive is very flexible. Any body part or object can provide 
erotic pleasure in varying degrees of intensity. Freud described this as 
“polymorphously perverse” (Freud 2000: xxxii) and understood it as a seemingly 
normal human disposition.  
From the first pleasure obtained through sucking, infants take their first steps 
towards sexual development, entering various stages that help them to create an 
emotional relation to their own bodies, other people, and the wider world. The oral 
stage is the earliest phase in which an erotogenic link between pleasure, the body, 
and sexuality is established. From there, other erotic zones become accessible. The 
anal stage, which Freud correlated to sadism, involves “letting go” or “holding on” to 
faeces. Here, erotic pleasure is derived from “expulsion”. The phallic stage marks the 
development of the child’s sexual energy, or libido, which is derived from 
stimulating the genitals and fantasies of control and self-sufficiency. In lectures 
given at the University of Vienna between 1915 and 1917, Freud posited that the 
child is driven by a curiosity which lacks a definite understanding regarding the aim 
of sex or intercourse, but is “sensual” in its nature and in the way pleasure is pursued 
(Freud 1966: 334–5) In Freud’s words: 
 
the libido-function, as we call it — does not first spring up in its final 
form, does not even expand along the lines of its earliest forms, but 
goes through a series of successive phases unlike one another … The 
turning-point of this development is the subordination of all the sexual 
component-instincts under the primacy of the genital zone and, 
together with this, the enrolment of sexuality in the service of the 
reproductive function. Before this happens the sexual life is, so to say, 
disparate — independent activities of single component-impulses each 
seeking organ-pleasure (pleasure in a bodily organ). This anarchy is 
modified by attempts at pre-genital “organizations,” of which the chief 
is the sadistic-anal phase, behind which is the oral, perhaps the most 
primitive. (Freud 1966: 337) 
 
The mother, as the first love object, provides the infant with the breast (nutrition), 
introducing the child to the realm of pleasure. A restructuring of the child’s psyche 
happens by necessity, as social reality constricts the constant search for pleasure. 
Impediments in the form of social restraints, such as the incest taboo, restrain innate 
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erotic impulses towards the mother and limit her possibility as a satisfying love 
object. The Oedipal conflict marks a milestone in the sexual development of the 
child, since it describes the conflict of symbolic internalization of the lost and 
tabooed object of desire. Unconscious to the individual, these desires remain and 
emerge from the psychic depths. The Oedipal conflict is also known as the phallic 
stage of sexual development, which functions as the anchor for all future repressions. 
Repression and the unconscious are “correlated” in the way that all that becomes 
repressed must vanish from a person’s conscious or accessible knowledge. The 
repressed material is stored in the unconscious and, from there, it may emerge as 
symptom (a fixation, anxiety, or obsession). Repression is the preliminary condition 
for symptom formation and “explicable as substitute-gratifications for desires which 
are unsatisfied in life” (Freud 1966: 310). 
In Instincts and their vicissitudes (1997 [1915]), Freud further investigated the 
“complex relationships between autoeroticism, the sexual drives, narcissism, and the 
dynamic genesis of the ego” (Gale 2005). Freud expanded his metapsychology of the 
psyche with particular focus on the instincts (or drives). He distinguished between 
external stimuli that come from the environment and instinctual stimuli that well up 
from inside. Ten years earlier, in Three essays on the theory of sexuality, he defined 
the word instinct as follows: 
 
By an “instinct” is provisionally to be understood the psychical 
representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of 
stimulation, as contrasted with a “stimulus,” which is set up by single 
excitations coming from without. The concept of instincts is thus one 
of those lying on the frontier between the mental and physical. The 
simplest and likeliest assumption as to the nature of instincts would 
seem to be that in itself an instinct is without quality, and, so far as 
mental life is concerned, is only be regarded as a measure of the 
demand made upon the mind for work. (Freud 2000: 34) 
 
Freud underscores that in the case of external stimuli one can remove oneself from 
the source of excitement, but one cannot escape the pull of the innate drive. 
However, the individual will pursue homeostasis, a point of balance or lowered 
excitement through discharge. The “very essence” of the drive is “the amount of 
force or the measure of the demand upon energy which it represents” (Freud 1997: 





An instinct, on the other hand, never acts as a momentary impact but 
always as a constant force. As it makes its attack not from without but 
from within the organism, it follows that no flight can avail against it. 
A better term stimulus of instinctual origin is a “need”; that which 
does away with this need is “satisfaction”. This can be attained only 
by a suitable (adequate) alteration of the inner source of stimulation. 
… We thus find our first conception of the essential nature of an 
instinct by considering its main characteristics, its origin in sources of 
stimulation within the organism and its appearance as a constant force, 
and thence we deduce one of its further distinguished features, 
namely, that no actions of flight avail against it. (Freud 1997: 85) 
 
Freud argued that the human organism will always try to release excess stimuli, 
because it strives towards a state of no excitement:  
 
the nervous system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing 
stimuli which reach it, or of reducing excitation to the lowest possible 
level: an apparatus which would even, if this were feasible, maintain 
itself in an altogether unstimulated condition. (Freud 1997: 86) 
 
The pursuit of these desires, or the search for relief, marks the pleasure principle that 
operates from the unconscious and which constantly influences the individual.  
The ego emerges as a negotiator between the internal reality of a person (the 
pleasure principle) and the outside world that restricts the individual’s search for 
pleasure. Through splitting the drives (libido) into opposite reactions, love and 
hatred, the ego comes into being and uses these oppositions for and against itself: 
 
The initial ego/reality opposition (or internal/external reality 
opposition) … mutates into a purified-pleasure-ego under the 
influence of the pleasure principle in the narcissistic position. Then 
ego and pleasure correspond, and external world and unpleasure 
correspond. “At the very beginning, it seems, the external world, 
objects, and what is hated are identical”. (International Dictionary of 
Psychoanalysis 2017)  
 
Freud then demonstrated the role of hate as a constituent in affirming and preserving 
the ego, as well as the autonomy of hate in relation to love. The dichotomy of love 
and hate would gain a stronger momentum in Freud’s later work by fleshing out the 
concepts of the instincts into a drive towards life/love and a drive towards 
death/destruction. As Freud’s thinking extended into the field of cultural analysis, his 
controversial theory of the death drive became central for understanding how the 
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perfect facade of a consumer-driven materialistic world can coexist with convoluted 




Disillusioned by the atrocities and the extent of destruction wrought by the First 
World War, Sigmund Freud rethought his earlier theories of pleasure, sexuality, and 
the libido and came to the conclusion that, besides the life-preserving drive, there 
must be a major instinct that drives humanity towards death and destruction. In 
Beyond the pleasure principle (1961 [1920]), Freud elaborated a new theory of the 
psyche, which he reconceptualized as comprised of a three-part structure: the ego, 
the super-ego, and the id. Freud conceived the id as the oldest part of the psyche: 
 
It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is 
laid down in the constitution — above all, therefore, the instincts, 
which originate from the somatic organizations and which find a first 
psychical expression here [in the id] in the forms unknown to us. 
(Freud 2004a: 127) 
 
The id is also the area out of which “internal feelings and desires emerge from the 
instincts” (Bocock 1983: 77). Freud assumed that there was an impetus, a kind of 
motor force or energy behind a drive. The instincts, for Freud, are the forces existing 
behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id, and they represent the somatic 
demands upon the mind (Freud 2004a: 128). Freudian theory stresses that drives are 
impulses, wishes, and desires, which come from within the person, and are a 
fundamental component of the system of the unconscious, which is dominated by the 
pleasure principle. However, instinctual wishes (drives) cannot be known directly 
without linking them or mediating them to an idea, word, or phrase through which a 
drive accomplishes or pursues its aim. Thus, only ideas can become conscious, 
whereas the drive operating in the background remains obscure. The drives have 
discharge alone as their aim — “they seek satisfaction via the shortest routes” — the 
mechanism of the pleasure principle (Laplanche and Pontalis 1985: 324). 
Furthermore, Freud (2004a: 128) pointed out that the purpose of the individual’s life 
is the satisfaction of these innate needs. 
The pleasure principle, in contrast, “is a tendency operating in the service of a 
function whose business it is to free the mental apparatus entirely from excitation or 
to keep the amount of excitation in it constant or to keep it as low as possible” (Freud 
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1961: 76). It is an “economic” principle since unpleasure is related to an increase in 
the quantity of excitation and pleasure is related to its reduction (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 1985: 322). Thus, one can say that the pleasure principle is concerned with a 
basic organic endeavour, the “return to the quiescence of the inorganic world” (Freud 
1961: 76). Since the greatest pleasures (like orgasm) are concerned with the 
extinction of highly intensified excitation, “the binding of an instinctual impulse 
would be a preliminary function designed to prepare the excitation for its final 
elimination in the pleasure of discharge” (Freud 1961: 76).  
Freud argued that what the consciousness contains consists essentially of 
perceptions of excitations coming from the outside world and feelings of pleasure 
and unpleasure arising from within the mental apparatus. He conceived of 
consciousness as turned towards the outside world while enveloping other inner 
psychical systems (Freud 1961: 26). The excitations from the deeper interior layers 
find their way into the consciousness directly and in undiminished amounts (Freud 
1961: 32). 
The ego is rooted in the unconscious. The ego is both conscious as well as 
unconscious, since it has developed from the id. As Bocock writes, “It is the aspect 
of the mind’s functioning which is responsible for reality testing, that is for rational 
thinking and for checking what is safe to do in a given physical and social 
environment” (Bocock 1983: 76). The ego is an intermediary layer between the 
external world and the id, and its functioning can be compared to a protective shield 
against outer influences. The ego develops through contact with the outer physical 
and socio-cultural reality, but it was once merged with the id. Through the influence 
of the outer world, the ego seeks to bear upon the id, both with its instincts and its 
tendency to search for pleasure. It tries to put the reality principle to the test, while 
striving to sustain pleasure and avoid unpleasure. In Freud’s model, the ego only 
senses change in the rhythm of the interchange between pleasure and unpleasure, 
which results in rising tensions. As already mentioned, Freud pointed out that a part 
of the ego itself is unconscious, because it reaches down to the id where the 
repressed (painful experiences or forbidden wishes) are stored. “An action done by 
the ego is as it should be if it satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, the 
super ego and of reality – that is to say, if it is able to reconcile their demands with 
one another” (Freud 2004a: 127). In his late work Civilization and its discontents 
(2002 [1930]), Freud argued that it is a delusion to experience the self, or the ego, as 
an autonomous and independent entity. The ego “extends inwards, with no clear 
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boundary, into an unconscious psychical entity that we call the id, and for which it 
serves, so to speak, as a façade” (Freud 2002: 4-5). 
The ego is connected with two opposing principles that govern mental 
functioning. One is the id, or the pleasure principle, but the ego also works under the 
influence of the reality principle. The reality principle supports the individual to 
adjust to cultural demands by delaying pleasures until a later moment. Freud 
connects the reality principle to the third element in the psyche, the super-ego. 
Freud’s concept of the super-ego steadily evolved as his theories extended into the 
realm of cultural analysis. The super-ego is the agency of the psyche that is in charge 
of the limitation of satisfactions, and it undertakes the work of repression. In one of 
his later public lectures from 1932, Freud likened the super-ego to the conscience, or 
more precisely, he described the conscience as a function of the super-ego; it 
consciously and unconsciously functions as a censor, punisher, and critic (Freud 
1981: 53). 
The ideals of this super-ego are introduced into the psyche of the child through 
parental/external authority and their cultural ideologies. These ego ideals have the 
function of generating guilt, which convinces the individual to adhere to the reality 
principle. The evolution of culture is not possible if everybody is purely in pursuit of 
his or her own pleasurable agendas. Also, guilt directs destructive aggressiveness 
towards oneself, or one’s own ego, instead of towards the outer world; you cannot 
have your mother; you cannot kill your father; you have to abide by the laws of the 
nation; you have to play by the rules of your workplace; but you can self-loathe, be 
painfully critical towards oneself and others, and abuse drugs and alcohol. In Freud’s 
model, guilt rises in the place of aggression towards others. And repression is the 
outcome of the reality principle’s dominance (Bocock 1983: 78). As Freud expressed 
this:  
 
Following our view of sadism, we should say that the destructive 
component had entrenched itself in the super-ego and turned against 
the ego. What is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a 
pure culture of the death instincts, and in fact it often enough succeeds 
in driving the ego into mania if not into death itself. (Freud 1962: 53) 
 
The death drives 
 
The late Freud developed two key concepts to further understand instinctual 
behaviour: Eros (the drive towards life) and Thanatos (the death drive). Eros and 
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Thanatos are deeply intertwined and, in analysing their interplay, one struggles to 
find where the quality of Eros ends and that of Thanatos begins. War, for instance, is 
culturally justified as necessary to preserve the community, society, and nation, to 
defend its resources, identity, and pride. In this instance, destruction serves 
preservation and, paradoxically, death serves Eros. Freud probed the dynamics of the 
interior relationship between destruction and preservation, hate and love, and 
explored how these are projected onto the historical stage as well as how they play 
out in the individual. Freud summarized his concepts of sexuality/libido and the self-
preservation instinct under the term Eros, the impulse to bind together ever-greater 
unities (family, tribe, community, nation, civilization), to preserve these units, and to 
bind them together through (object-related) love.  
Defining the death drive is more complex. For Freud, a tug of war is 
observable between Eros and the death drive, and it manifests in the way in which 
people relate to and live with each other. Until Freud’s clinical observations of 
negative repetitive behaviour, he assumed that the unconscious always operated in 
favour of the pleasure (principle), based on his libido theory. In the essay 
“Remembering, repeating and working-through” (2004b [1919]), Freud made clear 
that the compulsion to repeat negative experience was symptomatic of many of his 
patients. Painful memories were not remembered and thus could not be worked 
through, but instead they were acted out without the awareness of the person. Freud 
observed that the “compulsion to repeat … replaces the impulsion to remember” 
(Freud 2004b: 139). These repetitions emerged under the condition of resistance 
against the progress of treatment. He wrote:  
 
he repeats everything that has already made its way from the sources 
of the repressed into his manifest personality — his inhibitions and 
unserviceable attitudes and his pathological character-traits. He also 
repeats all his symptoms in the course of the treatment. And now we 
can see that in drawing attention to the compulsion to repeat we have 
acquired no new fact but only a more comprehensive view. We have 
only made it clear to ourselves that the patient’s state of being ill 
cannot cease with the beginning of his analysis, and that we must treat 
his illness, not as an event of the past, but as a present-day force. 
(Freud 2004b: 140) 
 
Freud realized that veterans repeat traumatic events in dreams and that children have 
an insatiable need to repeat certain games or behaviours in order to process difficult 
experiences. He thought that this behaviour seemed to give people a kind of 
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satisfaction that could not be derived from the need of the unconscious to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain. In order to explain this repetition, he introduced the 
concept of the death instinct, which strives to undo connections, to destroy, and to 
lead life back into an inorganic state. He suggested that all living creatures have this 
impulse to return to the inorganic state from which they have emerged (Freud 2004a: 
127). The death instinct is the source of negative, destructive energies expressed or 
suppressed in our daily life. Life instincts are much more obvious in the way they 
enfold, whereas death instincts are much more obscure. In his analysis of cultural 
formations, Freud argued that the drives and culture are necessarily intertwined, 
because the super-ego (the carrier of the cultural traditions and demands) receives its 
power from the depths of the id where the drives reside. Hence the death drive is not 
put into motion by outer events only but is part of the psychic structure of the 
individual.  
While the relationship between Eros and Thanatos is often obscure in Freud’s 
work, one key point that emerges from his thinking is the idea that the drives strive 
towards discharge and aim to keep the psyche in a state of equilibrium. He 
introduced the nirvana principle to point to this disturbing convergence of pleasure 
and death. This principle caters to the same character of both drives, their 
fundamental regressive or conservative tendency. The drives aim at a constant 
equilibrium, which constitutes a final regression beyond life itself. “The nirvana 
principle is conceived of as deriving its energy from the death instincts, and the 
pleasure principle serves these too, sometimes, and therefore it loses its former 
primacy in the unconscious life of man” (Bocock 1978: 113). Freud stressed:  
 
The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in 
general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal 
tension due to stimuli (the Nirvana principle …) — a tendency which 
finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of that 
fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of 
death instincts. (Freud 1961: 49–50) 
 
In Freud’s last big work, Civilization and its discontents published in 1930, he 
appeared disillusioned, as his thinking focused more directly on an understanding of 
culture and society. The common assumption is that culture is supposed to work for 
the benefit of the community and, to this end, must necessarily suppress the 
individual for the sake of cultural progress. For culture to express itself smoothly, a 
balance has to be found between the individual’s constraints and cultural demands. 
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These two poles, nature (drives) and culture, seem contradictory, but Freud’s 
introduction of the idea of the death drive brought a different dynamic into cultural 
analysis. 
Freud was very much aware of the difficult implications of transferring 
psychoanalytic theory from the individual to cultural analysis (Lorenzer and Görlich 
2001: 8). While his earlier work set the stage for the development of a culture-
theoretical meta-view, he abandoned his attempt to find genetic principles for 
psychoanalysis, as he moved towards articulating individuals’ connections to their 
cultural and social environment. In the later Freud, the structure of psychic conflicts 
is deeply embedded in a broader conflict culture (Lorenzer and Görlich 2001: 8–12). 
These fundamental and unsolvable contradictions between culture and human drives 
are visible in various areas. For instance, culture serves to help humans thrive in a 
hostile natural environment but can also serve as a tool for a powerful few to gain 
control over the masses. Also, within the individual, there is a hidden disdain for 
abiding by cultural mores due to the demanded abdication of one’s drive towards 
pleasure. This secret rejection leads to a heightened feeling of guilt, yet cultural 
progress and evolution relentlessly demand constraint to work and the renunciation 
of the drives (Lorenzer and Görlich 2001: 13–15). 
Freud’s work was pioneering because it opened up the incredibly rich and 
complex interior life of the individual for consideration. He laid the groundwork for 
many thinkers after him to take seriously the many manifestations of love and 
destruction in the human psyche, as well as in culture. In the upcoming sections, I 
discuss Freud’s heirs, who have been inspired to deeply understand the dual drive 
theory both within the individual realm, like psychoanalysts Melanie Klein and Otto 
Kernberg, and the social, like Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. 
 
Melanie Klein on the death drive 
 
The death drive found an important place in Melanie Klein’s theory of how personal 
identity and emotional life are shaped. In formulating object relations theory, Klein 
focused on the early mother–child dyad and how the infant generates an idea of self 
and others, central for the ego development, as well as the ability to form 
relationships. Klein adopted the Freudian notion of the Oedipal conflict but assumed 
that the death drive is already in operation in the young infant through emotions of 
destructiveness, hatred, and envy. Freud did not consider objects important as 
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representatives of the instincts. A subtle difference between Freud and Klein’s 
understanding is that she assumed that “instincts are always directed towards 
objects”, instead of being unfocused psychic urges (Frosh 1999: 122). In Klein’s 
words: 
 
The threat of annihilation by the death instinct within is, in my view 
— which differs from Freud’s on this point — the primordial anxiety, 
and it is the ego which, in the service of the life instinct — possibly 
even called into operation by the life instinct — deflects to some 
extent that threat outwards. This fundamental defence against the 
death instinct Freud attributed to the organism, whereas I regard this 
process as the prime activity of the ego. (Klein 1957: 22) 
 
Klein understood the infant to be already enveloped in a total world of fantasy from 
birth, supporting the connection between drives and objects. For an infant, the first 
object of desire is the breast. Such encounters with external objects form the basis of 
early psychological development. Stephen Frosh observes: “Klein provides not just a 
bridge between classical and object relations theory, but also a distinctive view of 
development which combines biological and social outlooks in the single concept of 
an instinct” (Frosh 1999: 122). Kleinian theory gives some explanations as to why 
the infant has this disposition towards objects. For example, they might be inherent 
in the instincts themselves; come out of the infant’s urge to comprehend the images 
of bodily parts, as he or she perceives them; or an attempt to comprehend early 
internal sensations (Frosh 1999: 122). 
The assumption that the infant has a disposition to experience the death drive 
builds the groundwork for the development of the paranoid-schizoid position, which 
is central to Kleinian theory. Experiencing these destructive emotions leads to 
anxiety in the child that needs to be relieved. The infant deflects this destructiveness 
towards the outside world, which, at this stage, means primarily towards the mother 
or the primary caregiver. In directing these primitive fantasies towards her, the child 
attempts to eliminate the dreadful negative emotions and the consequent internal 
stressful feelings. Paradoxically, this defence mechanism leads to even greater 
anxiety, because now the infant fears the retribution of the object towards which 
his/her destructiveness was directed. As a result of this fear, the mother’s body (or 
parts of it like the breasts) becomes associated with the death drive. Anthony Elliott 




the infant’s fear now rounds back upon itself, giving rise to intense 
feelings of persecution and dread. Klein argues that the child 
consequently fears aspects of the maternal body, entertaining fantasies 
that the breasts will devour it, cut it into bits, destroy it and scoop out 
its insides. There is, if you like, a kind of “eye for an eye” mentality at 
this psychological stage. If I sadistically attack you, then I can only 
expect retaliation in return. (Elliott 2002: 83) 
 
Haunted by negative feelings, which the infant unsuccessfully attempts to cast off, 
the child now fears complete disintegration through retaliation — an impossible 
situation requiring a solution. Thus, the next step in the child’s coping mechanism is 
to split the object into good and bad. It is crucial to keep these two aspects, good 
(breast)/bad (breast), apart because the good (that is the idealized part of the mother 
with which the infant lovingly and narcissistically identifies) is in danger of being 
tainted by the experience of the death drive, coupled with maternal frustration and 
deprivation (Klein 1957: 23).  
The aim of this strategy of splitting is to protect the ideal object (the good 
mother/breast), as well as the self, by limiting the harmful anxiety generated by the 
death drive. At the base of this paranoid splitting behaviour, Klein considered the 
Freudian idea of projection, as well as introjection. Here the child projects negative 
and positive feelings on the outside; and in the case of introjection, absorbs what it 
imaginatively perceives of others and the outside world. Freud understood projection 
as disposing of unconscious drives towards objects. But Klein went a step further 
than Freud. She believed that projection and introjection work through and operate 
inside unconscious fantasy. Describing the fundamental mechanics of ego formation, 
she wrote:  
 
To return to the splitting process, which I take to be a pre-condition 
for the young infant’s relative stability; during the first few months he 
predominately keeps the good object apart from the bad one and thus, 
in a fundamental way, preserves it — which also means that the 
security of the ego is enhanced. At the same time, this primal division 
only succeeds if there is an adequate capacity for love and a relatively 
strong ego. My hypothesis is, therefore, that the capacity for love 
gives impetus both to integrating tendencies and to a successful primal 
splitting between the loved and hated object. This sounds paradoxical. 
But since, as I said, integration is based on a strongly rooted good 
object that forms the core of the ego, a certain amount of splitting is 
essential for integration; for it preserves the good object and later on 




Therefore, this fragmenting of the psyche marks not only the emergence of the ego, 
but it can also facilitate emotional life, since these paranoid-schizoid mechanisms 
help to keep anxiety at bay. As the ego matures with time, the capacity to judge and 
discriminate and the ability to experience the emotions of love and hatred is 
established. In normal psychic development, good experiences dominate over the bad 
ones. Of further importance to the infant’s sense of selfhood, he or she begins to see 
people as “whole objects and relates himself to this object” (Segal 1964: 55) rather 
than perceiving fragments of them with a certain quality. The infant begins to make a 
connection to the mother as a person with good and bad characteristics and begins to 
understand that the relationship to her can have qualities of love and hatred. This 
realization, however, facilitates feelings of guilt and sorrow in the infant regarding 
his or her negative emotions and negativity towards her. In Kleinian understanding, 
this marks the “depressive position”. Hanna Segal clarifies this condition:  
 
In the paranoid-schizoid position, the main anxiety is that the ego will 
be destroyed by the bad object or objects. In the depressive position, 
anxieties spring from ambivalence, and the child’s main anxiety is that 
his own destructive impulses have destroyed or will destroy, the 
object that he loves or totally depends on. (Segal 1964: 56) 
 
In Klein’s object relations theory, the drives play a central role in the genesis of the 
self and the perception of others. In her understanding, the infant is already set up to 
experience strong emotions of destruction, hate, and envy — strong emotions that are 
always directed towards an object. This leads to the experience of anxiety early in 
life and thus coping strategies become an essential part of early human development. 
Essentially, the effectiveness of a good coping strategy that leads to the emergence of 
a healthy individual relies on the child’s ability for love. In the next section, I discuss 
a contemporary psychoanalyst’s take on how and why pathological psychological 
structures may arise. 
 
Otto Kernberg on malignant narcissism 
 
The contemporary psychoanalyst Otto Kernberg, whose work is influenced by 
Melanie Klein, considers the theory of the death drive to be irreplaceable for clinical 
observations, since it points to the fundamental struggle between love and hatred. As 
already stated in this chapter, Freud considered the struggle of life centred in erotic 
impulses and aggression as fundamental. However, Kernberg’s clinical observations 
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of the pathological behaviour of individuals led him to believe that the death drive is 
a secondary phenomenon, instead of a primary drive. Kernberg makes an important 
distinction between the biological and pathological roots of an aggressive impulse 
that sheds further light on this discussion of the death drive and its various 
expressions. Further, I will draw upon his analysis of psychopathological behaviour 
in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, when I turn more directly to cultural analysis.  
Kernberg’s key paper “The concept of the death drive: a clinical perspective” 
(2009) gives an overview of his central findings which synthesise the latest 
neurobiological findings regarding affects in relation to instincts. Affect, in this 
paper, is understood as an instinctual disposition of a behavioural mechanism, 
triggered by environmental influences. In Kernberg’s understanding, if a chain or 
sequence of behaviours is established, this constitutes the instinct (say for instance 
the flight-or-fight response). Therefore, an instinct is the product of interaction 
between inborn, biological triggers and environmental factors. A drive, however, is a 
sequence of affective responses that are organized in terms of unconscious meanings; 
therefore, the drive is forged on the basis of affects. Kernberg observes: 
 
affects constitute the primary motivational system, and … they are 
integrated into supraordinate positive and negative drives, namely, 
libido and aggression. The drives, in turn, manifest themselves as 
activation of their constituent affects with varying intensity, along the 
line of libidinal and aggressive investments. In short, I believe that 
affects are the primary motivators. They organize into hierarchically 
supraordinate motivations, or the Freudian drives, and the drives, in 
turn, become activated in the form of their component affectively 
valenced representations manifest as unconscious fantasies. (Kernberg 
2009: 1011) 
 
Kernberg makes an important distinction between aggression (biological) and 
aggressive drive, or death drive (pathological). He refers to the original Freudian 
assumption that instincts are biological in their nature, now verified by much clinical 
observation, as well as neurobiological findings of primary aggression (Kernberg 
2009: 1012). As in all mammals, humans have the biologically inscribed response of 
aggressiveness in order to combat frustration, which is a reaction to scarcities in the 
environment. Our fundamental need for love and closeness may be naturally related 
to this biological aspect of aggression, for instance, as manifested in the territorial 
defence of a newly born mammal to protect its source of nutrition and shelter or in 
competitive mating behaviour. Humans also display these instinctual behaviours, but 
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this does not explain the mechanisms of destructive, aggressive behaviour that are 
beyond these instinctual responses to danger or frustration, which are basic to the 
survival of the individual or species. Beyond the pleasure principle and the 
frustration that arises when the demands of the pleasure principle are violated, 
Kernberg argues that there exist severely self-destructive psychopathological 
constellations that lend support to the concept of a death drive.  
Kernberg points to the clinical support for the phenomenon of repetitive 
compulsion (originally one of Freud’s main anchor points in support of his 
theorization of a death drive), which suggests a relentless self-destructive motivation 
(Kernberg 2009: 1013). Repetitive compulsion can function to work through a 
conflict or, in other circumstances, to represent the unconscious repetition of a 
traumatic relationship with a traumatizing object.  
Another pathological manifestation of the death drive is seen in negative 
therapeutic reactions such as extreme forms of self-directed aggression and/or sexual 
sadism and masochism. The symptoms of this phenomenon range from unrestrained 
cruelty towards self and others, severe self-mutilation (such as severing limbs), and 
even the common illness of anorexia nervosa in its extreme form (Kernberg 2009: 
1014). Kernberg’s findings regarding perversion are interesting:  
 
Perversity involves the recruitment of love at the service of 
aggression, the effort to seduce another person toward love or 
helpfulness as a trap that will end with the destruction, symbolic or 
real, in a social and sometimes even in a physical sense of the person 
so seduced … In normal love relations small doses of aggression 
intensify erotic pleasure. However, under pathological conditions 
perversity may destroy erotic pleasure and even more so its object. 
(Kernberg 2009: 1014) 
 
Kernberg goes on to describe other forms of self-destruction, such as suicidal urges 
and behaviours. Freud described the emergence of suicidal tendencies (post dual-
drive theory) as the result of turning the aggression towards the lost object inward. 
Melanie Klein theoretically extended this idea in her depressive position theory, a 
line of thinking which explored how mourning often contains aspects of 
ambivalence. However, in a pathological display of suicidal tendencies carried out by 
narcissistic personalities, unable to cope with the thought of defeat, failure, and 
humiliation, the aim is to protect the self’s grandiosity by triumphing over reality, 




Kernberg (2009: 1017) refers to the work of psychoanalysts Freud, Bion, 
Turquet, and Anzieu on group behaviour to point out that unstructured groups have 
the tendency to project their needs and super-ego functions onto a leader. If this 
attempt is successful, group anxiety is lessened. However, such social situations run 
the danger of unleashing the death drive in the form of aggression towards perceived 
malicious outsiders “in order to protect the perfection and the security of the ideal 
group” (Kernberg 2009: 1017). Aggressive conflict, escalating in genocide and 
warfare, can be a worst-case scenario. In Kernberg’s words:  
 
there is impressive clinical and sociological evidence for a universal 
potential for violence in human beings that can be triggered too easily 
under certain conditions of group regression and corresponding 
leadership, and that, from the perspective of survival of human 
societies, may be considered as fundamentally self-destructive. 
(Kernberg 2009: 1017) 
 
Kernberg depicts pathological self-destructive behaviour as symptomatic of the death 
drive and its major motivational system. In this theorization, the death drive is not 
primary in its tendency, as it once was thought by Freud or Klein, but is, rather, 
indicative of the “dominant unconscious motivation towards self-destructiveness”, 
that it is a “particularly grave, organized motivational system” that aims not only to 
“destroy the self, but very essentially, to destroy significant others as well, be it out 
of guilt, revenge, envy, or triumph” (Kernberg 2009: 1018).  
To summarize, Kernberg sees the death drive as a secondary phenomenon, 
since he draws a distinction between the biological expression aimed at preserving 
life and a destructive impulse that goes beyond the life-affirming actions of the drive. 
Despite his clinical research that focuses on individuals, Kernberg’s theorization 
takes on an aspect of social critique when he makes the observation that the death 
drive does emerge in group settings for the sake of protecting their perceived 
ideology. On an individual level, the death drive aims at the elimination of concrete 
and specific relations with significant others, and the self and the patient can 
experience great pleasure in the aggression directed towards self and others. He 
stresses that the death drive has great seductive powers and often lurks behind the 
façade of love. In this light, the death drive is not opposed to the pleasure principle 
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but in accord with it (Kernberg 2009: 1020).3 Having discussed various theories 
about the genesis of the death drive, as well as the impact of the death drive on 
individuals, I now want to expand on the question of how the death drive affects the 
social arena. 
 
Critical social psychology: Marcuse and Fromm 
 
Marcuse on a social death drive 
 
The critical social thinker Herbert Marcuse was one of the most prominent members 
of the Frankfurt School, who in his main body of work fused Marxist theory with the 
psychoanalysis of Freud. The failings of Marxist social theory, after the collapse of 
the socialist revolutions in Europe, gave rise to new conceptualizations that 
incorporated a greater understanding of culture and social settings. The psychological 
side of human interaction and choice had been left out of the Marxist equation, and 
thus many scholars began to adjust their thinking via psychology and psychoanalysis. 
John Rickert analyses the growing interest in psychoanalysis:  
 
Marxism originally turned to psychoanalysis in an attempt to 
understand the role of psychological factors in social phenomena. 
Specifically, it sought an account of the origin and power of ideology, 
the subjective conditions for social change, and the processes by 
which society enters the individual psyche. (Rickert 1986: 387) 
 
In his 1955 work Eros and civilization, Marcuse attempted to merge Freudian theory 
with the philosophy of Karl Marx. Marcuse understood Freud’s theory to be 
essentially sociological in its nature (Rickert 1986: 362) and built upon his 
understanding of the world as laid out in Civilization and its discontents (1930), but 
with a stronger emphasis on history. While Marcuse agreed with Freud that some 
basic repression of Eros is needed in order to make civilization or culture possible, he 
argued that modes and amounts of suppression vary from one society to another and 
from one historical period to another. Marcuse cautioned against an unbridled Eros, 
because he argued that, if all members of society followed their pleasure without 
                                                
3 Kernberg (2009: 1019) believes that causes of the death drive include genetic 




inhibition, the social consequences could be as destructive as the death drive. In 
relation to the instincts, Marcuse observed:  
 
Left free to pursue their natural objectives, the basic instincts of man 
would be incompatible with all lasting association and preservation: 
they would destroy even where they unite. The uncontrolled Eros is 
just as fatal as his deadly counterpart, the death instinct. Their 
destructive force derives from the fact that they strive for a 
gratification which culture cannot grant: gratification as such and as 
an end in itself, at any moment. (Marcuse 1962: 11) 
 
Hence culture begins when the primary aim of the drives — the absolute satisfaction 
of the needs — is renounced with success or, in different words, when repression is 
heightened through restrictions placed on sexuality and eroticism. Marcuse stated: 
 
The adjustment of the pleasure to the reality principle implies the 
subjugation and diversion of the destructive force of instinctual 
gratification, of its incompatibility with the established societal norms 
and relations, and, by that token, implies the transubstantiation of 
pleasure itself. (Marcuse 1962: 13) 
 
But how much repression is needed for a thriving civilization? Marcuse drew on 
Marxist philosophy to consider when the suppression of Eros has a negative impact 
on individuals. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Arnold Farr (2013) 
writes that Marcuse’s attraction to Marxism is rooted in his wish to disassociate 
humanity from the burdensome oppressive forces of capitalism. Marcuse’s critique 
of society focused on the emergence of what he saw as a “totally administered 
society”, or a “mass society of blind conformity” (Farr 2013). Hence, to counter this 
development, he argued, a certain form of consciousness, a “radical subjectivity”, is 
needed that cuts sharply through present social and economic conditions through 
critique and refusal and bears the potential for positive transformation. Regarding 
Marcuse’s reception of the Marxian notion of alienation, Farr writes: 
 
Marcuse argues that in the 1844 Manuscripts Marx shows how the 
role of labor as a self-realization or self-formative process gets 
inverted. Instead of having his or her subjectivity affirmed the 
individual becomes an object that is now shaped by external, alien 
forces. Hence, Marx’s theory makes a transition from an examination 
of the self-formative process of labor to a critique of the forms of 




Marcuse himself stressed the historical component of capitalism: 
 
this fact appears as the total inversion and concealment of what 
critique had defined as the essence of man and human labor. Labor is 
not “free activity” or the universal and free self-realization of man, but 
his enslavement and loss of reality. The worker is not man in the 
totality of his life-expression, but something unessential [ein 
Unwesen], the purely physical subject of “abstract” activity. The 
objects of labor are not expressions and confirmations of the human 
reality of the worker, but alien things, belonging to someone other 
than the worker — “commodities.” (Marcuse 2005: 104)  
 
However, there are ways in which individuals can retain some of their humanity. 
Ideally, individuals can engage their reasoning capabilities and act upon their 
acknowledged need for pleasure. The gift of the reality principle, Marcuse suggested, 
is that it allows for the emergence of an organized, conscious, thinking ego with the 
function of reason. The pleasure principle, however, finds refuge in the unconscious 
and lives on in fantasy, which remains untouched by the reality principle. Yet fantasy 
does have enough power to influence the reality principle. Consequently, pleasure 
keeps sweeping back into reality and undercuts the foundations of the reality 
principle, which has to be established over and over again. Marcuse (1962: 14) 
stressed that a person’s desire and the change in reality are “organized” by society. 
Although pleasure needs to be renounced for the blossoming of culture, the pleasure 
principle cannot be divorced from culture and maintains its influence through 
fantasy, a mechanism that Marcuse called the “return of the repressed” (Marcuse 
1962: 15). He stated: 
 
The return of the repressed makes up the tabooed and subterranean 
history of civilisation. And the exploration of this history reveals not 
only the secret of the individual but also that of civilisation … 
Repression is an historical phenomenon. The effective subjugation of 
the instincts to repressive controls is imposed not by nature but by 
man. (Marcuse 1962: 15) 
 
Unfortunately, acting upon one’s desires is often curtailed by society. Marcuse 
emphasized the particularities of capitalistic societies, which, to him, are essentially 
systems of stark repression with strong unconscious components. In capitalist 
societies, the excessive repression of Eros is detrimental to the well-being of people. 
Marcuse (1962: 32) introduced the idea of surplus repression, which he used as a 
supplement to the idea of repression introduced by Freud. In this theorization, 
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Marcuse addressed the power of humans over humans, or “the restrictions 
necessitated by social domination” (Marcuse 1962: 32). Surplus repression is a mode 
of domination, unnecessary for creating culture, that arises from specific institutions 
of authority, which are to be found in societies with a certain degree of technological 
development. Its aim is to align the drives with the dominating performance principle 
(a term I explain below). Anthony Elliott defines surplus repression as the 
“intensification of self-restraint generated by capitalist exploitation and asymmetrical 
relations to power” (Elliott 2009: 40). An example of this is the conjugal family 
embedded in the patriarchal tradition.  
According to Marcuse, under conditions of surplus repression, society is 
stratified according to the economic performances of its members. He called this the 
performance principle and suggested that it is the prevalent manifestation of the 
reality principle in a capitalist, technology-oriented society. This principle might be 
generated through work that, on the one hand, has an alienating effect on the 
individual and, on the other hand, has the potential to liberate the individual from 
time and physical constraints. Hence, the performance principle does create a higher 
degree of freedom and thus could potentially serve the pleasure principle. Marcuse 
observed: 
 
The performance principle, which is that of an acquisitive and 
antagonistic society in the process of constant expansion, presupposes 
a long development during which domination has been increasingly 
rationalized: control over social labor now reproduces society on a 
large scale and under improving conditions. For a long way, the 
interests of domination and the interests of the whole coincide: the 
profitable utilization of the productive apparatus fulfills the needs and 
faculties of individuals. For the vast majority of the population, the 
scope and mode of satisfaction are determined by their own labor; but 
their labor is work for an apparatus which they do not control, which 
operates as an independent power to which individuals must submit if 
they want to live. And it becomes the more alien the more specialized 
the division of labor becomes. Men do not live their own lives but 
perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfill 
their own needs and faculties but work in alienation. (Marcuse 1962: 
41) 
 
The way in which the pleasure principle is allowed to express itself in society is 
reduced to genital-focused sexuality on a local level and on a temporal level to 
mundane leisure activities. Workers lack control over their lives and the expression 
of Eros. Their work is entirely dedicated to the “apparatus”, which aims to maximize 
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profit for capitalists. This requires conformity on the side of society, plus, in order to 
gain economic reward in societies with a strong competitive character and the creed 
of consumerism, people have to renounce their “instinctual gratification” (Marcuse 
1962: 3). Yet they have to develop desires in accordance with society, an important 
social mechanism on which Farr observes: 
 
The worker must be manipulated in such a way so that these 
restrictions seem to function as rational, external objective laws which 
are then internalized by the individual. The desires of the individual 
must conform to the desires of the apparatus. The individual must 
define himself as the apparatus defines all humanity. As Marcuse puts 
it, “he desires what he is supposed to desire”. (Farr 2013) 
 
In Marcuse’s understanding, these kinds of crass modifications of the drives alter 
Eros, as well as Thanatos. The organization of libido is restricted, channelled into 
culture-serving streams, and also turned into taboos and perversions. The constant 
restriction of Eros weakens the life drive and thus gives way to the destructive force 
of an unbridled death drive. Marcuse wrote on restrictions: 
 
The restrictions imposed upon the libido appear as the more rational, 
the more universal they become, the more they permeate the whole of 
society … [The individual’s] erotic performance is brought in line 
with his societal performance. Repression disappears in the grand 
objective order of things which rewards more or less adequately the 
complying individuals and, in doing so, reproduces more or less 
adequately society as a whole. (Marcuse 1962: 41–2) 
 
Freud theorized restrictions as potentially giving rise to more creative action and 
fulfilling relationships (sublimation). Marcuse, however, warned that excessive 
restrictions distort the individual to the point where this form of sublimation becomes 
impossible. Restrictions shapeshift into repression, which produces new forms of 
subjective control and normalization so “as to prevent repressed desire from 
interfering with capitalist exchange values” (Elliott 2009: 40). This disciplining of 
the human body, in order to align it with the capitalist modality of being, is termed 
repressive desublimation, a term Marcuse coined in his later book, One-dimensional 
man (1964). In this work, Marcuse theorized that sexuality is stripped of its erotic 
aura and is used in advertising, scattering human energy and focus. According to 
Marcuse, capitalism is a chimerical fantasy used to sell things, plus it cleverly 
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distorts a person’s own sense of their needs and wishes through production 




Unlike Freud, Marcuse assumed that scarcity is historically contingent and not an 
ever-present situation, and therefore the reality principle as a social construct 
changes over time. Thus Marcuse critiqued Freud’s failure to recognize the potential 
of liberation within his own theory. He argued that human drives are altered through 
socio-historic conditions, and therefore display greater flexibility than Freud 
assumed. Further, Marcuse argued that the seed of liberation can be found within an 
oppressive society. “The very progress of civilization under the performance 
principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon 
instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced” 
(Marcuse 1962: 117). In Marcuse’s utopian view, the great hope lies with the 
alienation of the individual, as well as the liberation of the libido through technology. 
The problem lies in the unfair and unequal distribution of wealth generated by a 
capitalistic society. The greater the gap between a suppressed Eros that longs to be 
expressed and social demands, the greater the degree of freedom that can potentially 
be accomplished. In this way, Eros could once again live up to its creative potential, 
as well as limit the destructive impact of Thanatos. To elaborate on this point more 
clearly, Marcuse philosophized that work, technology, and mastery over natural 
forces can be outlets for both instincts, and he saw a great advantage in technological 
improvements, since technology could lead to less repression or even to a non-
repressive development of the libido.  
Marcuse recognized that the death instinct can have a socially useful, if not 
life-affirming, purpose. The entire progress of civilization is rendered possible only 
by the transformation and utilization of the death instinct or its derivatives. The 
diversion of primary destructiveness away from the ego, towards the external world, 
feeds technological progress. The use of the death instinct for the formation of the 
super-ego achieves the punitive submission of the pleasure principle to the reality 
principle and thus assures civilized morality. In this transformation, the death instinct 
is brought under the service of Eros; the aggressive impulses provide energy for the 
continuous alteration, mastery, and exploitation of nature to the advantage of 
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humanity (Marcuse 1962: 46). Hence, Thanatos can and does work in the service of 
society in the formation and upholding of basic civility and cultural cooperation.  
Marcuse believed, as Freud did, that the instincts are innate to humans, but he 
emphasized that both drives are socially and historically malleable. The resistance or 
dominance of Eros over Thanatos is necessary, but impossible in such a developed 
and highly controlled civilization (Marcuse 1962: 80). The prevalent form of the 
reality principle, where capitalism strips humans of their essence and aligns their 
desires and pleasures with the capitalistic creed, is the reason why the death drive can 
have severe socio-pathological manifestations. 
 
Erich Fromm on destructiveness 
 
Another leftist critical thinker, who fused Marxism with Freud and Karl Abraham’s 
psychoanalysis, is Erich Fromm. Fromm believed that the critical connection 
between psychoanalysis and Marxism is found in what he called a “psychoanalytic 
conception of character” (Rickert 1986: 352), a theory on positive and (extreme) 
negative human traits, such as aggressiveness and destructiveness. Although inspired 
by Freud’s dual drive theory, Fromm put a weakened emphasis on the role of the 
Freudian instincts and hence earned the critique of his Marxist-psychoanalyst peer 
Herbert Marcuse, to whom the Freudian drives were crucial for understanding the 
status quo. Instead, Fromm developed a theory of instincts as rooted in the 
individual’s physiological needs and the human passions as rooted in the individual’s 
character. Understanding this conception of character is crucial in order to gain 
insights into Fromm’s idea of how death and aggression are reproduced in culture. 
Putting forward the theory of characterology, Fromm hoped to understand 
attitudes, actions, and ideologies of, not only social classes, but also entire societies. 
Fromm shifted focus away from the psychoanalytic traits of the individual to map out 
the character components of the members of a society, or what Fromm called the 
“libidinal structure of society” or “social character” (Rickert 1986: 353). In doing so, 
he argued, one holds the key to understanding the group as a whole and the role of 
prevalent character traits in ongoing social processes. Secondly, he argued, proper 
analytic social psychology must place emphasis on the socio-economic environment 




The phenomena of social psychology are to be understood as 
processes involving the active and passive adaptation of the instinctual 
apparatus to the socio-economic situation. In certain fundamental 
respects, the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is 
highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the 
economic conditions. The family is the essential medium through 
which the economic situation exerts its formative influence on the 
individual’s psyche. The task of social psychology is to explain the 
shared, socially relevant, psychic attitudes and ideologies — and their 
unconscious roots in particular — in terms of the influence of 
economic conditions on libido strivings. (Fromm 1970: 121) 
 
While Fromm agreed with Freud that character is shaped and formed through the 
influence of the family at an early age, Fromm argued that Freud failed to 
acknowledge the extent to which family constellations are, by themselves, shaped by 
socio-economic forces. The character traits within a family that are moulded by the 
environment are then passed onto the child. Rickert writes: “The family, then, is both 
the product of social conditioning and the ‘psychological agent of society’, the 
medium through which the social structure places its stamp on the character and 
hence the consciousness of its individual members” (Rickert 1986: 345). Rickert 
further interprets Fromm’s work: 
 
Eschewing the vulgar Marxist view that consciousness directly 
reflects economic reality, Fromm argues that social character is the 
mediating link between the economic substructure and the prevailing 
attitudes and ideologies. Specifically, he claims that human drives 
dynamically adapt to socioeconomic conditions; that the product of 
this process is the social character; and that character is what directly 
determines consciousness — i.e., the attitudes and ideals dominant in 
a given society. (Rickert 1986: 355) 
 
Social character is an active agent with the power to stabilize or undermine the social 
order, and ideology is anchored in this very character structure. Therefore, the main 
central claim of Fromm’s Freud-Marx fusion is that “the central factor determining 
the nature of social character is the given socioeconomic situation” (Rickert 1986: 
357).  
In The fear of freedom (2001 [1941]), Fromm turned his back on Freud’s libido 
theory and created his own analytic framework that abandoned the idea that social 
reality was mediated by the sexual instincts. Rather: 
 
the socioeconomic structure directly molded human energy and 
passions in such a way as to produce the traits required for the 
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continued functioning of the given social order. The question of why a 
particular class should have a specific social character was explained 
not in the unconvincing terms of Freud’s theory, but by saying that the 
socioeconomic situation of that class directly conditioned the 
character traits found in most of the population. (Rickert 1986: 360) 
 
For Fromm, the ways in which individuals relate to each other through processes of 
“assimilation and socialisation” constitute their character structure. “Character, then, 
is a certain orientation to the world that develops in the process of meeting needs for 
survival and meaning” (Rickert 1986: 360). In this sense, the most powerful instance 
in shaping one’s character is the network of social relationships to which one is 
exposed. Character is not developed, unlike in Freud’s or Klein’s musing, through 
certain innate infantile experiences during a child’s early libidinal development. 
“Rather, it develops in direct response to the child’s experience of social reality as 
constituted by the requirements of a particular socioeconomic system and transmitted 
by the family environment” (Rickert 1986: 360). 
 
Passions and pathological aggressiveness 
 
Passions, one is cautioned to understand, are not manifestations of the instinctual 
drives. Fromm conceived of these character-rooted passions as, again, having socio-
historical and environmental dimensions. The dynamic structure of character is made 
up of the relatively permanent components of the passions, which represent the 
motivational source for the individual (Fromm 1976: 6). He wrote: 
 
Although not directly serving physical survival they are as strong — 
and often even stronger — than instincts. They form the bias for 
man’s interest in life, his enthusiasm, his excitement; they are the stuff 
from which not only his dreams are made but art, religion, myth, 
drama — all that makes life worth living … he [the individual] suffers 
severely when he is reduced to the level of a feeding or propagating 
machine, even if he has all the security he wants. Man seeks for drama 
and excitement; when he cannot get satisfaction on a higher level, he 
creates for himself the drama of destruction. (Fromm 1973: 7–8) 
 
To understand the depths and intensity of the passions, one must recognize that the 
energy of the passions is directly tied to the individual’s search for meaning. They 
help the individual to bring sense to his or her life and environment. To what extent 
these needs are met and whether they are beneficial or pathological, therefore, is 
entirely dependent on the socio-economic conditions in which a person exists.  
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As an equivalent to the death drive, previously discussed in this chapter, 
Fromm put forward the idea of “malignant aggression”, which encompasses things 
like cruelty, destructiveness, sadism, and necrophilia. In this respect, and not unlike 
Otto Kernberg, he distinguished between benign or defensive aggression, which is a 
“built in” biological reaction geared towards survival, and malignant aggression, 
which is destructive (Fromm 1973: 1; 1976: 2). Again, in Fromm’s understanding, 
malignant aggression is not based on an inherent destructive instinct but needs to be 
understood on the basis of its historical and cultural environment, and therefore can 
be dominant and powerful within some individuals and cultures (Fromm 1973: 218). 
Even though pathological forms of aggression are rendered by the socio-economic 
environment and do not belong to the psychic structure that has survival at its core, 
the pleasure derived from destruction is inherently human (Fromm 1976: 3–4). 
“Malignant aggression is a human potential rooted in the very conditions of human 
existence” (Fromm 1973: 187). He further commented on people acting out this 
destructive potential: “They express life turning against itself in the striving to make 
sense out of it. They are the only true perversion” (Fromm 1973: 9).  
In order to transcend the triviality of one’s life — a life in which one’s passions 
do not find an outlet — the individual seeks adventure, is prompted to engage in 
risky behaviour, and tries to venture beyond, or even across, the limiting frontiers of 
human existence. This is what makes great virtues and vices, as well as destruction, 
so attractive and exciting. One has to be discerning if one’s environment only 
supports the engagement with one’s passions on a superficial level but leaves core 
needs unfulfilled. These core needs are, in Fromm’s humanistic view, love, the 
ability to connect to fellow humans (brotherhood), freedom, equality, and an 
environment that nurtures these core needs (Fromm 1994: 100–4). Hence, drug 
addiction, destructiveness, and other social ills come into existence as a response to 
the barred access to fulfilling one’s essential needs (Fromm 1973: 267). Unmet core 
needs or an unlived life can have certain manifestations, which I discuss in the next 




For Fromm, character typology is a way of illustrating the various complex traits of 
human personality and defining core aspects that belong to certain characters rather 
than describing an individual. An individual, of course, can have various 
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combinations of certain character expressions. Fromm used the term character in a 
non-normative but descriptive sense (Rickert 1968: 383–4). I focus now on one of 
Fromm’s character types that I draw on in chapter four of this thesis.  
One form of malignant aggression is necrophilia, a character-rooted passion. 
For Fromm, necrophilia is a mere psychological phenomenon that emerges due to 
hostile environmental factors. Much like the Freudian dual drive theory, Fromm 
defined necrophilia, in part, as an opposition to biophilia — a love of life. Above all, 
necrophilia as a kind of destructive aggression has certain components: 
 
Necrophilia in the characterological sense can be described as the 
passionate attraction to all that is dead, decayed, putrid, sickly; it is the 
passion to transform that which is alive into something unalive; to 
destroy for the sake of destruction; the exclusive interest in all that is 
purely mechanical. It is the passion “to tear apart living structures”. 
(Fromm 1973: 332) 
 
In contrast, biophilia is the passionate love of life and of all that is alive. Biophilia 
refers to a biologically normal impulse and therefore aligns with Eros. The 
biophilious person constructs, rather than retains, and sees the whole, rather than the 
parts. Her/his biophilic ethics state that all that is good serves life; it is a reverence 
for life that enhances growth and unfolding. Necrophilia, however, is the outcome of 
an unlived life, of failure to arrive at a certain stage beyond narcissism and 
indifference. Evil, in this understanding, is all that serves death, that stifles life, limits 
and dismembers it (Fromm 1973: 364). Necrophilia can have many manifestations, 
which can range from the urge to physically mutilate an object or one’s own body or 
an obsessive interest in sickness and death. As we have seen, Otto Kernberg (2009: 
1014) observed these kinds of behaviours in his clinical observations.  
In Freud’s work, the life drive and the death drive have equal importance since 
both are based in biology. Fromm, like Kernberg, saw necrophilia as a secondary 
phenomenon that only emerges due to a hostile socio-economic environment. 
Biophilia, on the other hand, is a biological impulse to preserve and connect life. 
According to Fromm, tendencies of necrophilia and biophilia can be found in every 
human, but the question is which tendency is strongest. Therefore, Fromm urged us 
to seek greater understanding of the different expressions of this negative trait and to 
seek understanding of which social conditions foster necrophilia (Fromm 1973: 10). 




Destructiveness is not parallel to, but the alternative to biophilia. Love 
of life or love of the dead is the fundamental alternative that confronts 
every human being. Necrophilia grows as the development of 
biophilia is stunted. Man is biologically endowed with the capacity for 
biophilia, but psychologically he has the potential for necrophilia as 
an alternative solution … If man cannot create anything or move 
anybody, he cannot break out of the prison of his total narcissism, he 
can escape the unbearable sense of vital impotence and nothingness 
only by affirming himself in the act of destruction of the life that he is 
unable to create … for destruction all that is necessary is strong arms, 
or a knife or a gun. (Fromm 1973: 366) 
 
Importantly, Fromm recognized that human pathological behaviour is deeply 
intertwined with the social formations. Furthermore, the pleasure derived from 
malignant behaviour is an entirely human trait. Ethically, Fromm was concerned with 
“arriving at ‘objectively valid’ ethical standards on the basis of a philosophical 
anthropology” (Rickert 1986: 372), and in this he often underestimated the rich 
psychic interior of the individual. His social concepts of good and evil, life giving or 
life destroying, are also often dichotomized in their understanding of human nature 
and lack the complexities of Freud and Klein’s theorization of the drive. However, 
his theory on necrophilia and biophilia underscores the role of the socio-economic 
environment in which a person develops his/her stance towards life. As Fromm 
recognized, a social world that highlights materialism and does not foster love and 




Are aggressiveness, hatred, and destruction at the core of the human being, as Freud 
and Klein mused? From this troubled interior life, does the death drive seep out into 
the world to leave its imprints in the tribulations of war and homicide, if there is not 
enough love or libido to halt its impact? To what degree is the socio-economic 
environment a key factor in how the drives express themselves in the world? 
Both Otto Kernberg and Erich Fromm see the drives as secondary phenomena 
and conclude that there are forms of aggression that are biologically distinct and 
serve the survival of the individual and the species. However, in talking about the 
pathological expression of aggressiveness and destruction, they point at something 
beyond, something excessive, and strangely pleasurable in its manifestation. 
For Fromm, this is due to the socio-economic environment, which dictates how 
an individual’s character is moulded into being. This character, in turn, determines a 
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person’s consciousness towards a love of life (biophilia) or a disregard of, if not 
hatred for, life (necrophilia). In Fromm’s theorization, Eros and Thanatos are not as 
convoluted as in Freudian or Kleinian thinking. For Fromm, the degree to which love 
and compassion are present in an environment makes the difference between 
producing a healthy person and a shell of a human, filled with materialistic desires 
and disdain for the world. 
Regarding love, Kernberg makes the observation that “perversity involves the 
recruitment of love at the service of aggression” (Kernberg 2009: 1014). But being 
lured by love and the willingness to be seduced can happen only in the presence of 
desire. Marcuse claimed that desire has to be brought under the service of capitalism. 
The bastion of the pleasure principle, fantasy, is distorted and wrought into the tracks 
of society and, through this depleting of existential erotic energy, it is harnessed for 
capitalistic purposes, emerging as Thanatos, which is lethal for self and others. 
What exactly is it about desire that has such an immense power to turn groups 
of people into a society of “mass conformists”, as well as to unleash such destructive 
powers? In the next chapter I will turn to Lacanian theory, which provides another 
framework to explore how individual interior states intermingle with the ambient 
expressions of society and how death illiteracy shapes the sense of self in 
contemporary society. 
While the dual drives might only indirectly impact social attitudes towards 
death and dying, an investigation of the social (or symbolic) implications of the 
drives sheds analytic insight into understanding contemporary struggles with 
mortality. Lacan suggested that Freud’s death drive theory might be obscure, but to 
dismiss the idea would be to overlook a significant discovery. Like Erich Fromm, 
Lacan understood the death drive to be a cultural phenomenon rather than an intrinsic 
biological urge to return to an inanimate state (Evans 2006: 32). He did not view the 
death drive in opposition to a life drive, but theorized the drive more generally 
through the lens of the death drive. Exploring this idea further will help illuminate 
not only the current climate of death illiteracy but also the individual as well as 





The functions of desire: drive in Lacanian psychoanalysis 
 
After finishing high school I worked in a nursing home where I looked after a 
woman in the last stages of dementia. There was nothing left of her character, not a 
hint, a shine of personality, psyche or soul as we imagine it. No interaction was 
possible with her, nor conversation, nor were there signs of her experiencing pain or 
discomfort. All she could do was stand up from her wheelchair, chew and swallow, 
and compulsively masturbate. Every night and every morning when I got her ready 
for the day, as soon as she had access to her genitals she would masturbate. I was 
instructed to tighten her incontinence pants extra diligently to keep her hands out of 
her pants, because she would masturbate to utter rawness. I was a volunteer, 
untrained and unprepared for what I encountered in my work as a nurse in aged care, 
yet the scarcity of workers required that I do the same job as every nurse.  
This woman was one of my first conscious encounters with what Freud named 
the drives. There she was, with her decayed mind, with no hope for orgasm nor hope 
for any other form of satisfaction, yet grinding away at a sexual drive that seemed, 
along with her ability to maintain her body through food, the only functioning force 
in her life. “Drive is not a universal thrust”, as Žižek argues:  
 
breaked and broken up, it is the brake itself … — its “stuckness” … 
The elementary matrix of drive is not that of transcending all 
particular objects toward the Void of the Thing … but that of our 
libido getting “stuck” onto a particular object, condemned to circulate 
around it forever. (Žižek 2006: 62)  
 
Mentally and emotionally the woman seemed evacuated, but her well-fed shell, 
masturbation compulsion and her ability to eat suggested a sheer excess of life —she 
was brutally sincere in her “self-less” state of existence. Yet, her daughter came 
lovingly every night to feed her dinner. How, I asked myself, does she align the 
memory of who her mother once used to be with who she is now? And although I felt 
compassion towards the mother and daughter, and nursed the mother to the best of 
my abilities, I could not, and still cannot make sense of these daily scenes. It reminds 
me of another statement made by Žižek: “human life is never ‘just life’: humans are 
not simply alive, they are possessed by the strange drive to enjoy life in excess, 
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passionately attached to a surplus which sticks out and derails the ordinary run of 
things” (Žižek 2006: 62). 
Psychoanalytic theorization of the genesis of the ego and the pleasure and 
reality principles, as discussed in the previous chapter, brings a wealth of 
understanding to how individuals struggle with their innate needs and wants in a 
world in which reality seemingly stifles desire. My encounter with this strange drive 
in my nursing home experience pointed towards a certain dimension of desire which 
seems to be located beyond the pleasure principle. The French psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan theorized this “something beyond” that marbles throughout our canvas of 
experiences and disrupts our experience of a familiar world. Lacanian theory enables 
one to dive deeper into the meaning of desire, outlined by pioneers such as Freud, 
Klein, Marcuse, and Fromm. Investigating desire is integral in understanding the 
schism of death because desire, excess and violence are not only intertwined in our 




The imaginary/the mirror stage 
 
The psyche is not as hardwired as contemporary attitudes about the self lead us to 
believe. In Lacanian psychoanalysis the self itself is called into doubt. In Lacanian 
understanding, the common notion of the “I” and the popular idea of “finding 
oneself” denote an impossibility due to a void at the core of our being. For Lacan, the 
self is a fetishized illusion; a true self, longing to be released, cannot be found. Yet, 
the resistance to the idea of the self as based on a lack is the thing that keeps our 
illusory self together. This idea can best be understood through an examination of the 
Lacanian threefold system of the psyche consisting of the Symbolic, the Real and the 
Imaginary. Let me begin with a brief introduction to the psychoanalytic background 
to the development of Lacan’s schema. 
After Freud’s death two schools of thought emerged with two different 
approaches to ego conceptualization: a solid ego and illusory ego. Elisabeth Grosz 
remarks that believers in Freud’s “realist ego” saw it as an innate, naturally given, 
psychical instance in which the ego functions as a negotiator between the demands of 
the interior (id) and an exterior reality that constantly impinges upon the individual 
— very much the common idea of a self that is currently popular. In the view of ego 
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psychology, an individual who struggles is believed to have a weakened ego that 
must be strengthened against the tides of the interior and exterior in order to strike a 
healthy balance of selfhood. Lacan, however, argued that ego psychologists never 
challenge their own concepts of ego, id and reality, and he developed a new theory of 
ego interpretation, which he argued remained true to Freud. In Lacan’s reading of 
Freud, he further explored the ego with its narcissistic tendencies, where its function 
involves a systematic refusal of reality. Elisabeth Grosz remarks that:  
 
Psychoanalysis, for Lacan, is resolutely disconnected from medicine; 
it is not an analysis of the “self”, consciousness, or the ego, aimed at 
boosting its performance … Psychoanalysis neither strengthens or 
weakens the ego. It is not a system of “cure” … Psychoanalysis is no 
more — or any less — than an analysis of the unconscious which 
belies the subject’s ego or consciousness … It subverts, renders 
ambiguous, and resists the ego’s conscious ideals. The ego cannot 
judge reality or mediate between reality and desire, because it is 
always marked by error, (mis)recognition or lack. (Grosz 1995: 27–8) 
 
Lacan drew on Freud’s model of a narcissistic ego to develop his own theory of the 
ego’s genesis. The Freudian narcissistic ego is “an entirely fluid, mobile, amorphous 
series of identifications, internalizations of images/perceptions invested in libidinal 
cathexes” (Grosz 1995: 28). For Freud, the ego was a container for libido, where 
“libido can be stored from its various sources throughout the body in the anticipation 
of finding appropriate objects in which it can be invested” (Grosz 1995: 29). Lacan 
was prompted by Freud’s remark that a certain process, a certain structuring of all 
experiences, has to happen (yet in opposition to biological or instinctual processes) in 
order for the ego to come forth. “Ego is the psychical representation of the subject’s 
perceived and libidinalized relation to its body” (Grosz 1995: 31).  
The trajectory of normal ego formation consists of two key moments. The first 
phase is the mirror stage, which marks the constitution of the Imaginary Order, 
which is an illusion of a wholeness that covers up the infant’s state of loss and lack. 
The second invokes the assimilation of language in which the subject is introduced 
into the Symbolic Order. In Lacan’s understanding, the mirror stage — occurring 
between 6 and 18 months of age — invokes the formation of the ego via a process of 
objectification. Even before birth, the infant’s desire is structured by the desires and 
intention of the mother. A human child is heavily dependent on the mother or 
caregiver for its physical and psychical survival. Its care is a necessity of a social 
organization, and in this sense ego development is naturally social as the child has a 
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“syncretic union with the mother” (Grosz 1995: 33). After birth, the child’s drives 
are channelled into erotogenic zones whereby the child is forced to respond to factors 
outside of him/herself. Lacan stressed that the ego emerges from a conflict arising 
from the contrast between an internal emotional experience and a perceived visual 
experience. In Lacan’s words: 
 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes 
precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation — and, for the subject, 
caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that 
proceed from a fragmented image of the body to a what I will call an 
“orthopaedic” form of its totality — and to the finally donned armour 
of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development 
with its rigid structure. Thus, the shattering of the Innenwelt to 
Umwelt circle gives rise to an inexhaustible squaring of the ego’s 
audits. (Lacan 2004: 6) 
 
Desire as primordial lack 
 
To elaborate on this quotation, there are certain conditions that need to be in place 
for the mirror stage to happen. There is the child’s first recognition of a distinction 
between itself and the (m)Other. The child realizes it is not “complete in itself” 
(Grosz 1995: 35) in the sense of being fused with the world and its mother. The child 
also begins to understand that the mother is a separate entity. This is the first 
recognition of lack or absence; henceforth, the ideal state of primordial oneness or 
wholeness becomes an unattainable ideal, placing the infant in a state of disjunction 
between desire and the prospects of fulfilment. Due to this first acknowledgement of 
absence, lack or loss the child is thrown into the mirror stage. Frosh argues that 
“from the beginning, therefore, the child is constituted in relation to lack and loss, 
and that loss has its form in the absence of the object of the child’s desire” (Frosh 
1999: 143). This is important, because whenever Lacan refers to desire it implies 
loss. For Lacan, desire is constituted by an absence, a lack. 
The mirror stage then invokes the child finding a new self-reliance instead of a 
dependence upon the (m)Other. The mirror stage functions as compensation and 
enables the child’s acceptance of this newly discovered lack. This stage might be a 
triumphant moment for the child since it promises self-mastery and control over the 
bracketed and fragmented information that is relentlessly thrown at her/him. For the 
first time, a sort of cohesiveness and congruency has been established, that is 
independent from the (m)Other’s ability to gratify the child’s needs. In 
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acknowledging the mother as absent, a new independence is gained on which base 
the first psycho-sexual drives emerge. This newly discovered auto-erotic pleasure, in 
which parts of the child’s body and its functions (defecation, sucking, etc.) serve as a 
substitute for dependence on the mother’s ability to provide pleasure, is fundamental 
to the mirror stage. Hence the mirror stage is an “internalized psychic sensory image 
of the self and the objects in the world” (Grosz 1995: 32). It also means that for the 
first time the child acquires a basic understanding of space, distance and its position 
in the world. 
It is important to understand that the mirror stage serves as an experience of 
integration or recognition of the individual, in which the child identifies with a vision 
coming from the outside. For Lacan a self cannot be constituted without taking on 
the meaning of the Other (Frosh 1999: 143). There is no innate core of a so-called 
self. What one generally views as self is created by something in relation to 
something outside itself. This process helps the child to distribute the pressures put 
upon him or her by the relentless chaos created by the drives.  
 
Phallus/the Symbolic Order/castration 
 
The mirror phase ends (if it ever does) with the second phase of ego constitution, 
involving the subject moving from primary narcissism into the social or Symbolic 
Order. According to Lacan, the internalization of language plus the relationship to 
the (m)Other determines how the libido is distributed within the Symbolic, as well as 
within the Imaginary Order. The predominant ‘Other’ encountered in the Symbolic 
Order is, according to Lacan, the father (also called the Phallus or the Law). The 
father is what sets up the barrier to full access to the mother (which for the child 
represents pure pleasure). This could be a father figure but it is also the mother’s 
desire to pursue interests of her own, by which a child realizes the untruth of its 
primal desire for union with her. This father figure or, in Lacanian terms, the desire 
of the mother, is itself symbolized (Fink 1991: 25). The Phallus in the Lacanian 
sense is the signifier or the guarantee of the existence of symbolic meaning. As Frosh 
writes: 
 
It is a generative and connecting fantasy, possessed, as one might 
imagine, of an aura of procreation and sexual linkage. On the other 
hand, it also acts materially with real effects, specifically signifying a 
cancellation — it is, therefore, not to be thought as something positive 
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and full of potency, but as a kind of divisive negativity. (Frosh 1999: 
146) 
 
Assimilation into culture demands a division between the imaginary unity between 
mother and child, as well as a symbolic differentiation. The child’s libido becomes 
structured in the sense that it is redirected into culturally appropriate forms of 
expression, which includes the destruction of the incestuous relationship between 
mother and infant.  
Once the child becomes aware of the mother’s incompleteness, he/she 
experiences alienation. Alienation arises from the fact of the mother walking away 
from her child (be it mentally or physically) which then sets the child out on a quest 
to map out the mother’s desire in an attempt to fill the void within her. This is how 
the subject (the individual) is constituted: 
 
to be that which fills her up, to be the all-encompassing object of her 
desire. That very aspiration is what allows the subject to come to be 
— to occupy the space within the Other; he latches onto that space of 
desire, explores its boundaries and aspires to fill it. In doing so he 
proves that the mother is not whole and complete — she is barred. 
(Fink 1991: 22) 
 
This mechanism, also known as castration, marks the dissolution of the Oedipal 
infatuation with the mother. The child experiences the Phallus as the mother’s desire, 
which creates a moment of loss, depression and a profound sense of emptiness 
within. Realizing, at an important time in the child’s development, that the mother 
has desires other than the child results in the experience of castration, in the sense of 
individuation from the mother. However, it is impossible to pinpoint what the 
missing thing is. “[T]he signifier which signifies the subject” (Fink 1991: 23) cannot 
be identified by the child. In this sense the (m)Other is always linked to an 
incompleteness or insufficiency. It is important to discern that the Other of the 
Symbolic Order has a different function than the primordial ideal of the Mother. 
Richard Feldstein defines the Other as follows: 
 
The Other holds a place other than the site of the subject. A self-
contained set of signification, the Other insists on the alterity of the 
unconscious: it has its own demand, its own desire, its own time, and 
its own linguistic effect, all of which can be understood as impersonal. 
For whenever we move from the personal, “I believe that you should 
do this,” to the impersonal, “It is imperative that you do that”, we 
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witness the linguistic turn indicating our identification with the place 




The Real, existing outside the Symbolic and Imaginary orders, is lurking underneath 
the perceived normality, leaving its fingerprints on the façade of the imaginary’s 
integrity. The Lacanian Real is not to be mistaken with what is generally understood 
as reality, which includes its imaginary and symbolic representations. For Lacan the 
Real is what the world is to an individual prior to his or her entry into language. Life, 
one could say, is the constant progression of the Real, which is all that is pre-lingual, 
into reality (the Symbolic). Thus, the signifier, the Symbolic Order, cuts “fissures” 
into the Real in order to push it outside our perception.  
The infant is born into the field of the Real. The emergence of the ego marks 
the point when the child ventures outside the order of the Real. Elisabeth Grosz 
defines the Real: 
 
The real is the order preceding the ego and the organization of the 
drives. It is an anatomical, “natural” order (nature in the sense of 
resistance rather than positive substance), a pure plenitude of fullness. 
The Real cannot be experienced as such: it is capable of representation 
or conceptualization only through the reconstructive or inferential 
work of the imaginary and symbolic orders. It is what is 
“unassimilable” … in representation, the “impossible” … Our 
distance from the Real is the measure of our socio-psychic 
development. The real has no boundaries, borders, divisions, or 
oppositions; it is a continuum of “raw materials”. (Grosz 1995: 34) 
 
The impossibility of desire and its social determinants 
 
According to Lacan, social reality is structured through meta-narratives or what he 
calls master signifiers in order to create a “unified field of meaning” (Feldstein 1995: 
150). Master signifiers structure the meaning-making process, which implies that a 
free-floating signifier’s meaning is altered depending on which master signifier it 
relates to. For example, free-floating signifiers like success take on a different 
meaning in relation to the master signifier “democracy” than in relation to the master 
signifier “God”. Under the master signifier “God”, the signifier “success”, for 
example, might take on the meaning of spiritual liberation or unity with God. Under 
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the master signifier democracy, “success” might imply financial freedom and 
materialism.  
This shows that the master signifiers determine the ideology, the final reference 
or guarantee of meaning, according to which all other signifiers will be understood. It 
is important to discern that this is not because the master signifier actually has an 
inherent meaning or essence: 
 
but simply because it is able to halt the process of referral by the 
empty gesture of referring only to itself. This “reflective” signifier is, 
therefore, nothing more than a kind of cul-de-sac in the chain of 
equivalences. This means … that “beneath” the alleged unity of the 
field of meaning, there is only a tautological, self-referential, 
performative gesture. (Gunkel 2014: 193)  
 
Further, the master signifier is arbitrary; in fact, it is no different from any other 
signifier. However, other terms cluster around and gain their significance through 
this master signifier. Because of this arbitrariness, the master signifier is introduced 
not through reason but rather through an, often concealed, violent and capricious 
imposition within the Symbolic Order. In order to understand any ideology, Žižek 
(2006) argues, the master signifier at its centre must be analysed.  
There is an important link between symbolization and desire in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. For Lacan, desire is based on castration (alienation), which means 
that the subject becomes structured by the Other and this marks a loss of “primal 
jouissance” (Feldstein 1995: 156) — the primal unity with the mother. This “primal 
jouissance” is ruptured by the Other’s lack, which means that the child is prompted 
to map out the (m)Other’s desire, which in turn determines their assimilation into the 
Symbolic Order. However, something of the “primal jouissance” remains and this 
resists symbolization. In Lacanian terminology these aspects that resist 
symbolization are referred to as objet petite a, but I will refer to them as “object a”. 
Object a (although escaping the Symbolic) therefore becomes a reminder of the first 
encounter with the Other, and becomes part of the subject, yet will always remain 
more than the subject.  
It is important to note that object a is not desire in itself, it is the cause of desire 
and through object a one gets attached to an empirical object of desire. Russel Grigg 




In this respect we need to distinguish between the desired object, 
which is an empirical object, and the object as cause of desire, which 
Lacan calls object a; for it is through and by means of object a that the 
empirical object becomes an object of desire; the object doesn’t form 
part of the desired (empirical) object but constitutes, causes, the desire 
for that object — hence its name, “object a, cause of desire”. (Grigg 
1991: 34) 
 
But, so Lacan argues, the formation of our specific desires comes from outside the 
social order. Meanings are fixed and predetermined by the overarching structure of 
culture, as are each person’s desires aligned with the omnipresent Symbolic Order; 
therefore desire is the function of the Law. 
Regarding desire, one must take into account the important social function of 
fantasy, which Lacan understands as “a screen between the subject and the Other” 
(Grigg 1991: 34). Fantasy is not to be understood as escapism but an enactment of 
desire. Fantasy acts as a structuring, stabilizing force, acting in the name of the 
Symbolic, that turns simple objects into objects of desire. “Far from being a retreat 
from reality, fantasy is what gives shape and structure to desire and makes it possible 
for the neurotic subject to act upon his or her desire in the empirical world” (Grigg 
1991: 34). 
 
Language and the Thing 
 
To further the understanding of desire, one has to look at the earliest experiences of 
the individual. For the infant, birth involves a separation from nothing less than 
her/himself in the sense of an assumed unity with mother and environment. Hence, 
the first encounter with the Other is also the encounter of the lack of her/himself — 
the object that cannot be regained (Frosh 1999: 142). The infant probably has actual 
distinguishable needs since there is a difference between the sensation of having a 
full diaper and an empty tummy. However, it is doubtful whether the infant is 
capable of differentiating between sensations of desire and gratification. For 
example, the mother/caregiver responds to the baby’s discontent and, by naming 
him/her, attempts to soothe the child, thus introducing him/her to language. Frosh 
observes: “in this sense language confers individuality on the subject introducing the 
I–you dialectic by structuring its position with respect to culture” (Frosh 1999: 145). 
Speech serves as a means to receive a response from the Other, but the identification 
with language leads to an object-like self-loss. The subject cannot be present to itself 
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due to the fact that the “I”, experienced in language, is constructed through the 
discourse that surrounds it (Frosh 1999: 148). Therefore, the omnipotence of “I” 
encountered in the state of the Imaginary is under siege once it enters into the 
Symbolic Order: 
 
The positioning of the subject with respect to language requires an 
encounter with otherness in a way that fractures the omnipotence of 
the mirrored “I” in the Imaginary. If the Imaginary celebrates the 
fictitious identity of subject and ego, it is the tearing of this identity 
that produces the positioning of the subject into the Symbolic order, 
and at the same time constructs the unconscious by repression. (Frosh 
1999: 145–6)  
 
Thus humans are primordially within language and used by language. And here is 
where distinct desire resides. In order not to experience the self-loss in language, the 
boundary between self and the other needs to be reemphasized. Although at the core 
of desire is the fulfilment of the subliminal loss and lack, satisfaction is impossible, 
as discussed earlier. Once need is articulated in language, it can be called an actual 
desire, emerging from the embodiment of speech. In this sense Lacan stated, “The 
symbol first manifests itself as killing the Thing [la chose] and its death results in the 
endless perpetuation of the subject’s desire” (Lacan 1966: 391).  
To elaborate on this point let me explain the importance of the Thing (la chose) 
in the Lacanian context. “[T]he signifier, Lacan argues, can be full only because it is 
empty, because it brings into being with its creation a void, a gap at the heart of the 
Symbolic” (Rutherford 2000: 32). Yet something remains that resists symbolization 
— the Thing. As Freud had earlier argued, the entry into language involves a 
“transformation of perceptions into a system of associations” (Rutherford 2000: 33). 
The pre-lingual representations are essentially without substance, without anything to 
hold on to.4 These representations are at the level of the Real in the sense that they 
are not packaged into a thought; they are not yet wrapped in signifiers. These 
representations are beyond words, “unthinkable, unnameable, unspeakable” (Fink 
1995b: 227). Our engagement with the objects of the world, Freud argued, is 
fragmented and chaotic. Once symbolized, they are organized through laws of 
association and combination, metaphor and metonymy. What is in the unconscious 
                                                
4 Another term would be the German Vorstellung, which is what is represented by the 




can only be known once it finds its way into the conscious in the gestalt of 
experiencing pleasure or pain. Let us take the experience of a hungry infant:  
 
The screams of the baby are unable to provide satisfaction; only the 
intervention of an external other can archive a return to the 
equilibrium of the pleasure principle. Thus discharge of the 
endogenous excitation requires communication, the cry to an other — 
and Freud conceives of this as the origin of all moral motives: “the 
initial helplessness of human beings is the primal source of all moral 
motives. (Rutherford 2000: 34)  
 
Thus the experience of satisfaction is an empirical one and relies from the very 
beginning on the Other, “a speaking subject” (Rutherford 2000: 34). Grigg describes 
Lacan’s thesis as “beyond desire as desire articulated to a desired object, there is the 
Thing” (Grigg 1991: 32). Rutherford provides the following definition of the Thing: 
 
The Thing is both a residue that resists symbolisation and the void that 
symbolisation creates … The Thing, for Freud, is a first outside: a real 
that never enters into the constitution of reality through language. The 
Thing exists prior to, and as a consequence of, the constitution of 
reality by the reality principle, by the transformation of perception 
into thought. It is the primary Other which never enters into the 
construction of that sifted and selected reality we inhabit, but is 
nevertheless present. Lacan understands sociality as organised around 
the attempt to capture, repudiate or control the unsignifiable Thing. 
(Rutherford 2000: 32–3) 
 
The Thing is constitutive for the subject but it is loss as such, “a loss that is prior to 
that which is lost, prior to the lost object … loss itself that is original … pure loss” 
(Grigg 1991: 33). It marks that which cannot be signified and is unable to enter the 
Symbolic Order. And while it indeed follows the principles of metonymic 
substituting within a signifying chain, that means the objects that represent this desire 
are substitutable (romantic partners, expensive gadgets, etc.). However, the desire as 
such cannot be touched and must not be confused with the desired object. Russel 
Grigg defines the Thing as “that which is in me more than I am” (Grigg 1991: 34). It 
lies within but at the same time it remains terrifyingly alien. Fantasy, Lacan argued, 
as the enactment of desire, serves as a screen or barrier between the subject and the 
Other, behind which the Thing is located. This protective screen prevents the subject 
from a traumatic encounter with the Thing. The Thing is essentially ambiguous, 
which means that at the same time it attracts, repels, and provokes both desire and 




Repetition/the death drive  
 
To return to the question of the death drive, to understand the Lacanian view of the 
death drive, one must consider its relationship with the Symbolic Order, in which 
repetition compulsion plays a major role. The death drive, Lacan wrote, is not a 
“perversion of the instinct, but rather that desperate affirmation of life that is the 
purest form in which we recognize the death instinct” (Lacan 2004: 321). The death 
drive represents the “fundamental tendency of the symbolic order to produce 
repetition” (Evans 2006: 33). Lacan understood it as a form of masking of the 
Symbolic Order, a cultural mechanism to keep the Thing at a distance. He referred to 
repetition compulsion using the terms “insistence of the signifier” or “insistence of 
the signifying chain”, implying that the compulsion to repeat is “fundamentally the 
insistence of speech” (Evans 2006: 167). Language allows for difference by 
becoming assimilated under a sign, and through the repetition the signifying 
difference is made equivalent by language. As Bruce Fink explains: “All 
identification … is based on the taking up of events, objects, etc. into the symbolic 
order, their being attributed particular words or names” (Fink 1995b: 223). Fink 
gives the example of a woman for whom all boyfriends have blue eyes. The signifier 
does not change (the boyfriends are different but not the colour of their eyes), 
thereby creating a serialization of substitutes. In Seminar IX Lacan states that 
repetition is a missed encounter with the Real. Hence the urge to repeat and repeat 
(the blue eyes of each boyfriend), because the unsignified element within the 
Symbolic cannot be located. 
The Real, Fink writes, is “that which always comes back to the same place” 
(Fink 1995b: 224) because the excluded element makes it impossible for the subject 
to meet it. Or in other words, repetition is a missed or impossible encounter with the 
Real (Rutherford 2000: 38). Laplanche and Pontalis define this compulsion to repeat 
as an “ungovernable process originating in the unconscious” (Laplanche and Pontalis 
1985: 441), hence the attempt to find the lost object is foredoomed. That the 
selection criterion for the boyfriend is blue eyes cannot be known consciously, 
because it is excluded from this signifying chain, but the chain revolves around this 
excluded element (Fink 1995b: 225). Unaware of this repetitive behaviour, the 
subject seems unable to identify what is at stake. Hence Lacan’s famous remark: 
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“Repetition is an insistence of signs” (Fink 1995b: 225), but whatever is 
“represented” through repetition is never “presented”: 
 
It is the missing Vorstellung (missing in the symbolic, in the 
representational space of the dream — not something missing in the 
real) that leads to repetition. It thus seems to be situated at the level as 
the lost object — the object that never was, as such, but which is 
retroactively constituted as having had to have been lost. (Fink 1995b: 
227–8) 
 
Thus object a, the cause of desire, is repetition. “Object a” is the placeholder for the 
Real, that “cannot speak for itself” (Fink 1995b: 228). The signifier creates, and by 
the same token kills, the very thing it aims to represent. The lost satisfaction, the 
constant re-visiting of the place that is incomprehensible, is constituted by the Real. 
No object will ever fill the void and deliver the kind of satisfaction one is yearning 
for, because “the symbolic order kills the living being or organism in us, … and only 
the signifier lives on” (Fink 1995a: 101).  
Let me now return to the question of death and its elision in modernity. 
Existential questions of death and desire are at the core of human experience, yet 
historically, cultural attitudes have changed and shaped the individual itself, thus 
radically altering approaches to both death and desire. As I discussed in chapter 1, 
death, infused with the mystery of the Real, has lost its place in society. As life 
expectancy has risen so too has the cultural occlusion of death. But something else 
has also gained a cultural stronghold — capitalism — an economic system playing a 
central role in the transformation of the individual and in the emergence of a self 
with an eroded death awareness. Capitalism has hijacked people’s desires and 
funnelled them into consumerism and its related displays of status. The emergence of 
the Protestant ethic has long been recognised by sociologists (Weber 2000, Fromm 
2001, Lemert 2011) as playing a central role in the emergence of capitalism. I want 
to now look more closely at how the spirit of capitalism fuels the cultures of the 
death drive in order to further pursue the implications of the Lacanian death drive 
and desire in connection to death elision in capitalism. 
 
Desire and the case of the Protestant ethic 
 
The Reformation was a turning point in the history of modernity. The Reformation 
began as a theological revolution that spread to the social, political and economic 
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realms. In the sociological classic The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism 
(2000 [1930]) Max Weber famously argued that modern individualism evolved from 
the transformation of Protestants, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, into 
the secular individuals who became the driving agents behind worldly and economic 
progress and success. These individuals became a force in history whose impact 
reverberates to this very day. Indeed, some argue that democracy, the nation-state 
and the free market as well as modern individualism have sprung from their 
development (Taylor 2007: 43; Lemert 2011: 8). 
At the core of the Lutheran revolution was a new understanding of the self, or 
human subjectivity, brought on through one mechanism: the turn inwards. Luther’s 
Reformation drew its revolutionary force from capturing the desire of people for 
more financial security and for greater protection from the institutions of the church. 
As Charles Lemert puts it so aptly: 
 
The very idea of the Protestant Reformation was that it was the 
individual alone who acts in faith to believe and, by the time one gets 
to later Calvinism, the believing individual is meant to demonstrate 
faith by acting as if he one were among the saved — this by the hard 
work of building up God’s world. (Lemert 2011: 8) 
 
The church had held power through its position as mediator between humans and 
God. People needed to rely on the church’s sacraments, attained by buying one’s 
remission from punishment in purgatory from the Pope. Luther’s doctrine uprooted 
the power of the church and gave people a new independence in religious matters; 
authority was handed to the individual. 
In The fear of freedom (2001 [1941]) Eric Fromm explores the emergence of 
the Protestant ethic and its influence on the meaning of freedom. While Luther and 
the later Calvin gave people greater freedom from the authority of church, the 
flipside, so Fromm pointed out, was Luther’s “emphasis on the fundamental evilness 
and powerlessness” of humans (Fromm 2001: 64). In order to overcome this 
evilness, individual will had to be demolished and submission to God became a must. 
Only then was there hope of receiving God’s grace. Therefore, one of the crucial 
points of Lutheranism was the understanding of faith. Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses 
of 1517 contained the revelation that faith was the path to God and that faith was 




The individual is essentially receptive in this relationship to God. 
Once man receives God’s grace in the experience of faith his nature 
becomes changed … However, man can never become entirely 
virtuous during his life, since his natural evilness can never entirely 
disappear. (Fromm 2001: 66)  
 
In the era before Protestantism the purpose of one’s life was spiritual salvation. Now 
with these newly articulated beliefs, especially that of one’s worthlessness, the stage 
was set for searching for one’s individual purpose outside of oneself. The individual 
became more and more ready for economic productivity, the accumulation of capital, 
obedience towards authority and subordination of one’s life to economic 
achievements (Fromm 2001: 72). The theologian John Calvin added new layers of 
complexity to Luther’s ethics. One can even argue that his main contribution was in 
systemizing, institutionalizing and internalizing Protestantism in subjects who in turn 
went out to change the world.  
The dualism of the Protestant ethic was enhanced in Calvinism through the 
notion of God’s radical transcendence on one side and the world, which is 
entrenched in sin and corruption, on the other. According to Calvin humans are 
totally dependent on God’s grace not only for salvation but in all aspects of life 
(Taylor 2007: 71). In Calvinism, the transcendence of God aims to describe God’s 
omnipresence in all realms, so that God and the world cannot be divided. Through 
this immanence of the divine, God acts even through the sinner’s wrongdoings. 
Taylor writes: 
 
The affirmation of human impotence and divine omnipotence leads to 
the unexpected identification of God with self and by extension world. 
At this point, the logic of opposition reverses itself in a logic of 
identity and creates the implosion of the sacred and profane. (Taylor 
2007: 73)  
 
This collapse of transcendence into immanence gave way to a new subjectivity.  
The cornerstone of Calvin’s school of thought was his doctrine of 
predestination, in which some are predestined for salvation and others for damnation. 
This, however, is not brought on and cannot be controlled by something a person 
does in life but is given pre-birth. Reasons for this selection remained a secret one 
was not allowed to question or dwell on. This newly held belief in the inequality of 
individuals, however, increased the feelings of powerlessness and insignificance 
already set forth by Luther. To ease this quandary, Calvin proposed that moral effort 
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and a virtuous life was of utmost importance, despite the fact that one’s 
predestination could not be changed and he stressed the need for ceaseless effort to 
accumulate merit (Fromm 2001: 78). 
With time, this striving to accumulate virtue gained more and more 
significance. Fromm argued that Calvin’s rationalization of people as powerless and 
insignificant must have left individuals in an unbearable state of anxiety and 
uncertainty. To lessen the sting of this situation, Calvin’s doctrine offered a frantic 
escapism, which progressively translated into seeking for worldly signs of God’s 
benevolence (Fromm 2001: 78). Although Calvin taught his followers that worldly 
success were an assurance, but never the cause, of salvation, soon the hope and belief 
that redemption could be earned through good works and a virtuous life (or at least 
the pretence of one) crept in and took the movement in a new direction.  
The Protestant/Calvinist pursuit of unity and salvation unfolded historically 
and culturally against a backdrop of high anxiety, driven by fear regarding one’s 
unworthiness of God’s benevolence — the fear of the ineffable as such. For Luther 
faith alone was the critical element. For Calvin, however, in order to showcase one’s 
status as saved, one needed empirical riches and success. These belief systems 
organized the experience of social reality through a master signifier “God” in which 
arbitrary signifiers like “salvation” implied ceaseless work and financial success. 
Despite this new burden of ceaseless work, Calvinism proved to be engaging 
for the Western world and thus had the power to transform society from within. In 
this line of thinking, people were now encouraged to engage directly with the world 
rather than retreat from it (Taylor 2007: 67). But as Fromm cautioned, work has now 
become an inner compulsion that goes beyond maintaining one’s living standard, or 
simply enjoying the realization of one’s productive creativity and ability (Fromm 
2001: 81). Luther and Calvin’s doctrines presented a picture of an individual in 
which the individualistic relationship to God provided the psychological preparation 
for the individualistic character of people’s secular activities — and this forged the 
basis for contemporary capitalism. 
This Protestant inward turn as well as the new possibility of a direct 
relationship between humans and God was motored by an internal desire. The 
Protestant ethic was grounded in the ceaseless effort for a moral and virtuous life and 
relentless striving for productivity. Desire was articulated through the accumulation 
of worldly riches as evidence that one had been chosen by God. The fantasy of being 
saved was based on an individualistic relationship to God and led directly into the 
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secular pursuits that remain a central part of contemporary society. While in this 
mindset the Calvinist God was now directly accessible, people still had to negotiate 
their perceived powerlessness and God’s assumed omnipotence. We can see that 
anxiety and desire go hand in hand in Protestantism plus it has injected anxiety 
directly into the culture, where it remains at the centre of contemporary cultural 
formations. Believers in the Protestant ethic and the Calvinist school of thought 
adhered to an excessive, never-ceasing productivity and effort (repetition 
compulsion) in order to avoid the existential pitfalls in their belief system creating a 
scenario for the death drive to find fulsome expression. In the next chapter I will 
discuss the fallout of this existential anxiety but first I want to return briefly to 
Lacan’s concept of jouissance to better understand how repetition and the pursuit of 
one’s desires can lead to excess and pain. 
 
Desire and jouissance 
 
Jouissance is a term that is hard to translate into English. It relates to the English 
“enjoyment” but also carries the meaning “orgasm”. Jouissance is a key term that 
takes on various meanings throughout the progression of Lacanian thinking. These 
meanings include jouissance as the pleasure of orgasm, hinting at joy that in itself is 
beyond communication and thus can acquire a mystical flavour. The term jouissance 
also contains the idea of desiring desire. This is distinct from desire in that the 
subject does not only strive to satisfy his/her desire but enjoys desiring itself. To 
enjoy one’s desire is essential to jouissance. Dylan Evans explains: 
 
In other words, desire is not a movement towards an object, since if it 
were then it would be simple to satisfy it. Rather, desire lacks an 
object that could satisfy it, and is therefore to be conceived of as a 
movement which is pursued endlessly, simply for the enjoyment 
(jouissance) of pursuing it. Jouissance is thus lifted out of the register 
of the satisfaction of a biological need, and becomes instead the 
paradoxical satisfaction which is found in pursuing an eternally 
unsatisfied desire. (Evans 1999: 5) 
 
The later Lacan (1959–60/1992) understood desire as the drive that aims — 
unsuccessfully — at jouissance. There is a distinct difference between these two 
different versions of the jouissance–desire relationship. In the first version desire and 
jouissance coexist: the subject enjoys desiring and jouissance sustains desire. In the 
latter account desire aims at jouissance, because “desire is predicated on a lack of 
 
 76 
jouissance, since one can only desire what one cannot have” (Evans 1999: 6). Here 
jouissance is aligned with pain and suffering, since desire is pursued and manifested 
to the point of excess. One can think about the pleasure principle as a cost–benefit 
analysis of a given situation, in which sometimes the renunciation of the desired 
object leads to a better future or the improved well-being of the subject. The pleasure 
principle, therefore, focuses always on the subjects’ overall enjoyment.  
Jouissance, however, has an utter disregard for the potential negative long-term 
consequences of a decision. It is when the calculating cost–benefit homeostasis of the 
pleasure principle is axed that the ego experiences pain. Jacques-Alain Miller 
suggests that “jouissance in itself is a certain destruction, and precisely in this it 
differs from the pleasure principle, in its sense of a certain moderation and a certain 
well-being. The very name jouissance fundamentally translates what resists the 
pleasure principle’s moderation” (Miller 1992: 26). Russell Grigg argues that 
jouissance is a “traumatic irruption of an appeal to the impossible, pitiless and 
insatiable jouissance, enjoyment, which disrupts the homeostasis of the pleasure 
principle and its prolongation of the reality principle” (Grigg 1991: 32). Jouissance 
means ambiguity. As Grigg writes, “there is enjoyment and satisfaction here, but its 
kernel is essentially horrifying. It simultaneously attracts and repels, provokes both 
desire and shame” (Grigg 1991: 34). In this understanding, pleasure cannot be 
obtained without the by-product of suffering, although suffering is distinctively not 
enjoyed. Evans describes the link between jouissance and the death drive as follows:  
 
The prohibition of jouissance (the pleasure principle) is inherent in the 
symbolic structure of language, which is why jouissance is forbidden 
to him who speaks, as such … The DEATH DRIVE is the name given 
to that constant desire in the subject to break through the pleasure 
principle towards the THING and a certain excess jouissance; thus, 
jouissance is “the path towards death” … Insofar as the drives are 
attempts to break through the pleasure principle in search of 
jouissance, every drive is a death drive. (Evans 2006: 93–4) 
 
Jouissance is the important factor that prevents the Symbolic Order from being 
immune to the death drive and to compulsive repetition. Hence, desire (empirical 
objects), jouissance and the compulsion to repeat (object a) are connected through 
the death drive. The subject finds itself on losing ground, unable to attain the essence 
of the desired thing which has no basis in the Symbolic Order. Every drive is a death 
drive because it pursues its own extinction, it engages the subject in repetition and it 
aims at the “realm of excess jouissance where enjoyment is experienced as suffering” 
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(Evans 2006: 34). Jennifer Rutherford stresses that, for Lacan, “lived reality” is 
primarily constructed as defence, and sociality functions according to the logic of 
this defence: 
 
Thus he conceives of desire as a movement that seeks to transgress the 
limit of the pleasure principle, and in contrast he conceives the law as 
a system of defence that seeks to uphold it — to maintain the distance 
separating the subject from the object cause of desire. (Rutherford 
2000: 37)  
 
In the Lacanian sense the death drive connotes a reaching beyond the limits of the 
pleasure and reality principle. Culture therefore is a product of its defence habits 
regarding the Thing and its desirous strivings towards the Thing. 
To return to the example of the Protestant ethic, the new concept of the self 
(the individualized relationship to God) was concretized through individual 
(repeated) action, involving the ceaseless effort to live a virtuous life to showcase 
one’s individual relationship with and one’s election by God. This relentless drive 
correlates to the felt social anxiety on which modern individualism is based. This 
anxiety is birthed in the shadow of individuating away from a God through a change 
of perspective. Instead of bargaining oneself a way into heaven, through ceaseless 





To return to the question of mortality, reminders of mortality are not as prevalent as 
they used to be but sickness, brushes with mortality, or even a moment of sincere 
contemplation can act as memento mori. Here death awareness, the interruption of 
the assumed permanence, has the potential to enter the realm of the uncanny, a place 
that cannot be embraced by rationality, or escaped by busyness, where social 
milestones measuring success or failure lose their importance. The realm of death is 
pure emptiness, where meaning liquefies and human ambition becomes pointless. In 
the process of dying, the wider world, the inner ring of sociality, the body, and the 
mind begin to fade; the body breaks down and the hard work of the ego and its 
illusions are shattered or once-established boundaries begin to fade. The individual 
encounters being-ness as neither subject nor object. The sheer existential knowledge 
of the body’s and mind’s decay brings forth a feeling of powerlessness, horror and 
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rejection. This rotting of borders and the breakdown of the binaries (world vs. me, 
subject vs. object, order vs. chaos) is the space where meaning collapses. The 
Lacanian influenced psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva describes this as abjection.  
Once one is beset by abjection, Kristeva observes, the content of thought no 
longer has a definable object, “the abject has only one quality of the object — that of 
being opposed to I” (Kristeva 1982: 1). The abject and abjection, however, also stand 
as a safeguard, in that they send the subject away from the horror of sinking into this 
moment. Kristeva describes a  
 
“something” that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of 
meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and 
which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and hallucination, of 
a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. (Kristeva 1982: 2)  
 
According to Kristeva the abject marks the phase in which the self is established, in 
which the infant separates from the mother and the individual comes into being. This 
is the phase in which the borders that separate the self from the other are created. As 
we have seen, in Lacanian theory the infant moves through the mirror stage, in which 
the Imaginary is grounded, and from there is introduced into the realm of the 
Symbolic through the acquisition of language. The abject marks the horror, the threat 
which arises when one fears being thrown back into the pre-linguistic realm. Kristeva 
calls this primal repression (Kristeva 1982: 10). The abject serves as a guard against 
the uncanny ineffable, and in guarding the self it becomes clear that “‘I’ am in the 
process of becoming an other at the expense of my own death, during that course in 
which ‘I’ become, I give birth to myself amid the violence of sobs, of vomit” 
(Kristeva 1982: 3). 
Nothing evokes the feeling of disgust, shock and horror more than the corpse. 
A corpse symbolizes that which one casts away in order to live, and to function in the 
symbolic: 
 
In the presence of signified death — a flat encephalograph, for 
instance — I would understand, react, or accept. No, as in true theater, 
without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me what I 
permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, this 
defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with 
difficulty, on the part of death. There, I am at the border of my 
condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, 
from that border. Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from 
loss to loss, nothing remains in me and my entire body falls beyond 
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the limit — cadere, cadaver. If dung signifies the other side of the 
border, the place where I am not and which permits me to be, the 
corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached 
upon everything. It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled. The 
border has become an object. How can I be without border? (Kristeva 
1982: 3–4) 
 
The abject is not only a border; it is ambiguity. In our expulsive, disgusted reaction, 
“revolt against” allows a space out of which “signs and the object arise”. Kristeva 
says:  
 
I experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and instead 
of what will be “me.” Not at all an other with whom I identify and 
incorporate, but an Other who precedes and possesses me, and through 
such possession causes me to be … Significance is indeed inherent in 




Life has this uncanny push towards excess. In the beginning of the chapter I 
discussed the woman I encountered as a young nurse who still obsessively followed 
the call of her sexual desires although her decaying mind was in the end stage of 
dementia. This is one example of excess that happens behind closed doors but it 
shows that jouissance is deeply rooted in the human psyche. Excess, while not 
acutely at the centre of our cultural awareness, has certainly infiltrated the fringes of 
current cultural self-understanding.  
Excess comes in all kinds of disguises. For instance we find evidence of excess 
in the shape of overeating, over-exercising, over-drinking, smoking, hoarding, 
gaming, shopping obsessions and various forms of exclusion and inclusion. Climate 
change is another form of social excess, spawned by relentless overconsumption and 
exploitation of global resources. Yet it is hard if not impossible to break the cycle of 
our own contribution to overconsumption. 
Lacanian theory seeks to explain this propulsion of the subject by his or her 
desires. In the era before Protestantism the purpose of one’s life was spiritual 
salvation. In what Ariès called the era of the tame death, religion and mysticism 
served to keep the Thing within its bounds and provided people with the means to 
cope with living in the shadow of death. This worked well in a time when the social 
environment was tightly organized. The emergence of modern capitalism and its 
associated belief structures, exemplified by the Protestant ethic, settled as a deep-
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seated anxiety in the midst of our culture as the cost of greater freedom — direct 
access to God. The pursuit of secular economic success has provided no means to 
escape this new form of existential anxiety. Luther’s Protestantism aimed at worldly 
asceticism but over time the opposite effect unfolded as materialism became 
conflated with spirituality.  
The Protestant ethic triumphed (and fails the individual) through its cruel 
notion that humans are inherently evil and that some are elected and others not. This 
ideology is incapable of providing a map to navigate our existential angst. It puts the 
Thing as the invisible elephant amidst our social environment, unknowingly framed 
by ceaseless productivity, while at the same time mortality awareness has declined. 
Today, death, illness, climate change, and other life-transforming occurrences simply 
carry no meaning for many individuals. It is difficult to be open to the existential 
meaning of death because of its lack of symbolization in contemporary culture. A 
heightened understanding of death requires letting death infuse and reframe one’s life 
and belief systems. This change is often initiated physically through illness, trauma, 
loss, or the intense labour of caring for a dying person. Or one can be confronted 
through the gaze, when faced with a dead body. Here the abject, the physical 
response of encountering the Thing, is the very threat that pulls at the ego. This 
contemporary existential illiteracy is deeply rooted in the Protestant ethic and it 
comes as no surprise that death denial has taken hold of modern society.  
The repercussions of this and its impact on our current self-understanding will 
be discussed in the following chapter. It will then become clear how a contemporary 
death drive is enmeshed in language, culture and individual preferences. In the 
meantime capitalism has hijacked desire and anchored it in consumerism, death still 





The necrophile self 
 
Capitalism and desire: consumption and excess 
 
In his essay, “The reality principle and the pleasure principle strike a deal” (2007), 
Zygmunt Bauman argues that we live in a time where the pleasure principle is 
married to the reality principle. Pleasure has become an integral part of everyday 
reality. Life for the individual is devoted to the search for pleasure. With modernity 
and the shift towards an obsession with consumption, desires are no longer 
constricted but rather encouraged through an ideology of consumerism. Consumption 
is understood to make one “feel better”. The maximization of consumption has 
become a new mechanism, a new rationality that is fuelled by instant gratification, 
consumer spontaneity, and credit cards (Bauman 2007: 187). 
This consumerist creed is deeply intertwined with the increasing social and 
global unpredictability of late modernity. Shopping, Bauman notes, has become the 
new coping mechanism in a world that is haunted by the constant threat of change 
and instability. People experience an acceleration of transient partnerships, job 
insecurity, abruptly changing demands for skills, and an unstable community, signs 
of the constant flux and unpredictability of society. Bauman suggests that the living 
body itself becomes the only constant in a sometimes abruptly changing, 
untrustworthy world. As the body provides the last bastion of stability, consumerism 
provides a mechanism for streamlining and optimizing one’s ego and personal life. 
Society, Bauman contends, cannot produce continuity anymore. It is left to the 
individual and his/her consumerist habits (Bauman 2007: 193). The body, aging and 
susceptibility to disease and accidents, also reminds us of our mortality. The ever-
present invitation to partake in instant consumption pushes away the fear of the 
future, cuts ties to the past, and helps create a superficial sense of liberation. As he 
writes, “The rationality of consumer society is built out of the irrationality of its 
individual actors” (Bauman 2007: 188). Consumerism is self-perpetuating since it is 
both addictive and easy, and the lure of shiny products gives false promises that one 
can buy predictability and stability: 
 
The consumer market sets the finishing lines close enough to prevent 
desire from exhausting itself before the goal is reached, but frequently 
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enough for the runners never to worry about the durability of the 
spoils’ value and for desire never to ponder frustration but always be 
eager to start afresh and never lose its vigour. (Bauman 2007: 194) 
 
Slavoj Žižek’s critique of capitalism and ideology provides insight into how attitudes 
to desire have changed. Žižek argues that capitalism has become the hidden 
background to which all sociality and symbolization relates. Capitalism structures the 
field on which many elements (master signifiers) fight for domination. The 
pervasiveness of this background makes it increasingly impossible to envision a 
world not entrenched in the capitalistic modus operandi. It is easier — as popular 
culture attests — to envision the end of the world than the undoing of capitalism. In 
Žižek’s understanding, capital becomes the new Real, constituting a background 
against which all symbolizations must relate. The smooth functioning of capital is 
that which remains the same, that which “always returns to its place” (Žižek 2000a: 
223). He also states that we are unable to envision an alternative to global capitalism 
since it “structures in advance the very terrain on which the multitudes of particular 
elements fight for hegemony” (Žižek 2000b: 320–1).  
The ruthless expansion of capitalism, with its absolute demand for growth and 
progress, is in utter disregard of humans and the environment and has now reached a 
point at which it is threatening human existence through the proliferation of 
wastelands, pollution, and the extreme economic inequality between rich and poor. 
Echoing Žižek, Naomi Klein argues that people of the Gilded Age in the USA 
(between the end of the Civil War and the market crash in 1929) actually 
experienced a time before contemporary capitalism dominated and thus had a 
different vision for which to fight. This is in contrast to today: 
 
The latest inequality chasm has opened up at a time when there is no 
popular memory — in the United States, at least — of another kind of 
economic system. Whereas the activists and agitators of the first 
Gilded Age straddled two worlds, we find ourselves fully within 
capitalism’s matrix. So while we can demand slight improvements to 
our current conditions, we have a great deal of trouble believing in 
something else entirely. (Klein 2015) 
 
Capitalism is both consuming, but it also excels in using crises for self-generation. 
For example, financial speculation can have a negative impact on whole populations 
and societies. Nowadays, the financial sector can generate large sums of money by 
speculating on the failure of a corporation or even on the economic struggle of whole 
countries. This is not an act committed by evil-spirited human beings. It is a purely 
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“objective”, systematic and anonymous undertaking. Capitalism appears 
indestructible because it uses any obstacle to propel it forward, and it is permanently 
self-revolutionizing and self-reproducing. In this crude focus on materialism that 
drives capitalism, the circulation and expansion of capital becomes an end in itself. 
Žižek writes: 
 
Its dynamic of perpetual self-revolutionizing relies on the endless 
postponement of its point of impossibility (its final crisis or collapse) 
… in capitalism, crisis is internalized, taken into account, as the point 
of impossibility which impels it into continuous activity. Capitalism is 
structurally always in crisis — which is why it is expanding all the 
time: it can only reproduce itself by “borrowing from the future”. 
(Žižek 2012: 473) 
 
In an unpredictable social world, materialism is predictable and can be comforting, 
because capitalism speaks to an individualized morality lodged in the creed “follow 
your desires”. Contemporary capitalism has a grip on subjectivity, because it not 
only seduces subjects but also demands enjoyment. These demands upon the body 
are a form of super-ego enjoyment, the prevalent form of enjoyment of late 
capitalism. Drawing on Marcuse’s concept of the performance principle, one could 
say that pleasure has risen out of the ashes and merged with a reality that demands 
excessive enjoyment, mostly through the consumption of commodities. Here, even 
the most absurd desires (manifestations of object a) become consumable, as long as 
they are profitable. The subject’s cannot penetrate and withstand the capitalistic grip 
because capitalism is presented as freedom, which fools the individual into adhering 
to its standards. This freedom, however, is illusory and acts as a mere distraction 
while serving capitalism’s reproduction. 
Consumer individualism is fuelled by phantasmatic images proliferated by 
modern media. In the rise of popular social media platforms like Pinterest and 
Instagram, seductive images accelerate and strengthen the desire to consume. As 
Žižek writes: 
 
At the immediate level of addressing individuals, capitalism, of 
course, interpolates them as consumers, as subjects of desire, 
soliciting in them ever new perverse and excessive desires (for which 
it offers products to satisfy them); furthermore, it obviously also 
manipulates the “desire to desire,” celebrating the very desire to desire 
ever new objects and modes of pleasure. However, even if it already 
manipulates desire in a way which takes into account the fact that the 
most elementary desire is the desire to reproduce itself as desire (and 
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not to find satisfaction), at this level, we have not yet reached drive. 
(Žižek 2006: 61) 
 
The consuming self 
 
Social theorists have explored the question of how capitalism alters the perception 
and conception of “the self”. Anthony Giddens, for example, looks at the modern 
individual’s preoccupation with composing an identity through image, bodily 
attractiveness and various self-realizing accomplishments. Self-development, he 
argues, is “the creation of a personal belief system by means of which the individual 
acknowledges that ‘his first loyalty is himself’” (Giddens 1991: 80). While 
emphasizing the concept of reflexivity that allows for an opening up of identity, he 
also points out that, while throughout history an identity or self has always been 
valued, modernity has brought changes in how this identity becomes nuanced. The 
self becomes a project for which the individual is responsible: “We are not what we 
are but what we make of ourselves” (Giddens 1991: 75). Further, the “trajectory of 
the self” is organized in the sense that it appropriates the past in order to create a 
future. Monitoring one’s inner reactions in relation to outside events is mandatory for 
the reflexive self. Reflexivity can only be accomplished by spinning a narrative of 
one’s inner and outer life. Of course, the story of oneself would not be complete 
without making, creating, and being aware of one’s body and its functions. Giddens 
argues that the body forms part of an “action system” which is daily honed and 
controlled via diet and exercise: “Experiencing the body is a way of cohering the self 
as an integrated whole, whereby the individual says ‘this is where I live’” (Giddens 
1991: 76). The body is a focal point in the endeavour to construct a narrative of self-
development, a “reflexively mobilized trajectory of self-actualization” (Giddens 
1991: 79). In this imaginary construct, one’s authenticity is discovered by laying 
open the “true self”, removing the “false” one, and by continuously grasping new 
opportunities and weaving them into a “series of passages”, turning one’s 
autobiography into a successful story. All these endeavours aim at fulfillment of the 
modern ideal of the self’s trajectory. In Giddens’ words:  
 
Fulfillment is in some part a moral phenomenon, because it means 
fostering a sense that one is “good”, a “worthy person”. “I know that 
as I raise my own self-worth, I will feel more integrity, honesty, 




In this sense, Giddens understands reflexivity as a mental tool that anchors the body 
and modern self as a beacon of stability in a fleeting and fast-changing world.  
The attention one’s body and inner life receive can have various 
manifestations. In Reinvention (2013), Anthony Elliott draws on the concept of 
reflexivity to describe contemporary society as obsessed with outer appearance and 
modern lifestyles. Dieting, life coaching, cosmetic surgery, reality television, and 
other means of consumerism create shiny new products that promise an enhancement 
of oneself and one’s experiences. Elliott argues: “the art of reinvention is inextricably 
interwoven with the lure of the next frontier, the break through to the next boundary, 
especially boundaries of the self” (Elliott 2013: 4).  
The human body becomes a commodity that is highly valued and seen as a 
playground (or rather a battlefield) on which the evaluation of self-worth and societal 
values are made. Reinvention, so Elliott argues, is a central driver, not only within 
the personal realm, but also nationally and globally. The global electronic economy 
plays a central role in the ways in which corporate and institutional uncertainties 
(off-shoring, lay-offs, company reorganizations) force people to adapt and redefine 
their relations and experiences regarding intimacy, family, work, and the self. In a 
world in flux, these new realities play a crucial part in generating a cultural anxiety 
that restructures identities and contributes to a cultural obsession with change and 
reinvention. Elliott argues this involves a recasting of the self: 
 
In this narcissistic condition, the self is recast as a do-it-yourself 
assembly kit. Reality becomes magically deflated, as there are no 
longer any constraints imposed by society, at the same time the self is 
inflated to the level of work of art […] drunk on the narcissistic 
fantasies of the ego, the endlessly self-fashioning individual of 
reinvention society is revealed as a compulsive neurotic, addicted to 
repeating the highs and lows of a life made over, again and again. 
(Elliott 2013: 6) 
 
Elliott pins this down to the idea that through reinvention one affirms oneself and 
legitimates one’s experiences. He argues: 
 
The reinvention craze paradigm extends beyond the core of the self to 
the body, that distracting reminder of mortality in a world where 
disposability has been elevated over durability, plasticity over 
permanence. The culture of speed and short-termism promoted by the 
global electronic economy introduces fundamental anxieties and 
insecurities that are increasingly resolved by individuals at the level of 




Now at the centre of contemporary anxiety is the constant validation of self. This 
kind of makeover response to global anxieties is quite new, since individuals are left 
to their own devices to work out their life and future prospects. People are judged 
and assessed, not on their previous accomplishments, but on their adaptability to 
embrace change and their willingness to succumb to the ideal of personal makeover. 
Long before Giddens and Elliott, the US historian Christopher Lasch warned 
that the contemporary self is influenced by the ideas of privatism and absorbed by an 
antisocial preoccupation with self-image, appearance, bodily self-improvement, and 
social survival. In his book published in 1979 The culture of narcissism, Lasch views 
the change of self-conception in the shadow of capitalism as inherently negative. He 
argues that, in the wake of this superficial consumer culture, narcissistic personalities 
emerge that are unable to form caring and open relationships since they are hooked 
into consumer capitalism’s promise to fill emotional holes. Life becomes drained of 
meaning, in Lasch’s reading, because capitalism has become, as Žižek suggests, the 
backdrop of everything. Personal relationships falter in the wake of this development 
and are replaced by an attitude of detachment necessary to navigate the demands of 
the modern world and its sudden changes. This disconnection leads to the 
misrecognition of local, as well as global, problems as people increasingly succumb 
to capitalism’s seductive invitation to follow one’s desire. Yet, the inability to make 
meaningful cultural and symbolic connections leaves the individual with a deeply 
disturbed sense of self-worth and self-esteem. The following passage eloquently 
elaborates the implications of the narcissistic self as it plays out in aging patients: 
 
the great argument for making the attempt [at psychoanalysis] at all, in 
the face of the many difficulties presented by narcissistic patients, is 
the devastating effect of narcissism on the second half of their lives — 
the certainty of terrible suffering that lies in store. In a society that 
dreads old age and death, aging holds a special terror for those who 
fear dependence and whose self-esteem requires the admiration 
usually reserved for youth, beauty, celebrity, or charm. … “To be able 
to enjoy life in a process involving a growing identification with other 
people’s happiness and achievements is tragically beyond the capacity 
of narcissistic personalities”. (Lasch 1991: 41, quoting Kernberg 
1975: 312) 
 
This bleak analysis of the modern self has been critiqued for its negative focus on the 
individual as merely a cultural victim, instead of a conscious participant (Aronson 
2013: 263). But Lasch is not alone in his stark view of the modern individual. 
Richard Sennett (1977: 333) boldly claims that narcissism is the new Protestant ethic 
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of contemporary society. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I discussed Weber who proposed 
that the loss of ritualistic religion (Catholicism) led to a “denial of gratification for 
purposes of validating the self” or in different words “worldly asceticism”. By 
denying immediate pleasure while ceaselessly pursuing a virtuous life, one could 
enact this worthiness as a “chosen subject”. Sennett compares the traits of the 
modern narcissist with the “worldly asceticism” of Protestantism and concludes that 
both focus on the inner emotional life as validation of the worthy self. In Sennett’s 
thesis: “In both there is a projection of the self onto the world, rather than an 
engagement in worldly experiences beyond one’s control” (Sennett 1977: 334). This 
inward turn is generated and maintained through secularism and capitalism, which 
have erased “the belief of an experience external to the self” (p. 334). The 
mechanism of this narcissistic attitude is withdrawal from the environment and from 
others, especially if self-validation is not found through others, or if one’s self is not 
the centre of attention.  
Narcissism and asceticism mesh because the inside is conceived as absolute 
reality, the search for the self — for one’s self. Optimizing mind, body, and emotions 
has found a major market in modern times. The individual is in constant self-
optimization mode, or conversely in a state of guilt through failing to adhere to the 
standard of self-optimization (eating the wrong food, not exercising enough, etc.). 
Sennett argues that there is a flow of continuous self-denial. The flawed self is 
rejected (as signifying one’s inner unworthiness, which equates to a form of social 
death) and, because of this experienced dissatisfaction, one’s energies are constantly 
focused upon oneself. Self-denial and self-absorption go hand in hand for the 
narcissist. 
If we recall that the existential anxiety at the centre of Protestantism and 
Calvinism was never resolved but heightened, the belief that humans are inherently 
evil and that one’s salvation (essentially one’s immortality) is based on the non-
penetrable arbitrariness of a fickle God, narcissism provides a bastion against an 
existential deadlock. Brené Brown suggests that the underbelly of narcissism is 
shame. While she is sceptical about the frequent use of the term narcissism, she 
observes:  
 
The topic of narcissism has penetrated the social consciousness 
enough that most people correctly associate it with a pattern of 
behaviors that include grandiosity, a pervasive need for admiration, 
and a lack of empathy. What almost no one understands is how every 
level of severity in this diagnosis is underpinned by shame … Shame 
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is more likely to be the cause of these behaviors, not the cure. (Brown 
2013: 21) 
 
God, as master signifier, is greatly diminished; worthiness must still be negotiated 
through increasingly self-centred actions. Brown makes a further observation about 
contemporary narcissism:  
 
when I look at narcissism through the vulnerability lens, I see the 
shame-based fear of being ordinary. I see the fear of never feeling 
extraordinary enough to be noticed, to be lovable, to belong, or to 
cultivate a sense of purpose. (Brown 2013: 22)  
 
Lasch and Sennett developed critiques of capitalism and the modern self long before 
the obsession with the body took on new heights in the form of today’s reinvention 
culture. The body has emerged as a mirror to the inner life of a person, and one’s 
morals and value are judged by its surface. Having one’s inner life judged by its 
outer appearance henceforth determines one’s social life or death, since one does not 
appear to be a congruent being if body and mind appear to be mismatched. This 
requires a narcissistic reflexivity that operates in the narrow framework of 
contemporary immortality strategies. However, rarely stepping outside its 
boundaries, this reflexivity never graduates into a reflection of existential matters 
because of the inaccessibility of the meaning of mortality and death. Thus, it comes 
as no surprise that attitudes towards desires have changed as well. 
 
Attitudes towards (empirical) desires 
 
Fantasies of the body are the magic of our time by which an abruptly changing world 
seeks refuge, distraction, and defence. Empirical indicators suggest that in the West 
this is transforming the individual’s relationship to desire. Desire is no longer viewed 
as something off limits. In an international study on consumer passion, social 
scientists Belk, Ger and Askegaard found that consumers today love to be seduced 
and are yearning for unity with the product of their dreams. Belk et al. define desire 
as a 
 
powerful cyclic emotion that is both discomforting and pleasurable. 
Desire is an embodied passion involving a quest for otherness, 
sociality, danger, and inaccessibility. Underlying and driving the 
pursuit of desire, we find self-seduction, longing, desire for desire, 
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fear of being without desire, hopefulness, and tensions between 
seduction and morality. (Belk et al. 2003: 326) 
 
Desire, they found, is a highly charged expression that contains seduction, sexual 
passion, a burning drive, emotionality, and passion. Desires come alive in a social 
world which “directly addresses the interplay of society and individual, of bodily 
passions and mental reflection” (Belk et al. 2003: 329). The imagination that 
underlies desires is fuelled by social context, lifestyle, and value systems. Attempts 
to fulfil these desires often involve consuming. They suggest that an underlying 
concept of the self supports this system of consumption: 
 
The modern subjectivity produces a more subtle form of power that is 
perceived as freedom. To do this, individuals must first come to feel 
that they have a free will, agency, a freedom to choose their lifestyle. 
This, in turn, requires that people “monitor their inner thoughts and 
desires” … in order to become the sorts of people they would like to 
be. This does not mean that they are really free agents, but it entails a 
felt agency, a particular (modern) self-construction, and self-
presentation. In modernity, we have a choice of selves, but becoming 
a choosing self is not freedom but a strategy of modern governance. 
(Belk et al 2003: 331) 
 
Writing on subjectivity in modern Turkey, Belk et al. made the observation that older 
generation Turks with a working-class background did not see themselves as in a 
position to indulge their passionate desires, whether for a car or a house. The “call of 
duty” towards family, land, and work prompted them to take a practical stance 
towards their desires. They observe: 
 
With consumer desire beyond hope, some feel that they do not have a 
life. But, rather than despair, they construct desire itself as unrealistic 
for themselves as well as many others like themselves. These are also 
voices not only of poverty but also of a duty-first mentality. Such a 
mentality reflects the Islamic notion of God’s will and the traditional 
cultural emphasis on the family, downplaying the individual, free will, 
and choice. (Belk et al. 2003: 334) 
 
This is exactly the sentiment expressed in the classic “deferred gratification” 
pleasure–reality principle dichotomy, in which postponing desire is necessary in 
order to attain the greatest amount of pleasure at a later date. This presumes the 
ability to calculate and sacrifice short-term pleasures for long-term ones, the very 
core of reasoning. The reality principle thus functions as an inherent prolongation of 




Ideologies of consumption — consuming ideologies 
 
Ariely and Norton argue that, in order to understand consumption today, one has to 
consider a shift from the consumption of food to the consumption of ideas or 
concepts that address people’s insatiable desire for stories. Materialism, they suggest, 
not only aims to satisfy basic needs but also to signal one’s social identity, attitudes, 
beliefs, status, and lifestyle to others. In all forms of consumerist behaviour, there is 
an investment in a story, or concept. This also extends to physical consumption, 
because “preconceptions and ideas about consumption can act to modify the physical 
consumption experience itself” (Ariely and Norton 2009: 380). The way people 
engage with the environment, the goals they pursue, are all built upon a certain 
understanding, certain concepts of what they ought to immortalize or to which group 
they want to belong. People are driven by the desire for experience, because 
experiences can be shared with others or displayed in various forms of social media, 
(as the popularity of the “selfie” suggests). Pursuing a certain goal such as fitness or 
health has an impact on the consumer’s purchasing decisions and thus plays into the 
hands of the health and fitness industry by providing a ready market for expensive 
sport gear, dietary advice, supplements and so on. 
Consumption also seduces by offering the hope of transformation, the appeal of 
an altered state, which promises escape from one’s mundane and trite existence. In 
2013 the US corporation Apple ran a print, online, and television advertising 
campaign named “Designed by Apple”. In one of their advertisements one can read: 
 
This is it. 
This is what matters. 
How it makes someone feel. 
Will it make life better? 
Does it deserve to exist? 
 
If you are busy making everything, 
How can you perfect anything? 
We spend a lot of time 
On a few great things. 
Until every idea we touch 
Enhances each life it touches. 
 
You may rarely look at it. 
But you’ll always feel it. 
This is our signature. 
And it means everything. 
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Designed by Apple in California. (Macleod 2013) 
 
While there is no image of their product, the picture shows two black teenagers 
sharing Apple’s iconic white headphones and gazing down at something outside of 
the picture (probably one of the Apple gadgets). Apple lures with an “experience” 
that promises a light-hearted change for the better. This longing for transformation is 
sometimes driven by nostalgia, other times by curiosity and, in the case of young 
Turks, as Belk et al. (2003: 335–6) argue, a disdain towards one’s own non-modern 
environment. The same is reflected in Apple’s advertisement which claims that their 
push towards perfection guarantees the enhancement of one’s life by purchasing their 
product. Consumption, or the desire behind it, also targets the need for sociality or 
belonging. In this case, the object of desire becomes the code for entering a certain 
social group with a certain lifestyle, or ideals. The desire behind consumption is felt 
almost viscerally and is often also attractive because of its “wildness”, “danger”, and 
“immorality”. Belk et al.’s interviewees often used words like “excitement”, “fear”, 
“inner turmoil”, “free”, “alive”, and “active” to describe these yearnings (Belk et al. 
2003: 337–9). Furthermore, desire is fuelled by the inaccessibility of the object of 
desire. Belk et al. make an interesting observation: 
 
Although the distance, restraints, and inaccessibility themes emerged 
in each site, there were subtle cultural differences, with distance being 
greatest among the Turkish informants and least among the 
Americans. This helps us to understand the muting of desires among 
some lower-income Turks who felt that there was no hope of attaining 
desires. (Belk et al 2003: 340) 
 
Ariely and Norton (2009) provide another example that suggests that even charity 
can function as a form of consumption. Happiness, so Ariely et al. argue, increases 
when people trade off their physical consumption for the benefit of others in the form 
of donations. However, the willingness to donate is generated by connecting with the 
story of an individual and her/his struggle, rather than through donating to a 
statistical anonymous group in need. This suggests that people need a storyline in 
order to connect with a group of people before they make a donation. Ariely and 
Norton point out that a possible reason might be that people like to “consume a view 
of themselves as altruistic individuals, leading to the benefit of increased well-being” 
(Ariely and Norton 2009: 487). 
Like Žižek, Belk et al. see consumer desire as a cycle that has a self-




Although desire is experienced as an emotion focused on a certain 
object, it is also seen as a process during which emotions change, 
especially with the realization of desires. The initial course of the 
cycle of desire is seen as involving self-seductive imagination and 
active cultivation of desire. Desire is cultivated and kept alive until the 
object is acquired or until it becomes clear that it is beyond hope, that 
it will never be acquired. (Belk et al 2003: 340) 
 
Consuming concepts involves essentially adhering to the ideology inherent within an 
idea or concept. Ideology is an important social illusion, made of signifiers that 
constitute social groups or political identities. A master signifier fixes the meaning of 
these floating signifiers, which then become part of the structured network of 
meanings. In this sense, Žižek’s term “ideological interpellation” carries the 
following meaning: “Ideologies are conceptualized as composed of signifiers that 
constitute the political identities of social groups, but that ‘float’ because they can be 
articulated into various constellations, so that the struggle to articulate a hegemonic 
ideology is always open” (Boucher 2014: 130). 
Consumption, in this sense, becomes a social and ethical experience and mode 
of statement shackled to the capitalistic demand for enjoyment. This is also, if not 
especially, true for progressive causes (i.e. organic food, fair trade), as Žižek argues. 
Manipulative products, which promise that with their purchase a tree is planted, a 
child saved from running around barefoot, and so on, operate on a false state of 
emergency. People are propelled into activity on the grounds of guilt over their own 
pleasurable lifestyle and privilege. Such products have the implicit message “buy, 
don’t think”, whereas their motive is de-politicization while easing guilt. This 
marketing keeps capitalistic engines running while abolishing consumer guilt and 
deeper critical reflection. “The very act of participating in consumerist activity is 
simultaneously presented as a participation in the struggle against the evils ultimately 
caused by capitalist consumerism” (Žižek 2010a: 356). This liberal, tolerant 
hedonism flourishes in a time in which no break between the pleasure principle and 
the reality principle exists, as Bauman observes in his essay “The reality principle 
and the pleasure principle strike a deal” (2007). In his interpretation, human desires 
are aligned with capitalistic demands and practices just as Marcuse warned fifty 
years ago in his book Eros and civilization (1962 [1955]). In his thought, capitalism 
strips humans of their essence, and a person’s desire becomes organized by a largely 




Drive vs desire: undeadness  
 
To understand the global, cultural, and local consequences of consumerism and its 
mechanism, one must carefully distinguish between drive and desire. In Žižek’s 
understanding, the death drive does not stand in the service of total annihilation of 
tension (as in the Freudian idea of the nirvana principle). The death drive is in the 
service of self-reproduction. Desire, to reiterate, is the  
 
standard notion of the terrifying and fascinating abyss of anxiety 
which haunts us, its infernal circle which threatens to draw us in, the 
second stands for the “pure” confrontation with objet petit a as 
constituted in its very loss, [in other words] this sole object with 
which Nothing is honored. (Žižek 2006: 61)  
 
Desire is grounded in its constitutive lack. The drive, however, circles around a “gap 
in the order of being”: 
 
Drive inheres to capitalism at a more fundamental, systemic, level: 
drive is that which propels the whole capitalist machinery, it is the 
impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular movement of 
expanded self-reproduction. We enter the mode of drive the moment 
the circulation of money as capital becomes “an end in itself, for the 
expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed 
movement. The circulation of capital has therefore no limits.” (Here 
we should bear in mind Lacan’s well-known distinction between the 
aim and the goal of drive: while the goal is the object around which 
drive circulates, its (true) aim is the endless continuation of this 
circulation as such. (Žižek 2006: 61) 
 
In order to distinguish between desire and drive, one must understand that desire is 
about the lost object, whereas drive is about the loss itself as an object.  
 
That is to say: the weird movement called “drive” is not driven by the 
“impossible” quest for the lost object; it is a push to enact “loss” — 
the gap, cut, distance — itself directly. There is thus a double 
distinction to be drawn here: not only between objet petit a in its 
fantasmatic and postfantasmatic status, but also, within this 
postfantasmatic domain itself, between the lost object-cause of desire 
and the object-loss of drive. (Žižek 2006: 62)  
 
The domain of the death drive is spectral undeadness. In fact, it insists in its cycle of 




it is, on the contrary, the very opposite of dying — a name for the 
“undead” eternal life itself, for the horrible fate of being caught in the 
endless repetitive cycle of wandering around in guilt and pain. The 
paradox of the Freudian “death drive” is therefore that it is Freud’s 
name for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears within 
psychoanalysis, for an uncanny excess of life, for an “undead” urge 
which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of life and death, of 
generation and corruption. The ultimate lesson of psychoanalysis is 
that human life is never “just life”: humans are not simply alive, they 
are possessed by the strange drive to enjoy life in excess, passionately 
attached to a surplus which sticks out and derails the ordinary run of 
things. (Žižek 2006: 62) 
 
What Freud called the death drive is his psychoanalytic term for immortality, 
obscene immortality: the evil persistence and insistence that pushes beyond life and 
death, a zero level and almost metaphysical dimension of a self-relating negativity — 
the ultimate immortality strategy. 
For Lacan, desire is an ethical category in terms of jouissance that dismisses 
long-term calculations for pleasure, for an immediate push towards (and beyond) the 
desired object. Lacan, in saying “do not compromise your desire”, refers to the 
consistency with and fidelity to one’s own desires, which are beyond the pleasure 
principle. This is encouraged and exacerbated by contemporary materialistic 
immortality strategies. Hunting after one’s desires (empirical objects) is exactly what 
maintains the capitalist status quo and creates the many diverging lifestyles so 
notorious in capitalist societies in the West. The need for constant consumption 
concerns object a, which is not part of the Symbolic Order. However, it causes the 
desire for material objects and reinforces the capitalistic backdrop. Žižek believes 
that the subject is capable of radical autonomy. This sheer possibility of truly 
autonomous ethics does not allow for a cultural standard, because it pushes towards 
object a, which lies outside the Symbolic order:  
 
the Lacanian objet petit a is the exact opposite of the Master-Signifier: 
not the subjective supplement which sustains the objective order, but 
the objective supplement which sustains subjectivity in its contrast to 
the subjectless objective order: objet petit a is that “bone in the 
throat”, that disturbing stain which forever blurs our picture of reality 
— it is the object on account of which “objective reality” is forever 
inaccessible to the subject. (Žižek 2000a: 239) 
 
Object a, as the remainder of the primary jouissance, is part of the subject. Thus the 
subject cannot be reduced to a place in the Symbolic Order because within him or her 
is always that excessive thing, that something “more than itself”. This is exactly 
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where the modern individual runs into the knife of capitalism. Bauman’s idea that the 
pleasure and reality principles are fused should be refined by an understanding that 
the contemporary hunt after one’s desire does not concern pleasure, but jouissance. 
The pain and excess of this jouissance is not an immediate experience, during or 
right after consuming, but delays the consequences in forms such as financial debt 
and ecological disasters, fostered by the ruthless manufacturing machinery of 





The contemporary creed of consumer individualism — enjoy! — gives the illusion of 
control of one’s self and life, while discouraging reflection on the consequences of 
this experience-enhancing lifestyle. Aging, illness, death and decay, pollution, 
climate change, and so on are opaque signifiers that are unable to penetrate the shiny 
surface of the Symbolic and only find their way into the lives of the individual when 
directly confronted. Let me give you an example to flesh this theory out. In a recent 
New York Times article, Kate Bowler, a historian in her mid-thirties with stage IV 
cancer, talks about her struggle in a death-illiterate environment. For her earlier book 
Blessed: a history of the American prosperity gospel (2013), she researched a 
popular belief among Christians that those with the “right kind of faith” are granted 
wealth and health from God. This belief is partially based on the American 
metaphysical tradition of the “New Thought”, which Bowler explains as “a late-19th-
century ripening of ideas about the power of the mind: Positive thoughts yielded 
positive circumstances, and negative thoughts, negative circumstances” (Bowler 
2016b). 
During her research, Bowler encountered televangelists with “spiritual 
formulas for how to earn God’s miracle money”. She visited mega churches, 
undertook pilgrimages and interviewed believers from various backgrounds. She 
says, “If there was a river running through the sanctuary, an eagle flying freely in the 
auditorium or an enormous, spinning statue of a golden globe, I was there” (Bowler 
2016b). In this tradition, spirituality is conflated with materialism. To Bowler’s 
surprise, even Mennonites, known for their humble appearance and simplicity, 
cannot resist the pull of God’s grace in the shape of quasi-spiritual abundance, 
wealth and luxury. Bowler argues that the American fascination with the power of 
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the mind manifests in the popular self-help genres used to answer difficult questions 
about hardship and disease, why some people are healed and some not: 
 
The modern prosperity gospel can be directly traced to the turn-of-the-
century theology of a pastor named E. W. Kenyon, whose evangelical 
spin on New Thought taught Christians to believe that their minds 
were powerful incubators of good or ill. Christians, Kenyon advised, 
must avoid words and ideas that create sickness and poverty; instead, 
they should repeat: “God is in me. God’s ability is mine. God’s 
strength is mine. God’s health is mine. His success is mine. I am a 
winner. I am a conqueror.” Or, as prosperity believers summarized it 
for me, “I am blessed”. (Bowler 2016b) 
 
For people following the prosperity gospel, the term “blessed” has become their 
ideology, a master signifier under which one affirms “God’s goodness” and Jesus’ 
sacrifice, so humans can live in abundance. The idea of “being blessed” merged into 
an American phenomenon in which people feel encouraged to excuse their excessive 
consumptions, their jouissance, as God’s will. Bowler stresses: 
 
Blessed is a loaded term because it blurs the distinction between two 
very different categories: gift and reward. It can be a term of pure 
gratitude. “Thank you, God. I could not have secured this for myself.” 
But it can also imply that it was deserved. “Thank you, me. For being 
the kind of person who gets it right.” It is a perfect word for an 
American society that says it believes the American dream is based on 
hard work, not luck … This is America, where there are no setbacks, 
just setups. Tragedies are simply tests of character. (Bowler 2016b) 
 
The signifier “being blessed” creates meaning that occurs at the site of the Other, and 
the big Other here is the God of the prosperity gospel. Material abundance is seen as 
a worldly recast of God’s benevolence, but it also spawns death-illiterate subjects, 
who are incapable of relating to illness or death without their predetermined map of 
signifiers. “Blessed” is their defence strategy through which they protect themselves 
from the thing. Troubles, like illness and death, are merely seen as testing one’s 
character, or as punishment for scorning God. The inability to let the meaning of 
death penetrate the subject’s awareness has to do with the non-symbolized reality 
behind death and illness, a reality that Bowler, as somebody “critically ill with 
cancer” (Bowler 2016a), is forced to confront. The believers are unable to meet 
Bowler where her life becomes consumed by illness and death, because these 
concepts remain opaque to them. Lacanian psychoanalyst Bruce Fink observes that 
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individuals keep nudging against certain terms, with which they cannot establish a 
connection: 
 
It might be a term like death for instance, or any other term which 
seems opaque to the analysand, a sort of repeated endpoint in what he 
or she says, which always seems to put an end to associations, instead 
of opening things up. Here the analysand is, in a sense, encountering a 
total opacity of meaning — he may well know what the words mean 
in his mother tongue, remaining ignorant, however of what they mean 
to him, their special, personal meaning that has some kind of 
subjective implication. The subject here is eclipsed by a master 
signifier without meaning. (Fink 1991: 27) 
 
This death illiteracy surfaces when interacting with people. A well-meaning believer 
told Bowler’s husband that everything happens for a reason. Bowler writes about the 
encounter: 
 
“I’d love to hear it,” my husband said. 
“Pardon?” she said, startled. 
“I’d love to hear the reason my wife is dying,” he said, in that 
sweet and sour way he has. 
My neighbor wasn’t trying to sell him a spiritual guarantee. But 
there was a reason she wanted to fill that silence around why some 
people die young and others grow old and fussy about their lawns. She 
wanted some kind of order behind this chaos. Because the opposite of 
#blessed is leaving a husband and a toddler behind, and people can’t 
quite let themselves say it: “Wow. That’s awful.” There has to be a 
reason, because without one we are left as helpless and possibly as 
unlucky as everyone else. (Bowler 2016b) 
 
The inability to relate to the meaning of death and illness is not only a shortfall of 
people adhering to the prosperity gospel. Bowler observes the same kind of unease in 
other friends, no matter if they are of academic or “hippie” background. Researchers 
urged Bowler to “out-know” her disease while the hippies pushed her towards 
“healing foods”. The master signifier, whether it is “being blessed”, “living 
naturally”, or “knowledge”, serves to deflect the thing. Regarding the Christian 
ideology, she remarks sharply: 
 
The prosperity gospel popularized a Christian explanation for why 
some people make it and some do not. They revolutionized prayer as 
an instrument for getting God always to say “yes.” It offers people a 
guarantee: Follow these rules, and God will reward you, heal you, 
restore you … My world is conspiring to make me believe that I am 
special, that I am the exception whose character will save me from the 
grisly predictions and the CT scans in my inbox. I am blessed. 
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The prosperity gospel holds to this illusion of control until the 
very end. If a believer gets sick and dies, shame compounds the grief. 
Those who are loved and lost are just that — those who have lost the 
test of faith … There is no graceful death, no ars moriendi, in the 
prosperity gospel. There are only jarring disappointments after fevered 
attempts to deny its inevitability. (Bowler 2016b) 
 
This kind of death illiteracy is at the base of Kellehear’s suggestion that death 
awareness has been eroded, as discussed in the Chapter 1 of this thesis. Stigma, 
Kellehear suggests, is a reaction to avoid defeat, as well as the suppression of a 
sincere, personal connection with the meaning of the word “death”. Death establishes 
the incoherency of this ideology. Death is a fissure through which the real pushes 
itself back into our lives, colliding with the ideology of its effacement of stigma. 
Bowler describes the undoing of her own desires and beliefs through her illness: 
 
CANCER has kicked down the walls of my life. I cannot be certain I 
will walk my son to his elementary school someday or subject his love 
interests to cheerful scrutiny. I struggle to buy books for academic 
projects I fear I can’t finish for a perfect job I may be unable to keep. I 
have surrendered my favorite manifestoes about having it all, 
managing work-life balance and maximizing my potential … Cancer 
requires that I stumble around in the debris of dreams I thought I was 
entitled to and plans I didn’t realize I had made. 
But cancer has also ushered in new ways of being alive … 
everything feels as if it is painted in bright colors. In my vulnerability, 
I am seeing my world without the Instagrammed filter of breezy 
certainties and perfectible moments. I can’t help noticing the 
brittleness of the walls that keep most people fed, sheltered and whole. 
I find myself returning to the same thoughts again and again: Life is so 
beautiful. Life is so hard. (Bowler 2016b) 
 
Interestingly, both spirituality (or God) and death hint at the un-symbolizable, the 
unknown or mystical, that is the very driver, the very desire, of these congregants. 
However, Bowler, being caught in the quicksand of the thing, is now staring into the 
abyss of her own vulnerability, which is opposite to and disproportionate to 
(capitalist) ideologies that promise control and distraction. The capitalist demand to 
enjoy! is surely exaggerated for the ones buying into the ideology of “being blessed”, 
and their denial (as well as the unease of Bowler’s friends) is essentially heightened 
by consumerism. Although death illiterate and unable to be present to the difficult 
emotions arising in the shadow of a terminal diagnosis, they attempt to break though 
the walls of their symbolic shackles through excess accumulation. That is the mode 
of jouissance, a path towards death, towards the Real.  
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Despite the vast choices of experiences or ideologies, consumption is a 
dominating force. Letting these non-sensical master signifiers inject new meaning 
into well-groomed lives might seriously undermine the scheme of capitalism. Naomi 
Klein writes of her denial of climate change: 
 
I denied climate change for longer than I care to admit. I knew it was 
happening, sure. But I stayed pretty hazy on the details and only 
skimmed most news stories. I told myself the science was too 
complicated and the environmentalists were dealing with it. And I 
continued to behave as if there was nothing wrong with the shiny card 
in my wallet attesting to my “elite” frequent-flyer status. 
A great many of us engage in this kind of denial. We look for a 
split second and then we look away. Or maybe we do really look, but 
then we forget. We engage in this odd form of on-again-off-again 
ecological amnesia for perfectly rational reasons. We deny because we 
fear that letting in the full reality of this crisis will change everything. 
(Klein 2014)  
 
While not every member of society participates in compulsory consumption or in 
excess, they remain hooked into its networks of consumption. One needs to buy meat 
and vegetables from the supermarket; one prefers to rely on information supplied by 
mass media and short-lived technology; one needs transportation and housing and so 
on. The choices for each of these forms of consumption have expanded exponentially 
with the evolution of capitalism. Whether one decides to adhere to a liberal tolerant 
hedonism and its ideology or prefers to live off the grid, no matter if one enjoys 
one’s consumption or one displays an aversion towards it, in contemporary times, the 
generation of meaning is linked to capital. The modern way of desiring and 
consumption is ever-present and impacts on the life of all members of society. Living 
in contemporary society means, whether you like it or not, you are (to whatever 
degree) a contributor to excess. 
 
Perverted immortality strategies 
 
To return to Bauman’s idea of an immortality strategy by fusing both his and Žižek’s 
theories, the systemic destruction and violence of our contemporary times becomes 
clearer. Zygmunt Bauman points out that his book, Mortality, immortality and other 
life strategies (1992), was not meant to be read as a study of something necessarily 
dangerous or unhealthy, but rather aimed to be a study of “liminal situations”, of 
human strategies to deal with the most existential issues that are by their nature 
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impossible (Bauman in Jacobsen 2011: 383). It is more of a human bargaining with 
the aim to postpone, defeat, disarm death or escape the fact of mortality (or the 
impermanence of things as such). His Mortality, immortality and other life strategies 
(1992) is, as such, not concerned with the event of death but with the way death is 
coped with, its effects and impact on life areas that have no direct connection with 
death. In an interview, Bauman described this focus as “the presence of death as a 
ghost haunting the totality of life” (Bauman in Jacobsen 2011: 386). He further 
observes:  
 
our presence-in-the-world is totally without foundations and therefore 
meaningless and absurd, yet the same facilities that allow us or force 
to be aware of that absurdity make of us obsessive meaning-makers. 
We are, simultaneously, victims of absurd and its indefatigable 
fighters/conquerors. (Bauman in Jacobsen 2011: 386)  
 
On a physical level, seeking immortality is impossible. However, through 
prolongating life on a social level, we seek to leave behind a legacy, evidence of 
having lived a life of meaning. These sublime forms of immortality are, in Bauman’s 
words: 
 
forms of “ethereal living”, in the sense of continuing to be present in 
human memory and never disappearing from it without chance of 
resurrection; not “being un-dead” is here at stake, but “being un-
forgotten” — reminding ourselves to the living through the (durable, 
perhaps even indestructible) traces of our presence. (Bauman in 
Jacobsen 2011: 399)  
 
Immortality, in this sense, can also be read as a defence strategy against helplessness, 
felt vulnerability, and our inability to control the existential cycles of birth and death. 
Bauman is right when he states that immortality strategies are not dangerous, since 
they are a human way to build culture, to make sense of our existence and to build a 
bridge from life into death. Yet in contemporary times, immortality strategies are 
infused with a lethal death drive that enjoys excess, produces excess waste, ever new 
ways of exploitation and the destruction of our ecosystems and human lives. Bauman 
mentions “survivalism” as the shadow side of immortality strategies, because it “is 
not about immortality or eternity: it is about surviving others — and when brought to 
its radical, and logical extreme, the survivalist obsession may well lead, as it all-too-




In rich countries, the majority of people do not commit or experience violence. 
However, capitalist choices make most of us unconscious participants in a global 
culture of violence. In April 2013, a factory building in Bangladesh collapsed and 
killed over 1000 workers. The collapse of the Rana Plaza Building has been called 
the deadliest disaster in the history of the garment industry globally. Apparently on 
the morning of the tragedy, the 3639 workers refused to enter the eight-story building 
because of strong evidence that it was unsafe. The owner of the building brought in 
gang members and forced the workers into submission with violence and threats to 
take away their pay (Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights 2017). The 
disaster gained global attention because Bangladesh is the world’s second-leading 
exporter of clothing after China. The world’s biggest fashion retailers like Walmart, 
Zara, and H&M produce their garments in Bangladesh, because it has the lowest 
wages in the world for garment workers (Yardley 2013). So-called fast fashion is a 
major driver of overconsumption in the West. Fast fashion stands for accelerating 
trends and shortening seasons, which means that garments are already outdated 
before they leave the shelves. Whereas fashion retailers exchanged their stock twice 
yearly in the past, fast fashion requires restocking many times a year. This shows that 
the hunt for the latest fashion has become a prevalent immortality strategy in which 
one aims continuously to tweak one’s social status through outer appearance. 
Recently, newsweek.com exclaimed that fast fashion is creating an environmental 
crisis since its production has a major negative impact on the environment, since the 
low quality of clothing with its highly processed fibres renders it unfit for re-use and 
recycling (Wicker 2016).  
Immortality strategies centre around an identity of the self which serves as a 
cover for the proficient sense of lack and insufficiency at the very core of identity. 
While politics and society serve to fill these gaps, however, self-labelling and self-
definition are bound to fail. Just like Freud and Lacan, Žižek has argued in The 
sublime object of ideology (1989) that the decentred self is haunted by its lack and 
insufficiency. As Žižek emphasizes, the self is marked by a fundamental antagonism, 
hence the self-construct is fundamentally unstable and always on the edge of 
crumbling apart, because it is always failing to live up to the dreamed version of 
oneself. 
Fantasy here shields the constitutive lack of the psyche, and the Other serves as 
receiver of our own projections of conflicting passions and ambivalences. This 
unacknowledged primordial lack remains and finds its confirmation within the more 
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destructive and negative aspects of contemporary society — the death drive in action. 
As Žižek argues in the The ticklish subject (2000c), a postmodern world generates 
strong ideologies. Globalization, he argues, is a colonization by the market of more 
and more aspects of human lives, in which one can observe an acceleration in the 
generation of signs, symbols, and significations. The many lifestyles available to 
choose from, plus advances in technology and communication, erode meaning and 
value. The self has become an ambiguous and ambivalent player in a global game 
that is bound to continue with its self-affirming strategies.  
Contemporary society provides an ocean of miscellaneous choices regarding 
how to conduct oneself. Traditions have crumbled and social reforms have provided 
new freedoms for minorities and the unprecedented power of choice. One can define 
oneself as black, white, or neither; homosexual, metro-sexual, or anything one 
favours; as professional, artist, spiritual seeker, fashionista, vegan, paleo, blogger, 
stay-at-home mum, or working mum. The list of possibilities and possible 
combinations is infinite and provides the allurement of a mastery over one’s identity. 
While this has good consequences, for instance as anyone who has come out as trans, 
queer, bi- or homosexual can attest, many so-called lifestyle choices are increasingly 
ensnared in marketing tricks. 
The death drive is a sticking point in this vicious circle, and beyond it is the 
innate drive to destroy oneself and others. Just as Marcuse observed, our high-
maintenance, progress-driven culture is only possible though the power of 
destruction (think about fast fashion and the deaths of the factory workers in 
Bangladesh).  
While immortality strategies are probably as old as human culture, the 
alignment of human desires with capitalistic demands and practices brings a new 
destructiveness into play. The contemporary obsession with shaping, designing and 
altering one’s identity or self is maintained, permeated, fixated on, and also corroded 
and threatened by materialist desires. This peculiar sense of self stands in direct 
interchange and reciprocity with contemporary manifestations of the death drive, a 
force of excess leading towards destruction and violence. Thanatos is a destructive 
force meshed within society and the illusory self of the individual.  
The lack of death awareness is the foundation of a consumerist creed that has 
taken over the subliminal manipulation of the individual, who now has difficulty 
making choices that are non-supportive of modern capitalist practices. I would argue 
that death awareness runs counter to the shallow, yet excessive, pleasures that are 
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offered by the capitalist status quo. Immortality strategies are now more powerful 
than ever.  
 
Conclusion: the necrophile self 
 
Any ordinary dictionary would define necrophilia as the love of corpses or having a 
sexual interest in corpses. As clinical paraphilia, necrophilia is classified on a sliding 
scale, “whereby necrophiliac tendencies are rated from the most innocuous to the 
most heinous” (Aggrawal 2009: 319). While the “platonic necrophiles” (Aggrawal 
2009: 317) merely play with the thought of necrophilia (role play, fantasizing), they 
never touch a real body. The classic necrophile needs the tactile visceral proximity of 
the dead for sexual arousal. Their actions are on a sliding scale from being close to 
the corpse without touching, to sexual intercourse, to mutilating the dead body. Most 
dangerous is the homicidal necrophile who does not blench from committing murder. 
Eric Fromm, however, gave a different definition of necrophilia as love of all things 
dead, bringing to the concept a much broader cultural dimension. Although Fromm 
explicitly rejected Freud’s theory of dual drives, his work remains indebted to Freud 
(Fromm’s theory of biophilia and necrophilia was inspired by Freud’s theory of the 
dual drives as I have discussed in chapter 2). Fromm’s recognition of the malignant 
psychopathological core of destructiveness is a useful addition to Freudian theory. 
Fromm targeted the individual’s infatuation with materiality, as well as the social 
currents which support materialism.  
Eric Fromm’s idea of necrophilia is a malignant character trait shaped by social 
reality or one’s socio-economic environment, which essentially shapes one’s 
orientation to the world. In a globalizing world in which personal connections are 
eroded by fast-paced changes to one’s economic, social and ecological environment, 
consumption and materialism, as agents of meaning, are encouraged. To translate 
Fromm’s idea of necrophilia (the passionate attraction to all that is dead, sickly and 
putrid) into our contemporary time, it is not the kind of maliciousness towards one 
another that Fromm described. The maliciousness has crept into the fibres of our 
being or character (in Fromm’s words) in subtle, unacknowledged ways, through our 
embroilment with consumerism as the new, perverted immortality strategy. This 
maliciousness is displaced and plays out on a local and global level, as we can see in 
the example of fast fashion and the deaths of the Bangladeshi garment workers.  
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Just as consumerism is now in the fibres of our very being, capitalism has been 
relegated to providing the social backdrop. The assumed permanence of the capitalist 
ideology and its materialistic, self-focused individual is threatened by a shift in 
perspective, which could be through a master signifier like death or illness. It is as if, 
for the first time, one is looking back at one’s psychical birthplace and finding 
nothing but the Thing staring back. When getting too close to the Thing, the fabric of 
the Symbolic and Imaginary, these meaning-making bastions start unravelling, and 
one is confronted with the nature of impermanence, or what Julia Kristeva called the 
abject. Lisa Downing writes in her book Desiring the dead: necrophilia and 
nineteenth-century French literature (2003): 
 
Necrophilia hints at the imaginative collusion between life and death, 
an ambitious leap between the physical and the metaphysical. The 
obscure spark of desire in necrophilia lies precisely in the gap between 
the living erotic imagination and the object that is beyond desire. 
Fantasy operates by bridging the gap that is the threshold between the 
subject and the object of desire. (Downing 2003: 1–2)  
 
In a normal sexual encounter, two bodies are meant to fuse into one. The 
orgiastic/orgasmic experience renders the singularity of the human body obsolete, 
and for a short moment one experiences “le petite mort”, a small death in which 
one’s singular status falls into oblivion. Ideally, physical, mental and spiritual union 
with another being happens. The necrophile lover, however, does not seek to dissolve 
his singular status by fusing it with another living body. He or she is not bothered by 
the abject and dances on the edge of object dissolution. Hence the sexual attraction:  
 
That body is just lying there, but it has what it takes to make me 
happy. The cold, the aura of death, the smell of death, the funereal 
surroundings, it all contributes … Sure, I find the odor of death very 
erotic. There are death odors and there are death odors … There is 
also this attraction to blood. When you’re on top of a body it tends to 
purge blood out of its mouth, while you’re making passionate love. 
You’d have to be there, I guess. (Morton 2017) 
 
A necrophiliac union is not achieved through the fusion of bodies but through the 
breakdown of the binary of life and death, driven by a certain kind of curiosity about 
death. The dead body is a doorway to the ineffable. The mutilation of corpses often 
plays a central role for the clinical necrophile. As the body needs nourishment, so 
does the making of consumer individuality need constant new input in order to be 
sustained or to evolve. These are experiences of desires. The nourishment comes 
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from the world outside. The socio-economic environment not only reinforces the 
(self-) perception of the modern individual, it also maintains this self and reinforces 
its structures. The aim of the death drive is to desire, to keep the subject stuck in a 
vicious cycle of production and overproduction — of making, composing and 
reinventing the self. Fromm’s conception of evil as a malignant form of 
destructiveness describes necrophilic tendencies, whether individual or cultural. Evil 
rises to the surface on the back of the oppressed and repressed, which pushes to be 
re-integrated into reality. These inner and outer forces create necrophilic tendencies 
in the self, the individual, and from there seep back into the very fabric of our 
societal structures.  
The attitudes towards desire have changed so that desire is now felt on a 
visceral level, at a time when the body is the last bastion of continuity in a world of 
accelerated change. The obsessive pursuit of one’s desire creates an illusion of a 
freedom of choice that plays into the modern subject’s assumption of autonomy or 
freedom to conduct him/herself by the will to choose. The hidden backdrop of 
capitalism, to which all symbolization, all ideology, must relate, supports this. Death 
denial anchored in consumerism (a contemporary immortality strategy) is the curse 
of late modernity beyond which our latent necrophilic mental structures have not 
been able to operate. As Wittgenstein remarked, “the limits of the language (the 
language which I understand) means the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein 1999: 89) 
and the meaning of the word “death” is largely occluded in the West. The occasion 
of illness or death points out the incongruence of modern ideologies. Essentially, the 
necrophile self is the illusion of an independent self, which at its core has fused the 
reality and pleasure principles, leading to excess and overconsumption. This fusion 
corresponds to the modern (perverted) immortality strategy (the obsessive meaning-
making attempt) of the necrophile self that is located within the death drive, the 
spectral undeadness that demands an enjoyment of life in excess — jouissance. 
Death illiteracy is the consequence of the excluded master signifier that has the 
potential to undermine capitalism’s demand to enjoy.  
When death is not only misunderstood, but also emotionally avoided in order 
to maintain the functioning of societal structures, a lot of energy is used to maintain 
cultural belief systems based on a lack of emotional involvement with the issue of 
death. Culture, however, is embedded in the excess of its denial. As I have argued in 
this chapter, the systemic destructive drive manifests in an array of (often 
 
 106 
pathological) cultural and global tendencies lodged within the very construct that is 
closest to the individual: the self.  
In the next chapter I explore one of these manifestations of the death drive — 
or death’s visibility — in the form of modern (entertainment) media and how it 
represents death and violence. This area is of particular interest since death on 
screens is a daily occurrence, be it in the news or for entertainment purposes. These 
deaths are often violent and gruesome, yet they miss the very aspect that would make 





Death in the media 
 
I have argued that the death drive is lodged in the very being of the modern self and 
plays itself out on a personal, as well as global, level. Although the emotional reality 
of death is largely ignored and underestimated on the social level, strangely, death 
remains a presence in everyday life. Popular visual media exemplifies this, for 
example, where the necrophile self manifests in the ubiquity of violence presented 
and consumed via screens.  
By way of introduction to this chapter, as a child, I watched more television 
horror than most of my peers. There were no restrictions on what I was allowed to 
watch or time curfews set during weekends and vacations. In addition to this media 
permissiveness, I was raised by a grandmother who was obsessed with horror 
movies, so much so, that I was the only child allowed into the ‘over eighteen’ section 
of the local video rental store. By age ten, I had watched all the horror movies 
available on German mainstream television, such as Poltergeist, The omen, 
Rosemary’s baby, The exorcist, along with many zombie and vampire films, the 
Freddy Krueger series, Hellraiser, and more. 
At the age of 18, I went to the movies to see Saving Private Ryan. It was the 
first time that I had seen so much blood and gore on a large cinema screen and even 
my well-trained movie mind was shocked at seeing war depicted so realistically. 
However, ever since I left home at 17, I have not watched television on a regular 
basis. In fact, I did not even own a television for a long time. However, when I did 
occasionally go to the movies or watch a show, I was struck by the acceleration of 
violence occurring in the form of the depiction of hyper-real, gruesome screen 
deaths. My tolerance level for consuming violence has lessened since I was a child. I 
now detest watching violence and gore and actually refuse to watch horror movies. 
In researching this chapter, I tried to watch the notorious television series The 
walking dead, but after one and a half episodes: things cannot be unseen! I decided 
that I was no longer able to countenance the carnage. The film theorist Gwyn 
Symonds came to a similar decision to limit her research to “mainstream viewing 
choices”. However, this was only after she first almost violated her own comfort 




I stood in front of a video store turning over in my hands a DVD that 
was a compilation of actual executions, ostensibly put together as an 
anti-capital punishment tract and then walked away from buying it to 
view for research purposes. So I discovered my threshold as a 
researcher and a consumer. Perhaps, being an audience member will 
always triumph over being an academic in the end, especially when it 
comes to texts representing violence. (Symonds 2008: 210) 
 
This chapter addresses the new visibility of death, particularly death as portrayed in 
film and television and other forms of media, like video games and social media 
websites. The emergence of the hyper-real depictions of violence and destruction 
along with their broad appeal and acceptance (while attitudes towards real-life death 
remain problematic) speaks of a deeply distorted relationship to the subject of 
mortality. Death’s new media presence seems to be intrinsically interwoven with the 
subject of violence; however, in this chapter I will not delve into the gory details of 
the horror genre. Instead, I will look at the proliferation of violent imagery, its 
impact, the evolution of violent entertainment, and the emotional response and 
responsibility of the viewer, in order to identify the make-up of the necrophile self 
and its reciprocal relationship with media and entertainment. This is especially 
relevant when one takes into account that the average time per day that people spend 
on screens (TV, computer, smartphone and tablet) is between 5 and 10 hours, 
depending on the country (Frommer 2014). 
 
The proliferation of imagery of death and violence 
 
Geoffrey Gorer’s essay “The pornography of death” (1955) is a classic study of the 
modern taboos around death. In this essay, Gorer argued that death as media 
entertainment has replaced sex as the new taboo subject. In the aftermath of World 
War II, people started to engage with the subject of sex while death became the new 
taboo. However, with the onset of this taboo, a mass audience emerged that longed to 
push beyond this taboo by showing curiosity in unnatural and violent deaths. Gorer 
labelled the jouissance around this form of entertainment pornography, in order to 
highlight the brutal and exploitative character of screen deaths and their deprivation 
of the usual emotional responses of grief and mourning. 
But have these unmourned, unnatural and violent screen deaths increased since 
Gorer wrote this essay in the 1950s? As I have discussed earlier, in the introduction 
to this thesis, the conservative group Parents Television Council states in their 2007 
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report that violence in TV, especially prime-time TV, has exponentially increased 
between 1998 and 2006 (Parents Television Council 2007). Websites like 
moviebodycounts.com and bodycounters.com (their slogan is “A friend watches 
movies with you – A good friend helps you count the bodies!”) are devoted to 
tracking screen deaths. However, these websites are more amateurish since their 
readers seem to enjoy body counting as a hobby, rather than for research purposes. 
According to more methodological studies that use content analysis to assess 
the frequency and quality of screen violence and deaths, there has indeed been an 
increase in deaths and violence on screen. The latest study on body counts, or screen 
deaths, is from 2012, and was commissioned by the website funeralwise.com, a site 
dedicated to “help you capably navigate all your funeral experiences” 
(Funeralwise.com 2017). This study (Funeralwise.com 2013) concludes that the top 
three deadliest television shows are the immensely popular zombie feast AMC series 
The walking dead, the CINEMAX series Strike back, followed by NBC’s Revolution. 
These shows account for 40 per cent of the total dead bodies in the investigated 
shows, with an average of 25 dead per episode. Of these deaths, 44 per cent died of 
gun violence and 19 per cent from knives or blades (the second most prominent 
weapons of choice). 89 per cent of the dead were male. However, while men mostly 
died through gun violence (50 per cent), women were more often killed by other 
means such as strangulation or beatings (70 per cent). (This leads to the 
consideration of whether the victimization of women is viewed differently, or 
whether this is a reflection of reality.) Finally, in comparison with an earlier body-
count study also done by funeralwise.com, they found a 12 per cent increase in 
violent screen deaths. Such findings accord with Gorer’s observation that screen 
deaths are unnatural, extremely violent and not mourned. 
Already in 2003, the sociologist Danielle Soulliere had come to the conclusion 
that prime-time television shows were predominantly about violent crimes and that 
narratives of (attempted) murder were overrepresented. Although in reality 
statistically these kinds of crimes are in decline, Soulliere fears that the high interest 
in crime shows might skew, if not undermine, the viewer’s understanding of crime 
and criminal justice (Soulliere 2003: 13). Analysis of the motives of the fictional 
perpetrators of violence rarely addresses the social-economic issues that lead to 
violence. Instead, explanations predominantly focus on the individual’s character, 
such as the perpetrator’s moral derangement, internal monstrousness, or mental 
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health issues. Again, the frequency of these fictional motives does not match reality 
(Soulliere 2003: 28–9). Soulliere concludes:  
 
The overemphasis on relatively rare incidents of violent crime such as 
murder may be attributed to the escapist nature of entertainment 
television … which is fueled by the tendency to dramatize crime 
shows by presenting extraordinary rather than ordinary events. It is 
precisely because murder is not the stuff of everyday life that it finds 
itself a prominent feature of entertainment television. Violent crime, 
especially murder, strikes at the very core of our humanity and is 
therefore fascinating, dramatic and entertaining. (Soulliere 2003: 30) 
 
What about the increase in the detailed brutality and hyper-real imagery of screen 
deaths? The media researcher Gregory Desilet argues that traditional storytelling 
works with suspense and surprise in order to create desire and curiosity in the 
audience. Suspense arises through the withholding of information at a crucial point 
within the story in order to create an appetite and curiosity for the unfolding 
narrative. Surprise is the fulfillment of this appetite. They both enhance the 
experience of story, which would otherwise be a boring way of relaying information. 
In this way, a story can be told over and over again, whereas the news loses its 
appeal through repetition. The horror genre (as most genres that rely on violence) 
amplifies suspense and surprise into dread and shock. However, the genre must 
continue escalating its levels of horror in order to retain its shock value. The shock 
effects of horror films, therefore, have now moved into hyper-realistic and ultra-
graphic depictions of brutality and violent death (Desilet 2006: 242–3).  
However, in October 2016, an article in The Guardian asked whether 
television has reached “peak gore”, assessing the extremely brutal season 7 premiere 
of the already gory TV hit series The walking dead and the new TV show Ash vs. evil 
dead (O’Neill 2016). According to Slate Magazine, the premiere of season 7 of The 
walking dead attracted 17 million viewers but dropped below 12.5 million by mid-
season, apparently due to its unsatisfying storyline (Adams 2016). Phelim O’Neill of 
The Guardian wondered whether the grizzly violence of the show had been pushed 
to a saturation point, in which even an audience that usually enjoys horror is left 
behind. O’Neill recaps an episode of Ash vs. evil dead: 
 
Then came the capper, so to speak, as the guts, having snared Ash, 
pull him headfirst into the corpse via the rectum. Cue even more 
slapstick as Ash struggles to loosen himself from this bizarre 
predicament. It’s bloodless, but far from dry as Ash is covered with a 
different bodily fluid, one that stinks him up for the rest of the 
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episode. It’s hard to count just how many taboos were broken in this 
sequence, but it’s clear that nothing like this has happened on 
television before. Will it, indeed can it, ever again? (O’Neill 2016) 
 
O’Neill goes on to lament the gruesome and extreme killing of a favourite character 
in the opening episode of The walking dead (season 7) that apparently struck at the 
heart of the zombie series’ fans: 
 
From a technical standpoint, Glenn’s demise was no different than 
anything on Ash vs. Evil Dead; the gooey innards of one dummy head 
are not much different from that of another. Glenn’s pulping looked 
pretty similar to the damage meted by Ash’s possessed 1973 
Oldsmobile as it spun its wheels on the heads of those it ran over, 
grinding their features into a bloody mess. There it’s a side gag: here it 
was, for many, a step too far. Even after their annoying “fool me 
once” routine with Glenn’s fake-out death last season, this was still 
tough to take in what was, overall, a particularly brutal and bleak hour 
of television. Online chatter is full of viewers claiming this is the final 
of many last straws, others annoyed that there’s suddenly a lot of 
horror in this zombie TV show. (O’Neill 2016) 
 
In the commentary on this article, a father who regularly watches the series with his 
son writes: 
 
I’m a big fan of TWD. So is my son. The season opener was so damn 
graphic that I had a talk with him afterward. I’ve never felt as if I had 
to do that before. I put it to him simply, “what’d you think?” He looks 
at me and says one word, “disgusting.” He’s 14 and isn’t phased by 
much. That episode got to him and it got to me too. When I was 14 
(1984) that kind of gore would have been restricted to a movie theater 
with a big fat “R” rating and would have been considered extremely 
graphic. Now it’s on television. I’m not going to stop watching, yet. 
But if they continue to “push the envelope” when it comes to gore and 
violence on AMC, I won’t be watching much longer. It’s unnecessary 
and it detracts from the story. (O’Neill 2016: comments) 
 
Extreme violence of this kind is often labelled as appropriate for an audience of 13 
years and older (PTC 2013: 5). For instance, the highly violent television show 
Revolution (rated TV-14, suitable for fourteen year olds), exposed its audience to an 
average of 91.5 acts of violence per episode during its autumn 2013 screenings. The 
Parents Television Council warns that this “is equivalent to a child seeing one act of 
violence every 39 seconds” (PTC 2013: 6). The AMC cable network used to rate The 
walking dead TV-14, then changed it to TV-MA (mature audiences) after the Parents 
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Television Council challenged the network to adjust its rating due to the show’s 
severely violent content (PTC 2013: 2).  
 
Impact of imagery of death and violence 
 
Despite many parents auditing their children’s viewing, children are surrounded by a 
culture that endorses entertainment violence. Research suggests violent themes in 
media and the play of children have increased, as seen in a recent study addressing 
the popular LEGO toy. The LEGO company has been in business since 1949, and its 
iconic toys are beloved by children and adults alike. However, in recent years, LEGO 
products have become increasingly violent, especially with the onset of themed kits 
featuring contemporary movies. 40 per cent of scenarios depicted in recent LEGO 
catalogues contain some form of violence or threatening behaviour, suggesting that 
LEGO is responding to the general trend of children’s entertainment that includes a 
steady increase in levels of excitement (Bartneck, Min Ser, Moltchanova, Smithies, 
and Harrington 2016). 
There is much debate over whether violence in films or computer games has a 
negative impact on young people, or generally on people of any age. Three potential 
impacts of violent content can be its mimetic effects, victimization or sensitizing 
effects, but also its desensitizing effects. However, research into these areas is 
contradictive and inconclusive. One argument is that aggressive behaviour is only 
correlated to violent media, not the cause of it, because violent media may be simply 
preferred by violent individuals (Desilet 2006: 22). In a more controversial 
framework, media violence is linked to catharsis. In this view, entertainment media 
may be a response to a culture of constraints that does not allow for authentic 
emotional expression. The consumption of violent media can bring on a catharsis, or 
release of latent aggression through the watching. The media researcher Gregory 
Desilet observes: “Entertainment media respond to this climate of constraints with 
violent video games and programming that allow the cathartic release of aggression 
through participation in a projected fantasy world that provides ‘safe’ targets and 
symbols for violence” (Desilet 2006: 19). 
Those who endorse entertainment violence claim it is a cathartic release of 
aggression, rather than provoking violent actions (Desilet 2006: 19). In this sense, 
society and its repressions beget the return of the repressed in distorted forms that 
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find their outlet in media entertainment. Desilet quotes the novelist Andrew Klavan, 
who talks about the “joy of cruelty”:  
 
that thing of darkness that must be acknowledged as our own … Some 
emotions have to be repressed and repressed emotions return via the 
imagination in distorted and inflated forms: that’s the law of 
benevolent hypocrisy, the law of civilized life. (Desilet 2006: 23) 
 
Another theory concerns media and its mimetic effects. This ancient platonic 
discussion targets how art imitates life and, reversed, how life imitates art. While art 
can be a reflection of the outside environment, art can also pull its viewers into its 
content:  
 
In discussing tragic drama in particular, Plato reasons that in response 
to repeated viewings of the depiction of violent conflict the audience 
will be seduced — by the emotional outpourings of the characters — 
into similar emotional abandonment that will promote emotional 
hypersensitivity, suspension of rationality, and incapacity for action in 
the face of real violence and conflict. (Desilet 2006: 25) 
 
Theories of mimesis and catharsis are relevant to this debate given that violent 
entertainment is infused with multiple layers of social, religious, mythical, 
metaphysical, moral, emotional, and psychological components. Yet the dramatic 
structure of entertainment violence portrays attitudes towards conflict that are part of 
our common social and cultural imagination, regardless of its potential mimetic or 
cathartic effects in regard to aggression (Desilet 2006: 26). 
Research results regarding the impact of violent content are inconclusive, 
perhaps because the issue is under-researched, and also because of doubts that 
existing research findings, generated in sufficiently controlled lab environments, 
adequately translate into real-life environments. In a recent article in The Guardian, 
Rich Stanton (2016) discusses the obstacles to finding a conclusive answer regarding 
a causal link between entertainment violence and children’s violent behaviour. 
Stanton observes that in the past three decades research on violent video games has 
been flawed, limited, misleading, and misrepresented. He further blames the moral 
panic of a headline-hungry media that, all too often, jumps to conclusions linking 
murder and the influence of violent video games. Stanton discusses a recent research 
paper that draws on the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children, a data set 
of 14,500 children born in 1991–1992, to find a connection between violent video 
games and conduct disorders. A conduct disorder involves a set of extreme, often 
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aggressive and defiant behaviours. This study found that there is a 19 per cent chance 
that, if a child plays violent video games by age eight or nine, they will be diagnosed 
with a conduct disorder by the age of 15. Stanton warns that these numbers represent 
a correlation, however, not a causation (especially since the sample numbers of 
diagnosed children were small), and that, in addition, there are various unknown 
factors that might play a crucial role in the causes of teenage aggression. Further, the 
degree of violent imagery in violent video games, just as in television and movies, is 
in constant evolution. One of the great difficulties facing researchers is that computer 
games are hard to categorize, and Stanton stresses that “genres” (like adventure, 
strategy, shooter, etc.) pose an inadequate classification since games often have 
complex modifications. Furthermore, there is a surprising lack of funding for such an 
important area of research. As he argues, “Without quality research, we allow 
debates about videogames to be influenced by ideologically-driven skeptics” 
(Stanton 2016).  
But is it always moral values and ideology that drive the sceptics to want to 
protect young minds from gory violence, or could it be an (unconfirmed) intuitive 
hunch that extreme media violence is merely inappropriate for children? A recent 
study gives new, concrete evidence that, in fact, media violence induces both short- 
and long-term increases in aggressive thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. Tom 
Hummer summarizes innovative research done on this topic based on neuroimaging 
tools, allowing the observation of the effects of violence in the brain, which are 
usually hard to detect through more traditional research techniques. This kind of 
research helps to clarify how exposure to media violence in childhood affects brain 
development with possible lifelong consequences. He argues: 
 
While such research is limited, evidence suggests that prefrontal 
mechanisms for controlling emotion and behavior are altered by 
exposure to violent media. Therefore, long-term increases in 
aggression and decreases in inhibitory control due to excessive media 
violence exposure may result from impaired development of 
prefrontal regions. However, additional neuroimaging research is 
necessary to establish whether and how exposure to media violence 
specifically shapes subsequent neural maturation. (Hummer 2015: 
1790) 
 
Hummer points out that research suggests “psychopathology may interact with the 
effects of media violence on the brain” and that “inhibitory mechanisms were altered 
by violent game play, including the ability of prefrontal regions to inhibit the 
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amygdala response to negative stimuli” (Hummer 2015: 1795–6). Hummer provides 
significant evidence to suggest a strong association between exposure to greater 
media violence and alterations of parts in the brain that regulate thoughts, emotions, 
feelings, and behaviour. These alterations have a negative impact: “neuroimaging 
research suggests that increased exposure to violent media content is associated with 
lower prefrontal control of emotions or behaviors and with delayed development of 
frontal or frontoparietal regions” (Hummer 2015: 1802). While more research needs 
to be done to disentangle people’s emotional reactions to screen violence and its 
actual impact on viewers, I would like to address a deeper question regarding the 
cultural implications of violent (entertainment) media. 
 
The monstrous and the Thing 
 
In his book Our faith in evil (2006), Gregory Desilet examines the reciprocal 
relationship between entertainment violence and cultural life. He argues that there 
are cultural traditions concerning inherited ways of dramatizing life. In order to 
understand the structure of contemporary narratives of violent films, one has to 
consider their roots in ancient traditions of tragedy and melodrama. These 
melodramatic structures are part of the rich and dense layers of cultural sediment that 
continue to have an impact on our understanding of the world and ourselves today. 
The prevalence of a melodramatic structure in contemporary texts, film, and drama 
depends upon a particular understanding of evil that leads to entertainment violence 
as we know it today. The melodramatic textual structure relies on a black and white 
morality and the resolution of conflict through destruction. Desilet defines the 
melodramatic form as 
 
presenting conflict with a pole of radical and essential evil … The 
focus on violence in certain contexts of film and drama leads to a 
focus on melodramatic form, which leads to a focus on the particular 
notion of evil that has been handed down through many layers and 
levels of tradition. (Desilet 2006: 2)  
 
Evilness is a fundamental driver of the horror genre, and there are many theories that 
attempt to explain the genre’s appeal to a broad audience. One popular explanation is 
that the horror story symbolizes adolescent sexuality and teenage angst, particularly 
in relation to incest and the fear of rejection (Desilet 2006: 96–7). In this sense, the 
dual aspects and deep internal divisions of the protagonist manifest as an alien 
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agency that infiltrates the subject and launches its attacks on the subject and 
environment from “inside”, like the classic Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, or Ridley Scott’s 
Alien, in which the alien uses human hosts for reproduction. Sexuality serves as a 
metaphor to further anchor the evil as an independent alien agency, and as an 
aggressive, destructive, and demonic presence. In the melodramatic presentation of 
the world, the good and the evil agencies have their own independent origins. Evil is 
not a once-good agency that has somehow been corrupted, polluted, or fallen from 
grace. Evil derives its powers from its spiritual and physical proximity to death and, 
through it, acquires the characteristics of pollution and defilement of an original, 
independent functioning, idealized whole. Desilet observes the role evil plays in the 
melodramatic conflict and the tragic myth of the origin of evil: 
 
The notion of evil as defilement dominates the moral code and the 
moral structure of tradition, including the traditions of melodrama, 
and serves as a template for conflict, including especially the internal 
divisions arising from sexual anxieties … this different way of 
understanding the operation of evil in the world was argued to be 
consistent not only with the tragic vision but also with the potential for 
structuring an alternative orientation towards conflict. (Desilet 2006: 
97) 
 
The world portrayed in this genre is often nihilistic and dominated by death and 
violence; however, change, defeat or escape is impossible. The resolution in these 
dark stories now relies on an escalation of the monstrous (Desilet 2006: 244). The 
torturous conflict emanating from the psyche is reallocated towards the destruction of 
the physical body, yet the sheer brutality in which the attacks of the monstrous are 
deployed points towards a cultural obsession with materiality still devoid of grief and 
mortality awareness. This is not only observable in the horror genre, but also in 
contemporary crime shows. 
Jacque Lynn Foltyn observes that over the last decade a new obsession with 
forensic science, dissection, decay, and DNA as “crime-solving substance” has also 
found its way onto our screens. DNA, in Foltyn’s reading, has become a pop-culture 
icon, a sacred entity of science-worshipping societies that replaces the soul as a new 
form of immortality (Foltyn 2008: 170). Whether in fictional works or real life, 
celebrity deaths and CSI (crime scene investigation) have become a familiar 
spectacle for the sake of entertainment, as can be seen in the obsession over the 





The infotainment coverage devoted to the corpses … created a series 
of overlapping media spectacles with sometimes preposterous 
narratives not only about DNA, but about the disfigured, 
decomposing, embalmed, dissected, disinterred, photographed, 
missing, and found remains of the newly famous, renowned, 
legendary, royal, semi-mythic, and possibly divine. (Foltyn 2008: 162) 
 
In accordance with Gorer’s early thesis, Foltyn argues that the current fascination 
with the entertainment corpse (the result of an unnatural, violent death) is devoid of 
grief and mourning. With death as a natural experience marginalized, mediated 
portrayals of death are on the increase. Gorer’s text was written before the 
availability of death images spread through the Internet and before the corpse was at 
the centre of media attention. Foltyn believes that Gorer would be shocked by the 
current media climate. Back when Gorer wrote his famous work, the camera did not 
linger over the dead body. “Bodies fell, the camera moved away, or if the camera 
focused on the dying or dead body at all, it was whole and appeared to be sleeping, 
not contorted in death agonies” (Foltyn 2008: 164). 
Grizzly deaths and the corpse’s gory details are now prevalent in 
entertainment. As Foltyn argues, death has not only supplanted sex as the cultural 
taboo, but has merged with it. The corpse has become eroticized (Foltyn 2008: 165). 
The archetypal cycle of sex, death, and birth bears a powerful imagery that comes 
forth in modern life through approaching the dead body. Icons of popular culture, for 
example Princess Diana, James Dean, and Marilyn Monroe, have an erotic aura that 
follows them into their caskets. As Foltyn argues, “The sexualized corpse can be 
both contradiction and fetish, and death imagery can be connected with other passive 
states such as sleep and sickness” (Foltyn 2008: 165). This is especially true in a time 
in which the culture of reinvention (Elliott 2013), with its obsessional relationship 
with bodily image, has a strong hold on the Western self. If the self can be 
continually reinvented, even death does not bring an end to the body but becomes 
instead a beautiful, erotic, and dissected corpse. Here, even DNA provides a new 
immortality strategy. Foltyn observes that the rise of the “beautiful female murder 
victim” points to a conflation of sorts: 
 
As taboos about both sex and death have relaxed in contemporary 
Western culture, and pornography has been increasingly destigmatized 
in modern liberal culture …, there’s been a growing conflation of the 
two once forbidden bodies, the sex porn body and the dead porn body. 




She identifies a third kind of body, a fusion between Gorer’s unmourned victim of 
violent death and the appallingly disfigured corpse of contemporary entertainment 
that is now sexualized. This sexuality plays out through the recurrence of television 
plots involving death through kinky, dangerous or perverted sexual practices. No 
longer confined to a fringe market catering to those enjoying splatter, “torture porn”, 
or “gorno” movies, corpse porn has become a standard of popular television and 
film. 
Foltyn argues there is a commonality between copse porn and sex porn. They 
share the exploitation of the young and beautiful, close-ups, and an emphasis on 
bodily fluids, as well as the absence of socially appropriate emotions. She further 
observes a stereotypical construction of femininity in contemporary crime 
entertainment. Both corpse porn and sex porn stars are mostly female victims and the 
killers are mostly male. If a female killer is present, she is mostly driven by greed, 
revenge, and jealousy. As with the body of the porn star, the corpse is divorced from 
mourning, spirituality, and compassion. In the presence of the good-looking forensic 
team and criminal investigators, autopsy aligns with rape and curiosity about these 
aligns with necrophilia (Foltyn 2008: 167).  
Foltyn further observes that the boundaries between socially and sexually 
acceptable contact between the dead and living have shifted. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 4, the classic necrophile lover pushes these boundaries further in following 
through with his/her attraction to the dead body. However, these blurred lines 
between death, violence, and sex have found their way out of the sexual fringes and 
into mainstream media in order to hold shock value, attract attention, and to make 
capital from it. Foltyn underscores Bataille’s observation that death is an “‘ecstasy of 
consumption’, fit to stand by sex and eating” (Foltyn 2008: 169). The images of 
violence, sex, and death, as they are sold in contemporary media, are the obvious 
markers of the contemporary jouissance of a death-illiterate society. The monstrous, 
as Desilet understood it, involved the internalization of the struggle with sexuality 
and sexual identity. Corpse porn externalizes this struggle with its explicit messages. 
The monstrous is present in the narrativization of bizarre killings and of the perverted 
motives of murderers. Both versions are, however, infused in preposterous gore and 
violence, devoid of an emotional response. They are different versions of the same 
kind of death jouissance. 
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Pondering the question of what the interest in morbid imagery tells us about 
contemporary culture, Foltyn speculates that it could be a sign of emerging mortality 
awareness and of the baby boomer’s attempt to bring death back into the community. 
It might be due to a distorted familiarization with the dead body (through obsession 
with celebrity death and morbid forensic shows), as she writes:  
 
In secular societies, where uncertainty about what happens after we 
die is apparent, the fear of death is managed, to a degree, by extending 
control over the corpse through dissection […] Perhaps the intensity 
of our hunger for scientific truth and certainty regarding the causes of 
death explored in forensic television and the mysteries of the demises 
of the dead famous, is related to our continued trepidation about death, 
a fear that arguably has increased as secularism pushes aside 
traditional religious convictions about the afterlife. (Foltyn 2008: 170) 
 
However, there is another explanation for these hyper-real images of death and 
destruction that I wish to explore here.  
Desilet argues that capitalism is a potent driver of such imagery. Capitalism not 
only devalues human relationships, but also people are viewed as an interchangeable, 
replaceable, sometimes useless and most certainly breakable commodity. Both 
material commodities and people are degraded through this attitude of vilification, 
and thus enter an existence that is viewed as distorted, polluted, and contemptible. 
Vilification falls into the category of the monstrous/evilness and hence becomes 
conflated with defilement. In this cultural paradigm violence serves as “intense 
religious or quasi-religious rituals of purification” because a “worn-out commodity is 
commonly discarded or recycled whereas something and someone suspected of being 
a pollution more likely elicits reactions consistent with mutilation, torture, and 
obsessive destruction” (Desilet 2006: 245–6). 
Returning to Lacanian psychoanalysis, Lacan put forward the idea that truth 
has the structure of fiction and aimed to explain that the Symbolic Order fails to cope 
with a fundamental deadlock (sexual difference, class struggle, etc.). The violent 
melodrama or the horror fiction demonstrates a failure to cope with this deadlock, 
which then creates a “fantasmatic spectre” or a “spectral apparition”, not with the 
function of occluding social reality, but to bring forth that which has been 
primordially repressed in order to establish social reality. Žižek observes: 
 
The spectral apparitions — these fantastic horrors, like the living 
dead, father’s ghost in Hamlet, and so on — they are not of the order 
of the symbolic fiction, but quite the contrary … This failure is then 
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posited in spectral apparitions, in ghosts, in living dead. They are 
always here, as the embodiment of what Lacan would have called a 
certain symbolic deadlock … Something cannot be symbolized, and 
the spectral apparition emerges to fill up the gap of what cannot be 
symbolized. So, again, the spectre conceals not social reality but what 
must be primordially repressed in order for social reality to emerge. 
(Žižek 2010b: 100–1) 
 
The real resists symbolization, and reality, therefore, will never be fully constituted, 
which is what ideological spectral fantasies try to frame.  
On another note, Jennifer Rutherford (2013) analyses the notorious and 
extremely popular cultural meme of Zombies in her book of the same title. She 
observes the monstrosity of the zombie, as “disturbance of the symbolic rite” 
(Rutherford 2013: 15). Zombies represent many, often contradictory, meanings that 
defy systematizing. Zombies represent a “zero level of humanity” or the 
“inhuman/mechanical core of humanity”; they are “figures of the world’s 
unspeakableness” (Rutherford 2013: 15) and are plastic and amorphous in the way 
they capture the current imagination of contemporary horror: “A vision of an 
apocalyptic future they evoke the repressed memory of what was and what is 
unfolding” (Rutherford 2013: 17). The zombie, she argues, has become a generalized 
metaphor for contemporary struggles and dangers encompassing environments, 
political structures, social institutions, behaviours, and systems. Zombie implies a 
potent absence, an inner lack that has a negative impact on the individual, yet this 
impact can manifest in miscellaneous ways:  
 
Zombie is both a property that can be possessed and a lack that is at 
the same time a mode of action. And zombies can be anything! 
Zombies are voters that lack acuity, institutions that refuse to dissolve 
and litigants that lack volition […] zombie as metaphor condenses 
elements of the present that we most need, and are least able, to think 
about. (Rutherford 2013: 22–3) 
 
The zombie meme is also highly commoditized by capitalism since it sells anything 
from cars to greeting cards. However, zombies also have the power to bring together 
disparate realities. Rutherford asserts: 
 
Zombie as metaphor links opposites: death and life; passivity and 
aggressiveness; drive and enslavement; discontinuity and continuity; 
love and hate; consumption and revulsion; the individual and the 
mass; self and other; an apocalyptic future and the repressed past … 
Zombie is a figure that empties meaning while proliferating it. It 
critiques, questions, interrogates the way things are while bleakly 
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laying out the impossibility of them being otherwise. (Rutherford 
2013: 23) 
 
Rutherford argues that one attraction of the non-human zombie might be its 
ambivalence towards emotions. They do not feel, yet hunger for brains, and thus, by 
extension, life. Zombies, in this sense, may be perceived as providing refuge from 
human existence that is tormented by conflicting emotions. Zombies are not dead. 
As she writes, the dead belong to us; our relationship to the dead continues, 
embodied in human forms of possession (ceremony, rituals, belief systems). 
Zombies, however, “do not evoke death as we know it, but incarnate death as we 
wish to forget it. They give continuity in visual and verbal forms to a death that 
representation would foreclose” (Rutherford 2013: 53). In this sense, zombies 
represent the potential for anonymous mass death that leaves the individual 
unmourned and easily forgotten. “When zombie fans seek immortality in the virtual 
world of images circling globally on the web, they lend their faces to this non-
human death sweeping all in its path” (Rutherford 2013: 53). Death sits on our 
shoulders and has become a potent driver of how and what we consume for our 
casual entertainment. An obsession with monstrous and mutilated bodies has 
become ever-present while loss on a personal level remains a clandestine and 
private struggle. Historically and culturally, death has always surrounded us and 
there seems to be a need to keep it that way.  
 
The historical evolution of violent death as entertainment  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I referred to Steven Pinker’s book The better angels 
of our nature (2011), in which he argues that human history is steeped in violence 
through large-scale wars, local civil wars, homicide, and so on, but that we are now 
living in the most peaceful era ever. It might be that, in this ostensibly peaceful time 
in the West (at least in relation to interpersonal violence), the absence of violence 
brings back generational memories of mass deaths, which are now represented in the 
monstrosity of contemporary entertainment violence. A group of Spanish natural 
scientists now claims to have established that humans do indeed have a natural 
predisposition to violence and that this lethal interpersonal violence might have been 
inherited from primates (Gómez, Verdú, González-Megías, and Méndez 2016). In 
their review of 600 studies that included Palaeolithic and Iron Age samples, they 
concluded that killing each other seems to have an evolutionary origin. The 
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evolutionary lineage from which humans descended shows higher-than-average 
levels of interpersonal violence compared to other mammals. While it remains 
unclear whether this is due to genetic or other factors, there is a tendency not only 
among humans, but primates in general, to murder each other. An estimated 2 per 
cent of human deaths among our distant ancestors are attributed to murder (Gómez et 
al. 2016: 233). Similarly, in tracking death in mammals, the researchers suggest there 
seems also to be a propensity towards deathly violence. José María Gómez, the 
leader of this study, explains in an interview with ResearchGate, a social networking 
website for researchers and scientists, that, while human lethal violence has an 
evolutionary origin, this can be altered by ecological and cultural factors. Yet lethal 
violence has an important phylogenetic component, which is not necessarily due to 
genetics but is much broader than that:  
 
The main message of the study, from our point of view, is that no 
matter how violent or pacific we are in the origin [sic], we can 
modulate the level of interpersonal violence by changing our social 
environment. We can build a more pacific society if we wish. (Gómez 
in Rikken 2016) 
 
Interpersonal lethal violence comes down to a variety of socio-cultural and 
environmental aspects. But death as enjoyment or, to be more precise, as jouissance, 
also stretches far back in time. Frances Larson observes in her book Severed: a 
history of heads lost and heads found (2014) that deathly violence as entertainment is 
culturally ingrained and has a long and eerily rich history of people gathering to 
watch public torture, executions, and beheadings. She claims “the lesson of history is 
that it is within our capacity as humans to witness decapitations and other forms of 
executions, and more than that, to enjoy them as popular public events” (Larson 
2014: 85). In the past, the traits of execution viewers, she argues, seemingly included 
both a lack of mourning and enthusiasm regarding the event. Audiences seldom 
displayed disgust (and if they were disgusted they still came to watch). Beheadings 
and other forms of killings were often difficult to execute and hence made for 
gruesome spectacles. Larson tells many stories of botched executions for which the 
executioner often had to pay with their own life. In 1790, the guillotine was 
introduced for reasons of discretion, efficiency, and accuracy. The crowd, however, 
showed disappointment in the fast, clean, and efficient workings of this machinery of 
death. The audience longed for the drama that comes with torture, mutilation, and 
dragged out executions (Larson 2014: 97).  
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An execution day was more of a carnival than a solemn ceremony. While 
public executions in the West have become unthinkable, public sentiment against 
these gruesome spectacles is a recent phenomenon (Larson 2014: 99). Moreover, 
late-modern individuals still display behaviour indicating joy and pleasure regarding 
the public display of impending death. In the age of smart technology, selfies, videos, 
and photos of tragic scenes of death and carnage are posted all over the Internet. The 
popularity of beheading videos found on the Internet suggests that modern 
technology assembles a new kind of audience with parallels to the ancient gore-
celebrating crowd. Larson gives the example of the beheadings of Westerners by 
terrorist groups. In 2002, a link to a video showing the beheading of a Wall Street 
Journal journalist by the Taliban was shared by the Boston Phoenix newspaper on 
their website. This received widespread criticism. However, just two years later, 
when Nick Berg was decapitated, Reuters made an unedited video available. All 
major United States television networks broadcast clips of this atrocity, although 
they stopped short of showing the beheading itself. 
Nick Berg’s video became one of the most searched-for items on the Internet. 
A website linked to al-Qaeda crashed due to the vast amount of traffic the beheading 
video generated (Larson 2014: 79). While it is difficult to figure out exact numbers 
of people watching these videos online, a study conducted by the Pew Research 
Center found that five months after Nick Berg’s death, between May and June, 30 
million people (24 per cent of all adult Internet users in the USA) had seen images of 
the war in Iraq deemed too grizzly to be shown in mainstream media while 28 per 
cent were actively seeking out these images and half of those who had seen them 
found they made a “good decision” in watching the graphic content (Fallows and 
Rainie 2004). As Larson states, “whether people thought it ‘important’ to see Berg’s 
execution for themselves, or simply watched out of curiosity, there can be little doubt 
that ‘the crowd’ was taking control, or was out of control, depending on your 
perspective” (Larson 2014: 81). Tragically, the beheading of Berg spawned a surge 
of similar beheadings by militant Islamic groups, and the executions with the most 
media coverage drew the most attention from the public. In fact, the public showed 
outrage at the mainstream media’s “censorship” of Berg’s beheading while 
displaying pictures of the abuse by American soldiers in Abu Ghraib (Zelizer 2010: 
289–90; Larson 2014: 80–1). 
Social media makes gruesome pictures of death and carnage more accessible 
than ever. In addition, real-life-violence voyeurism and exhibitionism through and 
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within the digital environment keeps evolving. Recently, the Internet landscape again 
drastically changed with the advent of live-streaming services available on Facebook 
and Twitter, and applications for smartphones such as Beme, Meerkat, and Peach, all 
introduced between 2015 and 2016. Mark Zuckerberg, CEO and founder of 
Facebook, has hailed the new live-streaming feature as an exciting innovation, 
providing users with a new experience of raw and unedited authenticity (Honan 
2016). According to BuzzFeed News, Zuckerberg exclaimed: 
 
We built this big technology platform so we can go and support 
whatever the most personal and emotional and raw and visceral ways 
people want to communicate […] Because it’s live, there is no way it 
can be curated … And because of that it frees people up to be 
themselves. It’s live; it can’t possibly be perfectly planned out ahead 
of time. Somewhat counterintuitively, it’s a great medium for sharing 
raw and visceral content. (Honan 2016) 
 
This raw and visceral experience “of the golden age of video”, however, also extends 
to the live broadcast of terror, rape, and killings. Spiegel Online points out that the 
militant terror group Islamic State and its sympathizers are proactive in using Twitter 
for spreading often professionally made propaganda clips, videos, and sometimes 
live streams of executions. The article further claims that research suggests terrorists 
themselves have been influenced by this sort of online proliferation of violence, as in 
the case of an Islamic terrorist who in June 2016 live streamed the killing of police 
officers in France (Stöcker 2016). But not only perpetrators use this new medium; 
victims also take advantage of it to make public the terror inflicted upon them. In 
June 2016, in a nightclub in Florida, the greatest mass shooting occurred in US 
history, killing 50 and wounding 53 in a homophobically motivated attack. During 
the incident, victims texted and (video) called their loved ones before their deaths 
(Scheer 2016). 
Assaults recorded for the purpose of distribution on the Internet are also known 
as performance crimes in criminology, which includes the announcement of or 
bragging about one’s crimes, as well as the broadcasting of a criminal act. These 
crimes often include violent attacks. The criminologist Ray Surette describes 
performance crimes as follows: 
 
The core elements of contemporary performance crimes are that they 
are created for distribution via social media and involve both willing 
and unwilling performers. Performance crime can be of two types. 
The first is a sort of “informed consent” performance where the actors 
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are aware of the production (sometimes recording or filming it 
themselves) and at least tacitly support its subsequent distribution — 
in this sense a crime performer is “behaving for the camera” similar to 
an actor in a play. The second involves an uninformed, unwitting 
performance produced without performer knowledge or acquiescence 
— here a person is being recorded in a production similar to a nature 
documentary. Social media have caused performances of both types to 
explode. (Surette 2017) 
 
He identifies that one of the biggest contributors to the rise of performance crimes is 
the shift from once-passive consumers to active producers and content creators 
thanks to ever-advancing technology. Whatever is created, be it benign or malicious, 
can be easily brought into circulation through the Internet and in particular through 
immensely popular social media websites (probably the most popular social media 
website, Facebook, alone has almost two billion users). 
Another factor for the rise of performance crimes, Surette explains, is the 
contemporary celebrity culture that instils the desire for one’s own stardom and 
following audience (also called followers in the online world). Sadly, performance 
crime also often involves performance victimization, public humiliation, and 
shaming of the victim in order to give one’s online presence an extra boost. “It is 
better to get your performance out there and be known than to be unknown in a 
celebrity culture, even if criminality is required” (Surette 2017). 
Be it the Charlie Hebdo attack, the November 2015 Paris attacks, the Brussels 
airport attack, the recurrent killings of African-Americans by police or the Dallas 
Police murders, incidents of live-streamed violence and terror are accumulating. The 
Internet has made the world’s violence more accessible to mass audiences. 
Perpetrators, witnesses, and victims are shaping a new space in which unedited 
graphic content is circulated and accessed, thanks to platforms such as Facebook. 
Facebook itself has experienced great difficulty in shutting down live streams with 
inappropriate content due to the sheer size of its network (Scheer 2016). These 
examples indicate the difficulty of dealing with the moral, emotional, and spiritual 
fallout of unedited graphic content found on the Internet. 
 
The emotional response and responsibility of the viewer 
 
In the previous section of this chapter, I suggested that classic journalism, as we 
knew it, has lost its strong footing. Susan Sontag suggested in her book Regarding 
the pain of others (2003) that humans are fascinated with images of violence and 
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suffering and that, compared to non-stop imagery (television, streaming videos, 
movies) photographic pictures have the potential to carry a “deeper bite” (Sontag 
2003: 20). Similarly, Barbie Zelizer revisits the role of the journalistic image and the 
changing perception of its viewers in her book About to die: how news images move 
the public (2010). Zelizer argues that during the early twentieth century there was a 
collective eagerness to show graphic images of death and impending death (what 
Zelizer calls the about-to-die image), which validated the professionalization of news 
photographers and the immediacy of the news they provided. Especially the “about-
to-die image invites a close consideration of the ‘as if’ of journalistic relay” (Zelizer 
2010: 24) in which pictures of impending death come to symbolize condensed 
moments of difficult public events and personal fear and dread. She further explains 
that the about-to-die image is superior to images of death, which are often associated 
with voyeurism. Further, about-to-die images relay an, often involuntary, public duty 
that invites the viewer to empathize with the victim since it stimulates an emotional 
response. These pictures have the potential to establish an association with a depicted 
person’s vulnerability and mortality and thus can be a medium to facilitate grief and 
mourning. The about-to-die pictures have tremendous value, because they pull the 
viewer in, subjectively as well as emotionally. This sincere engagement with the 
news is tremendously important because, beyond merely processing an event 
intellectually, the emotional and compassionate engagement actually leads to deeper 
understanding. According to Zelizer, the about-to-die image 
 
works beyond its compositional parameters. Presentationally, it draws 
attention through its generalizability, not specificity: the impending 
deaths from atrocities in Cambodia come to look like those in Iraq; 
assassinations in Guatemala resemble those in the United States. 
Giving journalists a way to show the unsettled events of the news 
while sidestepping the discomfort and ambivalence that throws people 
into disarray almost whenever they face death’s depiction, these 
images draw viewer involvement rather than introduce distance, as 
images of death tend to do when they seal viewing with the 
impossibility of engagement. (Zelizer 2010: 25) 
 
One of the great changes, she observes, is that journalism has become less confident 
about showing pictures of the dying, yet new technologies make these pictures ever 
more accessible. From the middle of the twentieth century, photos were no longer 
thought to offer the same kind of cutting-edge documentation, even though faster 
film and lenses intensified the graphic character of death images. Wartime and 
political censorship became more prominent means of controlling images of death. 
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Conventions about showing and viewing death were increasingly driven by a public 
sentiment that death in the news should remain unseen and non-graphic. This seems 
to contradict the story of Nick Berg’s beheading discussed earlier. Yet the 
motivations behind the viewers’ demand to see pictures of Berg’s death were 
politically motivated in that they were able to stir resentment towards the terrorist 
groups. The repeated discussion of American soldiers humiliating and torturing 
inmates of Abu Ghraib has been met with greater resentment. Likewise, ever since 
9/11, viewers have voiced a deep unease about seeing about-to-die pictures of fellow 
citizens. Maybe having one’s homeland under attack was too emotionally taxing for 
most American viewers, since pictures of people falling off the burning World Trade 
Center have come to be seen as voyeurism. Zelizer gives three reasons for this. 
Firstly, there is a new conservatism regarding pictures of impending death. Secondly, 
when photography was introduced into the daily journalistic trade, photos 
underscored stories by showing more of the world. Now the novelty of journalistic 
photography has worn off. Thirdly, nowadays journalism is eclipsed by the vast 
amount of graphic images distributed via the Internet. Journalists, thus, have lost 
their exclusive status as the publishers of news. The public has become an important 
driver of which pictures are considered news and which not. Zelizer observes: 
 
All of this suggests that there may be a shift in public sentiment about 
what news images are for, facilitated by changes in the public 
appropriation of images of death, a diminishment of journalists’ 
formerly exclusive and authoritative call on the images they show, and 
shifts toward a larger and more vocal public role in evaluating 
pictures. These later images hint too at a rise in the articulation of 
standards of decency, tastefulness, and propriety more than before, 
which increasingly sets the stage for determining which images 
appear. The about-to-die photo thus offers a prism through which to 
consider the shifting value of news images more generally. (Zelizer 
2010: 52)  
 
Now critical voices in the public judge that pictures that depict (impending) death are 
too frequent (Zelizer 2010: 52), showing there is a gap in public sentiment in 
connecting with the news on an emotional level. Watching (violent) death in fictional 
spaces, while being uncomfortable seeing death in the news, is not a surprise if we 
take a closer look at how we come to terms with death on a private level. Zelizer 
discusses this in an interview in Slate Magazine: 
 
We’re squeamish because news pictures of the dead and dying are of 
real people and real events. If a news image works, it penetrates, 
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lingers, forces our attention to the events involving death that it 
depicts. If a news image works, it doesn’t disappear when we cast 
aside the newspaper, dim the TV or turn off the Internet. That may be 
more intrusion than most people are willing to allow. (Zelizer, in 
Shafer 2011)  
 
The sentiments and attitudes of media consumers are diverse, complicated, and 
intensely contradictory. Some people are attracted by what others cannot stomach. 
Margaret Gibson describes the complicated relationship with death, media and the 
consumer as follows: 
 
While the quality or subject matter of some death and grief stories can 
resonate with people for a long time after viewing, a great deal of 
popular culture has a short-term impact of psyche and emotions. 
Popular culture, with its fast flows of imagery, talk and sounds, 
creates bodies and psyches absorbing and deflecting stories and 
emotions within fractions of time. However, there is quite a different 
temporality between the experiences of death and grief as they are 
represented in popular culture and the real-life experiences of death 
and grief, which obviously have more sustained temporal, not to 
mention deeper levels of psychic and emotional, impact. (Gibson 
2007: 418) 
 
 In her TED talk on why people are drawn to consume executions, Frances Larson 
(2015) points out that emotional detachment (the feeling that ‘it has nothing to do 
with me’) is a necessary condition, so that watching becomes a passive activity (in 
which curiosity about death pushes social boundaries). The consumer of these videos 
falls for a perverted intimacy, in which he/she gets a front row seat, with the contents 
available wherever, whenever, and in secrecy. In her talk, Larson argues that the 
sense of separation erodes the individual’s moral ability, which is the key to the 
capacity to watch gruesome content. The quality of these grizzly online events is that 
they appear less real and the quality of anonymity and invisibility of these online 
views erodes one’s accountability.  
Similarly, such detachment is observable for entertainment media. Violent 
screen deaths do not have the same emotional and moral weight as photos of people 
about to die in the news media. Actors, after all, get up after the sequence is shot and 
receive a decent pay cheque, which makes it easier to treat such entertainment 
violence as a commodity. Yet encountering death through news outlets does not 
necessarily imply an existential engagement with this topic at all. Death is still kept 
at arm’s length. While, in theory, Zelizer’s appreciation of the about-to-die image 
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and its impact sounds plausible, I doubt that most media formats provide a platform 
for existential and compassionate engagement with these pictures. Susan Sontag 
warned of this, when she pointed out that the news has been converted into 
entertainment for consumers of violence as spectacle: 
 
It assumes that everyone is a spectator. It suggests, perversely, 
unseriously, that there is no real suffering in the world. But it is absurd 
to identify the world with those zones in the well-off countries where 
people have the dubious privilege of being spectators, or of declining 
to be spectators, of other people’s pain, just as it is absurd to 
generalize about the ability to respond to the sufferings of others on 
the basis of the mind-set of those consumers of news who know 
nothing at first hand about war and massive injustice and terror. There 
are hundreds of millions of television watchers who are far from 
inured to what they see on television. They do not have the luxury of 
patronizing reality … Some people will do anything to keep 
themselves from being moved. How much easier, from one’s chair, far 
from danger, to claim the position of superiority. In fact, deriding the 
efforts of those who have borne witness in war zones as “war tourism” 
is such a recurrent judgment that it has spilled over into the discussion 
of war photography as a profession. (Sontag 2003: 86–7) 
 
Many about-to-die pictures, especially, are seen to violate standards of decency 
(Zelizer 2010: 52) and Zelizer tells stories of reporters who have been accused of 
failure to render assistance (Zelizer 2010: 168). This is an unfortunate squeamishness 
of the public, willing to lash out at witnesses, journalists, or perpetrators, instead of 
showing empathy for the victim or reflecting on the deeper implications of an image. 
It seems people in the late modern world are so detached from existential realities 
and from their own discomfort with death that blaming, looking away, and being 
apathetic is the logical, practical option. 
In fact, studies have shown (British Psychological Society 2015) that 
prolonged engagement with a violent news event can have effects similar to post-
traumatic stress disorder in individuals. Unease with pictures of impending death and 
dealing with the fallout of violent news also point towards a changing attitude about 
fear. This is important because fear will likely be experienced when engaging with 
death. With the change in the attitude towards fear, we observe a shift in the 
conception of the self — and therefore towards death itself. Behind these attitudes 
towards fear and the current death illiteracy of society is the threat of the dissolution 
of all meaning. 
Frank Fuerdi has argued that the phrase “culture of fear” is now embedded in 
everyday language, indicating that fear is a “cultural metaphor for interpreting life” 
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and a “cultural idiom through which we signal a sense of growing unease about our 
place in the world” (Fuerdi 2007: vii). Fuerdi is not only speaking about alarmist 
media and news reports, which have a constant focus on past, present, and potential 
disasters of any scale. Fear, he suggests, is a common theme that is deployed by 
lobbyists of all kinds (climatologists, anti-vaxxers, religious groups) when trying to 
“raise awareness” for their cause. Such fear, however, is no longer informed by 
personal experience. Fear is now experienced passively and directed towards 
conceptual, fictional threats. Fuerdi notes: “Today we are simply encouraged to 
regard fear as our default response to life itself”; society is “haunted by ‘fear of the 
future, fear of losing, fear of others, fear of taking a risk, fear of solitude, fear of 
growing old’” (Fuerdi 2007: ix).  
The act of fearing is culturally informed. Fuerdi argues that our current society 
shows great reluctance to positively engage with risk, since its negative 
consequences are exaggerated, hinting at an attitude people have towards not only 
death but life itself. Fear is equated with terror; it is a “raw fear” (Fuerdi 2007: 8). In 
the past, Fuerdi argues, people’s fears were concrete and based on a common cultural 
script. People feared death, illness, or God. Nowadays, fear is unhinged; the act of 
fearing has become in itself threatening (Fuerdi 2007: 1). The modern way of fearing 
also has a “free-floating dynamic” to it, in the sense that it frequently attaches itself 
to ever-changing subjects (the fear of terrorist attack, the fear of a zombie 
apocalypse, the fear of an Ebola pandemic) (Fuerdi 2007: 5). Fuerdi further argues 
that fear, in the past, was positively linked to an “expression of ‘respect’ and 
‘reverence’, or ‘veneration’”. According to the sixteenth-century philosopher 
Hobbes, fear constituted an appropriate response to new events (Fuerdi 2007: 7). 
Fuerdi underscores the role of fear of an awe-inspiring event and warns of our 
inability to cope with this nameless existential threat in contemporary times: 
 
“Respectful” and “raw” fear express very different relations to human 
experience. Parkin claims that respectful fear assumes “predictable 
response to behaviour”. It is a form of “knowable fear”. It is knowable 
because it is embedded in informal taken-for-granted and culturally 
sanctioned formal relations. In contrast “raw fear” has as its premise 
“an unpredictable aspect sustained by the victim”. This is a fear that is 
not rooted in folk culture, and not guided by a generally accepted 
narrative of meaning. Hence its unpredictability. (Fuerdi 2007: 8) 
 
Fear is also incredibly isolating: “In the absence of a master-narrative that endows 
the threats we face with shared meaning, people’s response has acquired an 
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increasingly private and personalized character” (Fuerdi 2007: 9). The individual has 
no such anchors anymore. Yet death in the media is ubiquitous, and death as 
entertainment seems culturally ingrained. I suggest that the inability to deal with the 
existential consequences of real death, combined with the jouissance of death 
entertainment, results in a lullaby of carnage. 
 
Conclusion: a lullaby of carnage 
 
What the new necrophiliac represents is a certain fascination and predisposition for a 
darker, maybe morbid side within — undeadness. This is a place where one is, 
maybe not comfortable, yet morbidly fascinated with the abject. Larson’s example of 
people attracted by gruesome beheading videos exemplifies the characteristics of the 
necrophile self that watches these videos out of curiosity and with no “higher” 
purpose. She cites one anonymous Internet user: 
 
You almost can’t believe that a group of people could be so pitiless as 
to carry out something so cruel and bestial, and you need to have it 
confirmed … Watching them evokes a mixture of emotions — mainly 
distress at the obvious fear and suffering of the victim, but also 
revulsion at the gore, and anger against the perpetrators. (Larson 2014: 
82) 
 
Freud was right that the inclination towards destructiveness is a part of the human 
situation. But the interest in death, anger or other negative feelings is not evil, as 
Fromm assumed. His proposed way out of human misery is naïve, as is Marcuse’s 
idea of libidinal rationality. A human is not a spotless, unconditionally loving, peace-
and-harmony-seeking being if only the outer circumstances are beneficial. There is 
this dark side within, which Lacanians attempt to theorize, since we are attracted and 
at the same time repulsed by the uncanny. However, our secularized society provides 
little means to handle the unsymbolized. A sincere engagement with death and dying 
is deeply challenged in the prevalent cultural climate ruled by capitalism.  
On some level, one knows what lurks in the dark corners of the unconscious 
and hence draws death and violence back into life through popular mass media, 
maybe as a form of control complex. But rather than accomplishing some sort of 
completion by acknowledging the absence of an issue and the pain it creates, people 
revel in its excess, while fearing the angst it creates. Scared of one’s own anxiety, the 
consumption of sterile mass death is exciting, numbing, and safe enough to allow us 
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to drop contemplating life’s essential questions with all their uncomfortable 
implications. It plays into the pocket of a necrophile self that cannot ponder death but 
celebrates excess and distraction in its all-encompassing hunger for more. 
Herbert Marcuse made an observation about the modern use of erotica that can 
be applied to representations of death in the media. In his book One dimensional man 
(2007 [1964]), Marcuse stipulates that, in the modern cultural climate, erotica (in the 
form of erotic advertisements) is used as a stimulus for capitalistic purposes. This 
drains enough of the individual’s libido to keep him/her complacent yet at the same 
time impairs finding the path to true emancipation. The repression of the individual 
and maintenance of the capitalistic standard is achieved through this marketability of 
sexuality. Marcuse writes: 
 
For example, compare love-making in a meadow and in an 
automobile, on a lovers’ walk outside the town walls and on a 
Manhattan street. In the former cases, the environment partakes of and 
invites libidinal cathexis and tends to be eroticized. Libido transcends 
beyond the immediate erotogenic zones — a process of nonrepressive 
sublimation. In contrast, a mechanized environment seems to block 
such self-transcendence of libido. Impelled in the striving to extend 
the field of erotic gratification, libido becomes less “polymorphous,” 
less capable of eroticism beyond localized sexuality, and the latter is 
intensified. 
Thus diminishing erotic and intensifying sexual energy, the 
technological reality limits the scope of sublimation. It also reduces 
the need for sublimation. In the mental apparatus, the tension between 
that which is desired and that which is permitted seems considerably 
lowered, and the Reality Principle no longer seems to require a 
sweeping and painful transformation of instinctual needs. The 
individual must adapt himself to a world which does not seem to 
demand the denial of his innermost needs — a world which is not 
essentially hostile. (Marcuse 2007: 77) 
 
I suggest that, in the same way, one can look at hyper-violence in (entertainment) 
media, which creates intellectual awareness that death is part of human life. 
However, consuming death in this way denies the platform on which to ponder its 
personal and existential meaning. The new visibility of death in the media has by 
now far exceeded what Gorer once described as the pornification of death. The new 
visibility of death, because death in the media has become omnipresent, is both more 
explicit in its details and preposterously gory. This new visibility is at the heart of the 
necrophile self because it develops a distorted interest and relationship with (virtual) 
violence that can be obsessive, as well as displeasing, yet the engagement with death 
and mortality still remains vacuous. 
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In the next chapter I turn to death’s visibility in contemporary art and 
exhibitions. Since the dawning of humanity, we have used art to address existential 
questions of birth, death, violence and the afterlife. However, the question I want to 
explore in this thesis is how artists and exhibitors approach death and dying in the 





Death in art: the anatomical beauty and materiality of 
death 
 
I have always looked upon decay as being just as wonderful and rich 
an expression of life as growth. (Miller 1960: 29) 
 
I first became aware of life’s brutality when I was 20 years old. I met my best friend, 
Sybille, when we were 17, and we immediately bonded over our favourite writer, 
Herman Hesse. Our relationship had all kinds of teenage ups and downs but, by the 
time we were twenty, Sybille was leaving our town to work in Japan. We decided to 
celebrate and seal our friendship with a vacation. Our plan was to fly to the island of 
Crete for a hitchhiking road trip. On the day before our departure, Sybille took me to 
visit her extended family to say her goodbyes as she would be leaving for Japan a 
week after our return. That night at her home, we went through her closet and 
playfully tried on clothes in preparation for our adventure ahead. She made two piles, 
those she loved and wanted to bring along for the trip and the ones she disliked. 
There was an ensemble, a twin-set combination that she particularly loathed. 
Garments like these, with their innocuous floral prints, were the epitome of the 
bourgeoisie to us. We, of course, thought of ourselves as rebellious in our hearts 
while wearing our bell-bottomed vintage jeans.  
Less than a week after our return from Greece, Sybille was killed in a car 
accident. The mother of my boyfriend shook me awake at seven on a Sunday 
morning. Her face was hovering over mine, tears streaming down her cheeks: 
“Sybille is dead”. Her car hit the curb at a weird angle and she lost control of the 
vehicle. Not wearing a seatbelt, she was flung through the windshield. 
I remember the moment when I heard the news. There was a cut, a suspension 
of time when all the clutter in my head fell away, and I experienced myself as pure 
presence, held hostage by the reality of impermanence. There were no thoughts. Not 
even disbelief, not yet. It just did not make any sense to me. We were young; we 
could not just die.  
Days of agony later, I walked into the funeral parlour in an attack of anxiety 
that would later re-visit me as a harbinger of other deaths. Caught in the aura of a 
heavy existential anxiety, death almost seemed seductive, albeit torturous. Sybille’s 
was the first dead body I encountered. Her previously flushed cheeks, the rosiness of 
 
 135 
her skin tanned by the Greek sun were gone. She had a massive cut on her head, and 
her skin was a lifeless greyish green. She had been done up by the morticians and 
they had dressed her in the disdained floral twin-set! 
It was almost impossible for me to make sense of the absence of the person I 
loved and with whom I had been skinny-dipping in the Greek ocean under a moonlit 
night just two weeks earlier. Where had she gone? Death, in its brutal immediacy, 
demands the utmost presence of our being. In this chapter, I explore how 
contemporary artists, photographers, and anatomists come to terms with loss, death, 
decay, and violence. Two themes emerged as I examined how these creators engage 
with mortality. One motivation is to defy death and tinker with its materiality. The 
other is to openly assimilate death and confront its immediacy. 
 




The controversial British artist Damien Hirst is notorious for inciting divided 
opinions about his art. Hirst’s art is evocative, confronting, and violent. He says of 
himself that he uses his art as a means to overcome his death anxiety. Will Self 
describes this in one of Hirst’s catalogues, Beyond belief: 
 
Hirst has often spoken about his fear of death, and at lunch he did so 
again: “I’ve always been afraid of it, always. When I was young I 
thought if I didn’t get cancer you’d be alright, but then it was 
explained to me that you died of old age, and I thought, bummer.” 
Since then, his fear of death, far from being supplanted by sexuality, 
has simply swelled and grown, becoming baroque, ever evolving more 
furbelows and frills. (Self 2008: 13) 
 
Hirst’s fascination with death is captured in his sculpture The physical impossibility 
of death in the mind of someone living (1991), where a shark is suspended in a tank 
of formaldehyde, a work that catapulted Hirst to success in the international art 
scene. For me, the title evokes my experience of losing my best friend, the sheer 
impossibility of imagining a living being ceasing to exist and the brutal realization of 
this in the encounter with her corpse. Hirst elaborates on this experience in a Channel 
4 documentary Damien Hirst — The first look (2012), where he likens the fear of 
sharks with people’s fear of death. Death is unimaginable, Hirst suggests, hence the 
use of euphemisms such as to ‘lose’ somebody, implying the possibility of a return or 
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reunion. In this sense, one keeps looking for the dead. In contrast, the shark, an icon 
of savagery, connotes violence and the brutal immediacy of death, capable of taking 
life at any age, at any place, and at any moment. Like the shark, the potential of death 
forever looms with its uncanny omnipresence.  
Hirst has created many variations of animals suspended in formaldehyde. For 
some of these works, cutting or dismembering the animal plays an important role. 
Unlike the predatory shark, a placeholder for death’s violence, in other works Hirst 
and his team have literally cut up animals. Such works are highly illustrative of how 
people can be drawn to violence in order to make sense of life. The installation 
Mother and child divided (1993), for example — for which Hirst won the Turner 
Prize in 1995 — consists of a cow and a calf cut in half by a chainsaw with each 
piece preserved in a tank of formaldehyde and exhibited together. This installation 
references both the violence of death and the laborious and gory moments of birth. 
While I doubt Hirst had Lacan in mind while cutting the animals up, one could 
speculate that the work evokes the Lacanian idea of ego formation, in which a child 
first moves through the mirror stage and assumes a self, and then later becomes 
integrated into the Symbolic Order through mapping out the lack in the (m)Other. In 
this reading, the opening up of the body serves as an allegory of the inner working of 
the psyche and the display of the animal’s insides as its map. When asked about this 
particular work in the documentary, Hirst again raises the impossibility of catching 
or understanding death (Damien Hirst — The first look 2012). The more you try to 
approximate it, he suggests, the more it escapes you. He also points out the longevity 
of unanimated bodies in formaldehyde abeyance — which makes it possible for the 
preserved artefact to outlive its maker. In this sense, the work suggests a defeat of 
death, or at least of decay, through preservation. 
Objects found in museums of natural history have often inspired Hirst’s art, as 
one could see at an exhibition dedicated to his key works at the Tate Modern. For 
example the installation In and out of love (1991–2012) occupied two rooms: in one 
room, dead butterflies were pinned onto colourful backdrops, while in the other room 
butterflies were born, fed and mated while getting drunk on fermented fruit. The 
work evokes the natural art of the cycle of life and death — as well as the magnetism 
of the excess of the insect kingdom. Hirst remarks that what he loves about dead 
butterflies is how alive and colourful they look. While the body of the insects dry 
out, the wings are made of chitin, a long-chain polysaccharide extremely resistant to 




It’s about love and realism, dreams, ideals, symbols, life and death. I 
worked out many possible trajectories for these things, like the way 
the real butterfly can destroy the ideal (birthday-card) kind of love; the 
symbol exists apart from the real thing. Or the butterflies still being 
beautiful even when dead. All these things are completely thrown off 
balance by a comparison I tried to make between art and life, in the 
upstairs and downstairs installations, a crazy thing to do when in the 
end it’s all art. (Jopling 1991) 
 
Hirst’s installation was later heavily criticized by animal rights activists, who alleged 
that over 9000 butterflies perished in the 23-week-long Tate exhibition (Brooks 
2012). 
Hirst’s fascination with the cycle of life and the alchemy of preservation has 
also led him to produce sculptures that are inspired by anatomical medical models. 
One of these works is a bronze statue, Saint Bartholomew, exquisite pain (2006), that 
depicts the religious martyr skinned with his muscles exposed and his flayed skin 
draped over his arm while he is holding a scalpel in its left raised hand, but he also 
carries a pair of scissors in his right hand. Hirst explains:  
 
He holds his own skin over his arm and he holds a scalpel and a pair 
of scissors in his hands so that his exposure and pain are seemingly 
self-inflicted. It’s beautiful yet tragic, and like Saint Sebastian his face 
shows no pain. I added the scissors because I thought Edward 
Scissorhands was in a similarly tragic yet difficult position — it has a 
feel of a rape of the innocents about it. (Hirst, quoted in Chatsworth 
House 2006) 
 
So according to its creator, this sculpture of the martyr does reference death as self-
inflicted violence, which is the tool of a seductive and tragic death instinct. The 
popular fictional character Edward Scissorhands is an artificially created man who 
has long sharp instruments instead of hands. The tragedy is that, while he yearns for 
closeness, his embrace is deadly. 
Another work of Hirst that evokes death and violence is a giant bronze statue 
of a pregnant woman, Verity (2003–2012). This work had a controversial reception 
in the English harbour town Ilfracombe, when it was erected to grace the shoreline in 
October 2012. The work is described as an allegory of truth and justice. Inspired by 
Edgar Degas’s Little dancer of fourteen years (c. 1881), an anatomical cross-section 
of the woman’s head and body discloses a developing foetus. In her upstretched arm, 
she holds a sword while she hides an off-balance scale behind her back. “Without the 
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perfect equilibrium enacted by the scales, the sword becomes a dangerous instrument 
of power, rather than justice” (Hirst and Science Ltd 2012). 
Verity is based on the Roman goddess of justice. In ancient Rome, Lady Justice 
or Justitia was the female personification of justice, often depicted with a double-
edged sword, a blindfold and a scale. The blindfold represents impartiality, the scale 
represents the evaluation of the support for and opposition to a case, and the double-
edged sword symbolizes the power of reason and justice. Hirst depicts Justitia with 
the face of a pregnant, dissected teenager and holding an off-balance scale behind her 
back. I interpret this sculpture as expressing the idea that, once justice is pregnant 
with power, reason will succumb to the lure of the death instinct. This reading is 
reinforced by Hirst’s comment that Verity is a further development of another larger-
than-life torso sculpture, Hymn (1999–2005), inspired by anatomical models used in 
schools, made of bronze and covered in car paint.5 Hirst explains: “It’ll decay. So, 
eventually, what you’ll be left with is this solid bronze man with bits of paint 
hanging off it. In a way, it’s like what happens to your body. I liked it for that 
reason” (Hirst and Burn 2001: 147). Hirst evokes decay through the gradual 
vanishing of glossy paint as if, after our death, the skin will melt off our flesh to 
expose another world underneath, capable of withstanding any transformation. The 
change is only superficial; the structure will withstand decay.  
In regards to taming decay and mortality in our death-phobic culture, Damien 
Hirst’s possibly most controversial, certainly most expensive, piece of art For the 
love of God (2007), has explicitly been praised as “victory over decay” (Fuchs 2008: 
16). Damien Hirst and his team purchased a human skull from a London taxidermist 
and cast it into platinum. The platinum skull has been adorned with approximately 
8600 diamonds weighing 1106.18 carats (Self 2008: 14). In order to create the most 
expensive piece of art to date, he allegedly relied on “the tactics and habits, as well 
as the camaraderie, of hedge fund speculators” (Silverman 2011: 399).  
For the love of God combines imagery of the classic memento mori with a 
distinct Aztec and Mexican aesthetic influence. The diamond-clad skull is meant to 
act as a reminder of our transient existence. The large stone at the centre of the head 
was inspired by the comic 2000 AD and represents the god-like power to control the 
universe. Nevertheless, death is still approached as something unbearable, something 
that must be disguised. The skull’s connection to mundane materialism is obvious, as 
                                                
5 Apparently after business magnate and art collector Charles Saatchi bought the sculpture 
for £1 m, Hirst was sued for infringing copyright because Hymn resembled an £14.99 
anatomical toy. Settlement was reached out of court (Dyer 2000). 
 
 139 
Hirst himself explains: “You don’t like it, so you disguise it or you decorate it to 
make it look like something bearable — to such an extent that it becomes something 
else” (Hirst and Science Ltd 2017). Materialism, corporate greed, and the fascination 
with death are at the centre of this work. This becomes particularly obvious in this 
statement: 
 
Alongside their dazzling brilliance and “Eucharistic” beauty, Hirst’s 
fascination with diamonds results partly from the mutterings and 
uncertainty surrounding their inherent worth. In the face of the 
industry’s ability to establish their irreplaceable value, it becomes 
necessary to question whether they are “just a bit of glass, with 
accumulated metaphorical significance? Or [whether they] are 
genuine objects of supreme beauty connected with life.” The cutthroat 
nature of the diamond industry, and the capitalist society which 
supports it, is central to the work’s concept. Hirst explains that the 
stones “bring out the best and the worst in people … people kill for 
diamonds, they kill each other”. (Hirst and Science Ltd 2017) 
 
Diamonds last forever, so they say, and in this case, diamonds are a stand-in for the 
contemporary pursuit of immortality, brilliantly visualized by Hirst. The diamond-
covered skull is beautiful, sleek, shiny, and absolute in its suspension of death 
anxiety. The wealth that diamonds represent becomes the glossy veil behind which 
death as master signifier vanishes: “the skull is a tangible exclamation mark at the 
end of this era of excess … It’s his enactment of the extreme and specialised ritual of 
money” (Self 2008: 15). According to Reuters, the skull was bought for $100 million 
by an anonymous investment group, of which Hirst is part (Lovell 2007).  
Damien Hirst mastered walking this tightrope between art as manifestation of 
capitalistic greed and its aggressive stance towards life with his diamond-covered 
skull. He says about himself: “it’s the maximum I can throw against death; perhaps 
that’s crass, to pit money against death, but it all depends on what it does visually” 
(Self 2008: 14). As Deborah Silverman observes, Hirst’s skull “belongs to a different 
symbolic universe and cultural economy: the skull as an imagery of piracy, poison 
and triumphant money lust” (Silverman 2011: 404). This connection between money, 
desire, excess, and commodification is typical of the necrophile, death-illiterate self. 
And the success of Hirst’s art shows that the necrophile self has become a cultural 
force that gloats over shock values and the brazen display of one’s status. 
Silverman interprets Hirst’s “shockaholic” art as “marketing Thanatos” or as 
expressing “forms of cultural pathology” (Silverman 2011: 391). Silverman is highly 
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critical of Hirst’s art as well as his persona. She identifies three main propellants of 
Hirst’s success: 
 
A hedge fund economy of greed and speculative fever; a politics of 
contempt for rules, corruption and impunity; and a society marked by 
perpetual war, permissible torture and violence at a distance. I 
consider Hirst’s as what I call “hazmat art in an era of cultural 
dysregulation” and emphasize the character of the work as physical 
poison and cultural toxin. (Silverman 2011: 392) 
 
Silverman underscores the lack of scrutiny and objective distance that allow looking 
beyond Hirst’s clever marketing strategies in order to identify the impact of his art on 
the collective consciousness. She links his art to the trajectory of the Belgian Art 
Nouveau “chryselephantine” sculptures of the 1890s that were sponsored by King 
Leopold II. The aesthetics of these sculptures, made of ivory tusk, concealed the 
violence and brutal history of their place of origin. Silverman likens Hirst to Mr 
Kurtz, the ivory hunter in Joseph Conrad’s book Heart of darkness:  
 
Hirst and Kurtz are both artists, butterfly collectors, and shamanic 
characters who flourish in a world of rapacity and greed, facilitated by 
international accommodation. Hirst’s diamond-clad skull, hailed as a 
global “cultural icon,” bears some eerie echoes to the posted skulls 





Hirst’s bronze sculptures bear a striking resemblance to the works of Gunther von 
Hagens, showcased in his extremely successful exhibition Body worlds. Von Hagens 
is not recognized as an artist, although his work is sometimes likened to art (Pesch 
2007: 382; Redman 2016). Body worlds plays with the suspension and 
transformation of the abject through the exhibition of plastinated bodies utilizing a 
process von Hagens developed to preserve real humans by replacing their body fluids 
with a form of plastic. Through this method, the original physical form of the body is 
preserved while it retains its durability and stability. The process of decay is stopped 
and the preserved body can be used as an object for exhibition. Von Hagens writes: 
“Plastinates show the inner workings of the body and the striking whole-body 
specimens show the human body in real-life poses, like never seen before” 
(Bodyworlds 2012). Von Hagens’ aim is to overcome the disgust and fear evinced by 
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the human corpse through an aesthetic representation of the body. Showing 
plastinates in active everyday positions creates an illusion of vitality, which reduces 
the distance between the plastinate and the spectator. In von Hagens’ words: “The 
beautiful plastinate, frozen between dying and decay, offers the possibility of a new 
sensual experience” (Pesch 2007: 375). Von Hagens’ aim is to make the plastinate 
appear as real as possible, freed from the taint of revulsion and, above all, 
disconnected from all mourning experiences. He sees himself as an educator, as 
somebody who is increasing the possibilities of research for science and contributing 
to the education of a broad audience. The primary aim of Body worlds is health 
education, targeting the layperson. The creator hopes to raise people’s awareness of 
the body as “naturally fragile in a mechanized world … and to recognize the 
individuality and anatomical beauty inside of them” (Bodyworlds 2017). 
The plastinates are made anonymous by removing the face to avoid recognition 
from family or friends. Von Hagens hopes that this anonymity helps the audience to 
focus on the beauty of the physical world inside the body, its “inner face” 
(Bodyworlds 2005). Although von Hagens refers to his work as education for the lay 
masses, he does not hesitate to make a connection with the Christian tradition of the 
memento mori, the public exhibition of the body parts of saints as reminders of 
mortality. Interestingly, he has used the memento mori analogy as a strategy to 
legitimate exhibiting corpses in legal confrontations that have arisen. The German 
section of the International Society of Human Rights, for example, regards von 
Hagens’ show as “business with the dead” (Pesch 2007: 381) and disregards its 
alleged scientific worth. According to them, it violates the dignity of the dead as well 
as indirectly violating human dignity.  
This sentiment is not too surprising if one takes a closer look at how these 
bodies are represented, and the manner in which Gunter von Hagens represents 
himself as an artist of the macabre. He has been accused of creating effects of thrill 
and lust by including the exhibition of plastinated gorillas and a full-sized bolting 
horse with rider. I visited a Body worlds exhibition at the age of 16 and I remember 
that one of the bodies was cut and prepared in a way that resembled a dresser. The 
body had drawers carved into it, that, when pulled out, gave a glimpse into the 
physical workings of its insides. I, too, was struck by people’s fascination with the 
plastination of a real baby nestled inside its mother’s womb. There is a striking 
similarity between Hirst’s Verity and von Hagens’ plastinated pregnant corpse. Both 
men address the power of recreation and the mystery of anatomy, and both juggle 
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with the theme of life and death and the overcoming of decay. The mother’s stomach 
was opened wide like a door, an open gate for those curious about how human life 
comes into being in a close-up of flesh and blood, yet without the gore, without the 
touch of skin, without the smell, and without animation. I remember vividly how I 
struggled with the fact that the plastinated doll in front of me had been a real mother-
to-be and that she probably left behind a grieving family. I also remember the 
reactions of people around me. One mother pointed out the pregnant plastinate to her 
toddler and commented: “Look, once you were in my belly, too. Just like that.” What 
sounded like a lovely introduction to an educational elaboration on the cycle of life, 
concluded to my surprise with: “That was the reason I had to barf so much.” 
From this personal experience, I wonder how educational such exhibitions 
really are to the layperson. They may simply provide sensational thrills without 
unsettling side effects, similar to entertainment offered by a violent media offering. 
However, von Hagens’ plastinated bodies are not meant to convey the experience of 
an encounter with a dead person, a corpse. Von Hagen was explicit about this when 
he defended his plastinates from the charge of violating German funeral legislation. 
In his argument, plastinates lose the status of a corpse because bodily liquids are 
replaced with plastic. The physicality of the plastinates evoke a different experience 
from that of an organic body. There are no smells, no discharge nor liquefaction. The 
plastinates resemble life-sized anatomical dolls. This is a deliberate attempt to 
remove the fear and revulsion surrounding the corpse and to offer the spectator an 
“aesthetic” presentation of the body (Pesch 2007: 374). I suggest that this suspension 
of the abject behind the veil of aestheticism sustains death illiteracy. Through the 
depiction of full body plastinates in active poses, von Hagens enables identification 
with the body without alienation from the corpse (von Hagens does enjoy presenting 
himself as an artist of the macabre whether his work is morally legitimate or 
considered a work of art in the eyes of the viewer). His success provides him with a 
certain degree of sanction and enables him to reject criticism regarding the 
legitimacy and ethical integrity of his work. As Pesch writes: 
 
As the architect of this experience, and as its tireless proponent, von 
Hagens has refigured death for modern sensibilities. A plastinated 
corpse isn’t pickled, like a body in a casket. It doesn’t stink, like 
cadavers at the morgue. It doesn’t rot or bloat or moulder. To see one 
doesn’t make you sad or sick; it doesn’t fill you with anxiety. The 
experience is something else instead — an encounter with a memento 
mori that’s both dry and durable and can be split and peeled without 
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disgust. It’s death denuded of its most gruesome elements, the body as 
a finely engineered machine. (Pesch 2007: 387, my translation) 
 
Another important aspect of von Hagens’ Body world empire is its body donation 
program, without which the enterprise could not function. The motivation of the 
different donors, Pesch observes, varies from the idea of being useful after death, of 
serving modern science through donating the body in the hope of a post-mortal 
existence, to the hope of outlasting death. The individual donor often longs to be 
recognized in his or her individuality, despite the fact that Body worlds’ policy 
emphasizes the need for anonymity in order to let the “anatomical beauty” of the 
organic body shine through. Most donors wish to remain in this world by preserving 
their full and intact bodies, by being exhibited together with their partners, or by 
preserving their individual markers such as tattoos. The body donors’ motives show 
that they long for comfort and hope that is lost in a profane world in which religious 
promises no longer draw on the faith of the individual, but mortality remains the 
unsolved riddle of each and every existence (Pesch 2007: 386).  
In this sense body donations can be interpreted as a secular substitution for 
religion, offering the hope that some recognizable aspect of a person’s self will 
remain preserved after death. In von Hagens’ catalogue from 2000, he describes the 
full body plastinate as “a new form of self-determined post-mortal existence” (Pesch 
2007: 389). This evokes hope for the individual donor, but stands in stark contrast to 
von Hagens’ juristic argument that a preserved body is mainly plastic and thus a 
specimen or object. To legitimize his work, von Hagens introduced the paradox of a 
commoditized corpse as a hopeful strategy towards one’s immortality. Pesch argues 
that von Hagens’ advertisement of a post-mortal bodily existence could be an attempt 
to reconcile with death and thus claim a religious position in addressing the human 
aspiration for immortality, which in the past was monopolized by the church. He 
identifies three key promises in the Body worlds literature to make people feel more 
empowered in the face of death, and therefore more likely to become donors. First, in 
favour of public education, people forgo a traditional funeral. Second, the 
emancipation of the body as a whole is made possible through the representation of 
the fascinating interior of the body. A new path to anatomical self-esteem emerges. 
Body worlds cultivates a fascination with bodies and a culture that recognizes the 
uniqueness of the body (an alternative to the traditionally body-hostile approach of 
Christianity). Third, the full-body plastinates give a new face to death, allowing 
death to lose its horror and be integrated into reality more easily (Pesch 2007: 390). 
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Anatomical self-esteem, avoidance of expensive and upsetting funerals, and the 
sanitation of death are all part of an immortality strategy projecting towards the 
future, yet still grappling with the present cultural death illiteracy. 
The inability to be in the presence of death may also occlude one’s ability to 
realize the historic context of these exhibitions, as well as the bodies themselves. 
There is a danger that the public could mistake von Hagens’ plastinates as art. The 
historian Samuel Redman raises concerns about Gunther von Hagens’ Body worlds 
exhibition in a recent article in The Conversation:  
 
People are very often unsettled by seeing what were once living, 
breathing, human beings — people with emotions and families — 
turned into scientific specimens intended for public consumption. 
Despite whatever discomfort emerges, however, the curious appeal of 
medicalized body displays at public museums lingers, enough so to 
make them consistently appealing as fodder for popular exhibitions. 
… But while charged emotional responses have the potential to 
heighten curiosity, they can also inhibit learning. While museum 
administrators voiced concern that visitors would be horrified viewing 
actual human bodies on exhibit, the public has instead proven to have 
an almost insatiable thirst for seeing scientized dead. (Redman 2016) 
 
Redman remarks that early exhibitions of human bodies have always been fuelled by 
academic and scientific curiosity. Additionally, there seems to be a historic 
fascination with death and the human body, evidenced by the large audiences drawn 
to museums and exhibitions showcasing preserved human bodies. In the past, the 
acquisition of bodies was underscored by racism, human trafficking, and robbery 
from both the battlefield and the graveyard. Exhibitors have moved away from such 
practices and from exhibiting human remains, especially since the proliferation of 
medical illustrations. Yet a large proportion of the contemporary population, 
attracted to these kinds of exhibitions of preserved corpses, may be unaware of the 
ethically problematic history of the dehumanization of the body — or what Redman 
calls “troubling transition[s] from person to specimen” (Redman 2016). This is also 
true for von Hagens’ practices of obtaining cadavers for his business — not all 
bodies are donors. A 2006 NPR report states that von Hagens’ sources for bodies are 
questionable. But von Hagen’s insists that all bodies — many of them unclaimed 
bodies from Chinese medical schools — are ethically acquired. In the past von 
Hagens received bodies from a Russian medical examiner, who eventually was 
convicted of illegally selling the bodies of homeless people, prisoners, and unclaimed 
hospital patients. Von Hagens’ present deal with Chinese medical schools remains 
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controversial, because of China’s human rights violations and the potential for 
receiving executed political prisoners. Further, the article states that no clear paper 
trail can be established between the displayed plastinate and donor forms (Ulaby 
2006).  
This handling of donor bodies literally shows that sanitized death (which also 
includes Hirst’s notorious art) masks the source and history of the preserved or 
adorned remains. When a corpse no longer decays and is renamed as a specimen or 
plastinate, the context of these exhibitions and artworks is lost and with it an 
appreciation of and gratitude for their origin. Redman urges exhibitors to emphasize 
the greater historical context of the plastinates to visitors: “Without it, visitors might 
mistake artfully posed cadavers as art pieces, which they most assuredly are not” 




Marketing death is another symptom of our contemporary death illiteracy. Over the 
last decade, skulls have become a common theme in fashion and retail. In 2006, 
before Hirst introduced his notorious diamond skull, David Coleman lamented in the 
New York Times that the once “clever and stylish” imagery of the skull had shifted 
“into overdrive, if not overkill” (Colman 2006). The skull — once imbued with 
respect for its rich history of mortality contemplation — is now rendered 
meaningless through its heavy commercialization. Hirst jumped on the bandwagon of 
popularizing skull imagery with his merchandizing and manufacturing business 
“Science” (Silverman 2011: 401). Michael C. Kearl observed that commodification 
dissolves the symbolic essence: 
 
Despite its long-term associations with humanity’s existential fate, 
danger and political injustice and savagery, this potent symbol was not 
immune to alternative meanings of mass media and the marketplace. 
As words become drained of their symbolic content when endlessly 
repeated, so ubiquitous alternative framings of the skull were to render 
its visage, if not meaningless, then at least largely void of its 
connotations of mortality and horror. (Kearl 2015: 7) 
 
Death has become merely a new commodity; death imagery can be marketed to 
inspire the very ideal of cultural necrophilia. Contemporary necrophilic culture has 
managed to extract the organic body from death. A corpse no longer decays, and the 
possibility of life changing and transforming is stifled. Instead this culture 
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sensationalizes the doings of a world replete with cultural and social pathologies. As 
a result of the modern sense of entitlement to bend and shape the world to our own 
human interest, we are now adept at draining the planet’s resources, in the process 
tipping life towards extinction. The West has accumulated wealth and abundance 
through transforming the planet’s resources into shiny and glossy commodities that 
symbolize Western ideals of status and riches. While various body ideals and the 
marketing of prestigious lifestyles distract the consumer, the repressed problems of 
grief and mortality slowly writhe their way into our consciousness. 
Hirst’s and von Hagens’ anatomical statues share an attitude to death that does 
not ultimately make us confront our deepest fear but rather represents a strategy to 
circumvent it. In this sense, it is no surprise that von Hagens is squeamish about his 
own mortality. In an interview with Wired Magazine, he revealed the many times he 
was confronted with the limits of the human body. In his childhood he was diagnosed 
with a dangerous bleeding disorder. This, however, did not prevent him from 
becoming a surgeon and later a plastinator, working with sharp tools on a daily basis. 
In his twenties, he was wrongly diagnosed with a rare heart disorder. He now has 
Parkinson’s disease, which makes it almost impossible to pursue his work. His future 
looks bleak at a time when his international plastinate imperium faces declining 
audiences and severe financial struggles. Von Hagens has always paid utmost 
attention to the efficiency of his work (Engber 2013) but, undermined by illness, he 
must now face financial loss and his own death. His wish is to be plastinated by his 
wife, to be cut into different parts and to be exhibited in his various institutions. His 
discussion with his wife about his last wishes reveals the struggle they both face in 
accepting his life-limiting condition:  
 
His voice grows weak — from disease or emotion, it’s hard to tell. 
He’s been talking coolly about what it means to die and what might 
happen to his corpse, but it’s the topic of his dog that chokes him up. 
“She can always sit beside me,” he sputters, and then pinches the 
bridge of his nose between his fingers and begins to weep. We sit in 
silence while his shoulders shake. 
For von Hagens, grief and sorrow are no different from any 
other defect of the human body that should be amenable to fixing. 
When his tears subside, he blames them on his disease — a condition 
I later learn is called pseudobulbar affect, or the involuntary and 
inappropriate expression of feeling. It was even worse a few years 
ago, he tells me, before he started treatment: “I was very upset at my 
uncontrolled emotions. I could not even go to the cinema.” He takes 
off his hat and shows the lumps on his scalp where the leads from 
brain-stimulating electrodes have irritated the skin. It’s the only time 
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I’ve seen his naked head. He says that he’s been better since the 
treatment. “Just now is the first time for the last week that I cried. So 
I’m nearly normal now.” (Engber 2013) 
 
Both von Hagens and Hirst push the boundaries to remind us of the reality of death. 
However, intellectually dealing with the reality of death is not the same as reflecting 
upon mortality and then bearing the weight of sorrow that comes with integrating 
loss. What is the difference? Well, in Hirst’s instance, reflecting on death has a 
tragic, nihilistic and almost cynical quality to it. At its core is a profound unease. In 
his butterfly installation, for example, Hirst lets the insects run their own life course. 
According to Hirst, the beauty in the room of dead butterflies resides in the fact that 
they retain their colourfulness after they have perished. The room of the perished 
butterflies is more colourful than the room where they were born and fed. Hirst’s art 
celebrates the extinction of decay. As Silverman writes: “Here extravagance and 
brutalism combined, exemplifying the distinctiveness of the thanatal style of our 
Hirstian culture: the shift from conspicuous consumption to conspicuous destruction” 
(Silverman 2011: 406). 
I argue that Hirst’s art is the manifestation of the necrophile self, and his 
popularity can only thrive in an environment in which the death drive operates 
hidden under the blanket of consumer capitalism. But I disagree with Silverman’s 
assessment that Hirst’s art has a purely negative impact on people. In her assessment: 
 
Hirst’s art and its commercialisation, unleashed in a decade of war and 
reckless capitalism, suggest that visual culture now offers stylistic 
displacements of distant, but always encroaching, violence … I 
consider Hirst’s global reach and toxic spread in the world of 
museums, galleries, and merchandizing as cultural IED’s, improvised 
explosive devices that blast our conscience and character. (Silverman 
2011: 417) 
 
I agree that Hirst’s work does not engage with existential themes such as loss, grief, 
sorrow, and decay that arise when confronting death. However, I propose that 
Silverman misses the point that his work emerges because of this cultural creed of 
brutality and materialism. He would not be the world’s richest artist without the 
prevalence of social death illiteracy. His role is not that of a perpetrator as such, but 
of a participator (maybe unconsciously), and a materializer and broadcaster of these 
subliminal cultural sentiments. While it is true that the necrophile self is also always 
a perpetrator, his art does not inject more toxicity into the world but rather extracts 
from it. It magnifies our struggle to come to terms with death and our cultural 
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disposition towards certain immortality strategies: Destruction is preferred over 
decay; materialism over materiality. 
 
The immediacy and materiality of death: decay and courage 
 
Photographers in the morgue 
 
Hirst and von Hagens are not the only contemporary exhibitors concerned with death 
and the abject. Unlike Hirst and von Hagens, however, the artists I now turn to have 
created work that contextualizes the (de-)materialization of the body. Often 
controversial, their works have a cathartic potential. Instead of suspending the 
process of decay through modern modes of preservation and representation, these 
artists attempt the gradual removal of taboos around the immediacy and materiality 
of death by working creatively with dying subjects, the dead body, and its soft tissue.  
 
As the history of Victorian post-mortem photography shows (Linkman 2006), the 
dead have been documented since the dawn of photography. The invention of the 
camera made family portraits more accessible and affordable for the masses. 
Photography came to play an interesting role for bereaved people. Photos 
(daguerreotypes) became precious keepsakes, often made after the death of the 
family member. These images (seemingly bizarre today) of corpses, sometimes 
situated alone or propped up next to the living, were often the only image a family 
had of the person who had passed away. One peculiarity of the time was that the 
dead were sometimes represented as still alive, but sleeping. These photos were in 
line with the old tradition of post-mortem paintings, but the daguerreotype 
introduced a new element of comfort for the grieving. Audrey Linkman suggests 
that, “By suppressing evidence of the unpleasant aspects of death and by suggesting 
a more familiar state of being, post-mortem portraits were intended to ease the pain 
of loss and bring solace and comfort to the bereaved” (Linkman 2006: 309). 
Post-mortem images changed after the turn of the century, as more emphasis 
was put on the funeral and less on the deceased (Ruby 1984: 212–13). The proximity 
of the camera to the dead widened, indicative, I suspect, of a cultural shift reflecting 
increased social discomfort with death. However, these eerie post-mortem pictures 
are not only comfort for the living. Their impact has a broader psychological 
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functioning. Film studies researcher Aténe Mendelyté interprets the significance of 
the post-mortem photo as follows: 
 
They show something through absence. They trap the unconscious by 
this visual trick, by the constant perceptual vacillation of the image. In 
this sense post-mortems are the perfect aesthetic images as for Lacan 
such is the function of Beauty — to open our sight to the Real. The 
picture’s true gaze affects us because it is the gaze of the ultimate 
jouissance in all its horror, exposing the subject as always already 
dead. (Mendelyté 2012: 89) 
 
Photographers confront death and go beyond the safety of the social order into the 
realm of the Thing. In 1992, controversial artist Andres Serrano published a series of 
photos called The morgue (1992). He was one of the first modern artists who entered 
this taboo space in order to reveal it to the public. In this tradition Danish 
photographer Cathrine Ertmann entered the morgue in order to document the stages 
and processes after a person has died. In About dying (2014), she tried to capture the 
spaces, practices, and moments hidden from the public eye: the uninviting cold 
rooms and hallways in which the dead are kept; the morgue, the crematorium, and 
the chapel. Her photos show the sometimes sombre and sterile environment in which 
corpses are examined and prepared for their last rite of passage. Her photos are eerie 
and confronting, like the autopsy scar lacing the chest of an elderly woman. Yet, 
although she took close-ups of corpses, like the stiffening neck of an elderly man, 
foreheads or feet, her photos are never too visually explicit and she appears to protect 
the identity of the dead. On her website, Ertmann provided an explanation of some of 
the photos. With an almost educational tone she writes: 
 
Muscular stiffening begins between four and twelve hours after death. 
It starts in the neck and makes movement of the limbs impossible. 
When it reaches the scalp, it can make the dead body’s hair rise. Like 
goose bumps on the living. 
In the crematory, the coffins are burned. Flowers are removed, 
but drawings, cards and pictures are included in the big oven and are 
burned at 850 degrees Fahrenheit. It takes about an hour and a half to 
transform into ashes. If there are bone fragments, they are crushed, 
and the ashes put in an urn. Afterwards, the urn is laid in the ground, 
or maybe the ashes are scattered over the sea. 
Some plan what clothes they want to have on when they are laid 
in the coffin, but more often it is the family who chooses. If no 
decision has been made, the chapel provides a shirt for the dead. The 
garment is cut in the back and behind the arms, so it is easier to dress 
the deceased in it. Sometimes the wish is expressed that the deceased 




Close-ups of hands are a recurring theme in Ertmann’s work, whether of the dead 
lying in a coffin or the mortician’s hands grooming the dead for their last public 
appearance. One strikingly odd picture portrays a wine-red tie placed around the 
neck of a dead man, dressing him as if for a wedding party. However, those nice 
garments are cut down the back and the dead are made to look alive by applying 
make up to their faces. This is kept hidden — I did not know this information for a 
long time. While my friend Sybille would rather have been buried naked than 
wearing the floral twin-set, I feel strangely relieved that at least the terrible ensemble 
was cut in the back. For some unknown reason, this now decreases my sense of 
absurdity at seeing my dead friend in a coffin in the despised clothing.  
Another photographer, Sue Fox, also visits morgues. However, she is more 
confrontational in her approach. Her work attempts to overcome the barriers between 
our curiosity about, and shock at, observing the intimate aspects of decay. Fox takes 
close-ups of corpses from shameless proximity. She does not shy away from 
portraying dead bodies slit open, latex gloved hands manipulating organs, or decay 
spilling out of corpses’ orifices. She says that in viewing the dead she exposes herself 
to one of the greatest fears, the fear of self-destruction, and that by absorbing these 
realities she attempts to extend her consciousness in order to attain a new perspective 
on life (Fox 2007: 105). These close-up images capture the horror of soft tissue 
liquefying and transforming into putrid gases. Despite our daily exposure to the 
horrifying pictures broadcast on our screens, these photos have the ability to confront 
and sicken the viewer in a way that sterile, blurry, glossy, or artificial media pictures 
do not. 
Fox calls her art a “spiritual praxis” (Fox 2007: 105). She writes about 
overcoming her angst during her first encounter with the dead:  
 
As if standing at a deep abyss from which she stared into a cave filled 
with the dead of endless epochs, she felt that life was always on the 
side of the loser. Her physical rejection of the sickening stench of the 
corpse, her examination of its decaying tissues, and its containment in 
the language of photography, enabled her eventually to feel that what 
she created in the face of decay helped to refine the chaotic energy of 
death. Art held out the possibility of creating a space to welcome 
death consciously as well as unconsciously, a space to appropriate 




In contrast, in contemporary society the aging, dysfunctional, and dying and their 
dead bodies are removed from day-to-day experience. The experience of 
disablement, dysfunctionality, and dying reappears via representation in the media. 
We imagine that the humans of the twenty-first-century Western world have seen 
everything horrific — dead children and their torn-up bodies, humiliated prisoners, 
brutal rapes, dead dictators, flesh-hungry zombies, and blood-thirsty vampires. 
However screens act as a filter, not only because of the distance they create between 
the viewer and the image, or because one has the possibility of zapping from death 
into a less controversial televised “elsewhere” at will. Entertainment media puts a 
shiny gloss on dead tissue and eliminates the putrid stench of decay, enabling the 
viewer to be close but never too close. One could argue that photographs, too, are 
second-hand experiences that fail to relay the “real thing”. But for Sue Fox, her work 
acts as a magnifying lens seeking proximity to the dead and thus underscoring the 
immediacy of death.  
 
Discerning social commentary and existential courage 
 
Fox and Ertmann display existential courage in facing the abject in the morgue and 
provide an eye for the curious who are unable to enter into the spaces reserved for 
the dead. However, the Mexican artist Teresa Margolles developed an even more 
compelling approach. Trained in forensic science, Margolles spent more than a 
decade working in morgues, first as a photographer, and later as an artist. Margolles 
uses waste materials from the mortuary and the street to tell the stories of the dead. 
Passionate about giving Latin-American victims of violent crime a voice and raising 
awareness of the poverty and desperation of survivors of crime, she does not shy 
away from using fluids collected from the washing of the dead, shrouds, or even the 
tongue of a murdered drug addict in Lengua (2000).  
Margolles has been accused by contemporary art critics and spectators of 
having a necrophile temperament, and of vilifying the dead (Macho 2007: 353). 
Interestingly, however, Margolles’ works are well received in Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland despite her art being so deeply unsettling. She is aware of Western 
countries’ death taboo, especially regarding the murdered body, and sees her work as 
an opportunity to break the silence in the European context. She says that her 
platform is the museological/art space where she puts the corpse at the centre of the 
discussion. A conversation, she hopes, that is focused around the person murdered, 
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the right to live and to take life — or what she calls the “realities of life” 
(global:artfair TV 2016). Engaging with her art and the philosophy behind it involves 
recognizing that deadness is as much a process as dying itself. 
In working with corpses in their different states, she closely observes the 
enfolding of the organic within the tissue of the dead. For example, in order not to 
show the tortured and mutilated bodies of crime victims, Margolles shows objects 
found around the corpse at the crime scene. This includes the soil the corpse touched 
and the sand that mixed with the body’s blood. Margolles is acutely aware that the 
blood dried into dust can be carried away by the wind and thus the dead are brought 
back into the communities and the lungs of those living. She remarked in an 
interview for the 7th Berlin Biennale in 2012 that “we are being filled by our fellow 
citizens” (solidarityaction 2012). Here the abject, that von Hagens and Hirst deem to 
be something to overcome, is conceived as already in our midst in the most 
innocuous form as dust. According to Margolles, social violence and the violence of 
the life cycle is inescapable; what is already present only needs to be revealed to the 
willing perceiver.  
For the 7th Berlin Biennale in 2012, Margolles exhibited her work PM 2010 
(2010) which is a collection of the front pages of the Mexican tabloid PM, published 
in Ciudad Juárez, one of the most dangerous border cities in Mexico. The Berlin 
Biennale curators, Artur Żmijewski and Joanna Warsza, write about her work:  
 
The newspaper is not available on the Internet and is only on sale in 
the city from Monday to Saturday at 1 pm. In this work, Margolles 
brings all 313 covers from 2010 — the most violent year in the entire 
history of drug trafficking in Mexico — to the audience. Each front 
page of the paper presents an image of one of the city’s victims of the 
drug war, who were shot, stabbed, or tortured in the most horrific 
ways. Hundreds of bodies were never found; probably most of them 
were dissolved in containers with acid. Liquid remains were put into 
the soil. These daily images from a tabloid reflect the routine 
experience of violence and death in a society which is collapsing 
under the pressure of organized drug crime. Poverty, crime, and the 
bloody rivalries of paramilitary gangs are always the day’s most 
important populist news items, next to recurring erotic advertisements. 
The paper turns each scene into a kind of obscure death porn, which is 
normalized through its constant repetition. (Żmijewski and Warsza 
2017) 
 
In this sense Margolles’ artwork becomes social commentary and, although she has 
been working with dead bodies for more than two decades, she uses the morgue as a 
daily thermometer of what is happening in the streets. The research in the morgue 
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thus becomes social. The Hispanic art researcher Julia Banwell underscores the 
impact of Margolles’ work on the audience: 
 
Her works are confrontational, urging the spectator to reflect upon the 
social milieu within which Mexico City's morgue is situated, as it is 
represented by the unclaimed corpses whose names we never learn. 
This serves to place the artist's subject matter within the public sphere, 
thus forcing viewers to contemplate a reality they may rather deny. 
Non-Mexican viewers may be unfamiliar … and unaware of its social 
problems. In this case, Teresa Margolles' art works operate as social 
commentary on two levels: firstly, to raise awareness of a situation 
that exists within an environment with which they had previously had 
little or no contact, and secondly in the way mentioned above, as a 
direct confrontation of the viewer with an uncomfortable social 
reality. (Banwell 2009: 58) 
 
The everyday triteness of tabloid magazines is infused with human suffering, 
although the format of the tabloid press does not allow for in-depth engagement (as 
discussed in Chapter 5). In fact, Margolles’ work is in stark contrast to what is served 
up by the entertainment industries. The dematerialization of the dead and the 
alienating reality of their physicality are approached differently in Margolles’ art 
than in the frequent modern representations of the dead on TV or elsewhere in media 
portraits. Margolles manages to reveal the true tragedy of crime through the 
accumulation of mere information by presenting this collection in a space where 
contemplation can potentially be achieved. 
 
Conclusion: reflections on life 
 
Margolles, Ertmann, Fox, von Hagens, and Hirst all work with existential themes of 
death and life, yet their approaches to those themes could not be more different. The 
art of Margolles, Fox, and Ertmann directly approaches the border between the living 
and the dead, representing the dead body not as dead matter, but as an organic form 
of transformation that serves as memento mori for every body. From this perspective, 
the necrophile self can bee seen as a state of perception that lacks a means of 
engagement with a mortal reality rendered opaque in our secular, materialistic 
cultural climate. Artists approach death and dying through a variety of lenses, but 
existential anxiety is always within us, hence the religious and cultural scripts that 
emerged historically in order to deal with our mortality awareness. I have so far 
argued that there is not a master signifier in contemporary society to help people 
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come to terms with mortality. Nonetheless, this does not imply it is impossible to 
individually come to a deeper understanding and integration of death. 
Margolles’ work is an example of this. Framing a lethal social death drive 
through its devastating impact on Mexican societies has required from her to 
confront the abject. Her work in the morgue shows that she is very capable of 
looking at what is present, the extremely violent killings of young people in the 
streets of Mexico. Her artwork, however, acts as a screen that protects the viewer 
from looking at the severity of the mutilated bodies, without occluding the truth of a 
bleak social reality — the fear, trauma, grief, and desperation inflicted by a ravaging 
war of drugs produced for consumption by a death-illiterate West. Letting the brutal 
truth of Mexican reality penetrate without inflicting too much of this violence upon 
the viewer, she avoids a pornographic representation of death while realizing the 
truth of loss. Margolles, Fox, and Ertmann want us to look at the reality, materiality 
and confronting immediacy of death and the social context in which death and 
deadness happen.  
The magic of the living body is made painfully obvious in death’s presence, 
where it becomes clear that life itself enacts violence, both in the act of being born 
into the world and the act of leaving it. A good death might be when life’s violence is 
suspended in a field of social grace, an environment of people who express caring 
attitudes, and engage in rituals to accompany the last hours of a person’s life. To 
explore this further, I want to introduce one last artist, Claudia Biçen, who engages 
with the perspective of those who are dying. This British-American artist developed 
a project, “Thoughts in Passing”, aimed at giving the dying a chance to reflect upon 
their lives and exploring what they can teach us. At a hospice in the San Francisco 
Bay area, Biçen created life-sized pencil portraits of some of the residents, 
accompanied by audio-clips in which they contemplate life and death. The musings 
of the dying are written in tiny words and sentences on their clothing as “a metaphor 
for how we carry our stories with us” (Bahrampour 2016). In an interview with Tara 
Bahrampour in The Washington Post (2016), Biçen shares the reasoning behind her 
work. As Bahrampour writes: 
 
It is also, she hopes, a way to slow people down. “You see artwork 
and you take a snapshot and move on. I thought, ‘how can I draw 
people in?’ When you’re up close to the piece you have kind of an 
intimate experience.” … “I wanted to create a feeling of compassion 
and empathy, of seeing yourself in that person,” Biçen said. “We put 
the elderly and the dying away, we shut them away. We’ve kind of 
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given up on them. They’re no longer productive… Particularly in 
American culture, productivity is so much at the core of what we 
value in people.” (Bahrampour 2016) 
 
There were three criteria for residents to participate in this project: no dementia, 
adequate health to sustain engagement, and willingness to deal with the often-painful 
truth of their mortality. Being diagnosed with a terminal illness does not guarantee a 
fast track to death acceptance and existential musings. Biçen talks about this 
experience in the hospice: 
 
“Most people are not right for this project because most people are not 
going to be able to go there,” she said. Some people in [sic] hospice 
are still in denial about what that means, and even those who accept it 
may not be ready to talk about it with a stranger or have their portrait 
done when they are so ill. “It was a big ask of people. I was very 
aware that it’s a huge ask.” (Biçen, quoted in Bahrampour 2016) 
 
When faced with a terminal illness that was not too rapidly progressing, the dying 
gained an opportunity to reflect upon life. Project participants had the opportunity to 
allow death to become a master signifier in their life through which they could re-
evaluate the past and present. What became acutely clear to Biçen was that the 
participants preferred a state of immediacy in relation to life. They expressed a need 
to be present in the given moment and to live on a day-to-day basis with little 
patience for the “small stuff”. Existential questions that in the past might have 
quietly bubbled in the background of a person’s consciousness were now magnified 
and took priority. For Biçen the project has been life affirming:  
 
Even though they were dying they were almost living more deeply 
than they had before. People talk about moving into the now. Having 
the future stripped away really pulls you into the now. They would sit 
and look at the beauty of a tree. One man, Harlan, would leave his 
window open 24 hours a day so he could see the sunrise because it 
meant he had made it to another day. (Biçen, quoted in Bahrampour 
2016) 
 
Regret was a strong theme that came up repeatedly in Biçen’s work. People either 
wished they had not worked so hard or prevented themselves from living life more 
fully. After the life-limiting diagnosis, some started to live life more lucidly as a 
result of finding a peace unknown previously. “There is so much this world has to 
offer and I barely skimmed it” (Bahrampour 2016). This statement reflects a 
common sentiment expressed by the dying, and one which can be approached from 
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two perspectives — either that of regret or that of reconciliation, sometimes at the 
same time. Dying is a very humbling experience that has the potential to amend life. 
Biçen came to understand this after a few of the participants died before their portrait 
had been finished. Not only the dying and the artist were affected, but also the family 
of the dying were deeply moved by and appreciative of these portraits and their 
accompanying audio-clips. Biçen’s work invites her viewers to stop and listen to the 
invisible members of our society. Biçen herself found that she now thinks less 
obsessively about dying: 
 
“I went into this thinking that every person was going to provide me 
with some kind of wisdom,” … “But people just die as themselves. 
We die as ourselves. There isn’t going to necessarily be some kind of 
revelation or change — this is it.” … “This anxiety about my 
mortality, I feel like now it has gone away.” She laughed. “I mean, 
I’m sure it’ll come back. But hey, you know what? You have 
everything now, so just be with it. Tomorrow is not promised. When 
you hear that from people who are standing on the edge, you listen.” 
(Biçen, quoted in Bahrampour 2016) 
 
People die like they lived. I came across this sentence over and over again both in my 
research on the dying and palliative care as well as while volunteering in palliative 
care. The importance of this statement, how death illiteracy is expressed and 
measured, and how it actually diminishes our quality of life, is discussed in the last, 










I found myself sitting in a bus heading towards town one cold sunny morning in 
February. Immersed in a clandestine tragedy, I needed to purchase new music to 
mark this moment in my life and to shore up a protective barrier around my 
vulnerable self. It was not a time for silence nor self-awareness. I held myself 
together by escaping and moving, numb and disconnected from the life around me. 
Konstanz, a historic town on the German shores of Lake Constance, is 
exceptional at this time of the year. It was Dirty Thursday in Fasnet (dialect for 
Fastnacht), the German carnival, a day in February or March in which all foolish ado 
culminates. Traditionally, fasting begins on the day after Dirty Thursday in 
preparation for Easter, and thus an excess of food, especially easily perishable things 
like eggs, fats and meat, is consumed. In modern times this also means an excessive 
consumption of alcohol alongside the traditional fat-loaded recipes.  
As I found my way into the city centre of Konstanz, people were in the streets 
celebrating and drinking. Many Germans, who fondly call this time of the year the 
fifth season, were desperately looking forward to breaking with normal conventions 
and creeds. At carnival, the serious and diligent German citizens turn into celebrating 
Narren (or in English ‘fools’).6 Some were in their local club attire dedicated to 
preserving the medieval pagan and Catholic traditions of chasing out the winter, and 
deadly diseases, others to anticipating Christ’s resurrection. However, most were 
welcoming the celebration with excess unhinged from its traditional roots.  
My mother died on Dirty Thursday. The call came in the early morning hours. 
As I lay in bed, confused by the meaning of the words I had just heard, I felt my 
being slip into a quavering idle. I was a fool thinking that I could protect myself from 
pain by assuming that, having already experienced the loss of two friends and seen 
old age and death close-up while working in a nursing home, I knew what death was 
                                                
6 The commonly used language for people participating in the German carnival is Narre or 
Narr, which describes a comedian or people participating in comedic acts. Narre is also 
associated with silliness, immaturity, ignorance, clumsiness and madness. Narr translated in 
English is jester or fool. 
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all about. Nothing prepared me for the loss of my mother. In addition, our 
complicated relationship made my grief all the more difficult. Due to my denial of 
the severity of her illness and the non-communication about all things existential in 
my family, I had missed my mother’s deathbed. The emotional and existential 
gravity of this profound loss created a tacenda in which the internal dimension of the 
experience had no external space to surface in my life. I was at a loss.  
Sitting in the bus on that Dirty Thursday, my inner saturnine landscape and the 
merry outer world could not have clashed more violently. I did not understand the 
impact that my foolish assumptions would have upon me — yet. Fellow fools of the 
cheerful kind filled the bus, some already inebriated by alcohol. One yelled in good 
old Fasnet tradition their battle cry “ho narro” right into my face, leaving traces of 
spit on my salty cheeks.  
The time of carnival is a season of lawlessness, in which normal, sober citizens 
turn into fools. Carnival can be understood as a mode of understanding in the sense 
that it provides a perspective that challenges the cultural status quo (Stallybrass and 
White 1986: 6). In this sense we can understand carnival as opening up a relation to 
the Lacanian Real, since it pushes us to reveal what is usually excluded from the 
cultural sphere (Stallybrass and White 1986: 10). Carnival allows for a reversal of 
hierarchies and a connection of terminal endpoints like birth and death or youth and 
age. The set of symbolic practices that make up carnival express behaviours that can 
be described as symbolic inversions; they contradict, abrogate, and potentially 
represent an alternative to the common dictates of the ruling class (Stallybrass and 
White 1986: 17). The opportunity is brief, however, and quickly followed by a time 
of fasting and abstinence as the dominating institutional structures are re-established. 
Carnival might be often disconnected from its strong traditional meaning, yet its 
ritualized spectacle and opportunity for transgressing cultural norms prevails.  
The role of fool is central here. The fool has many meanings and a rich cultural 
history. Traditionally, the fool occupies a paradoxical position in which he/she is 
understood to be below the human standard and to be an outlaw and yet strongly 
dependent upon a social group. Traditionally, fools enjoyed an extraordinary position 
in society (Welsford 1961: xi–xii), having the leeway to mention things normal folk 
would not dare to point their finger at. Fools were not only the entertainers, 
performers, and storytellers at royal or noble courts, they also enjoyed the privilege 
of criticizing their masters, mistresses, and ordinary people with an analytic 
sharpness. They were fools by decree and their special ability was to point out that 
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which could not be represented in the social order. Because a fool does not focus, but 
rather dissolves, events, they are equally at home in reality and the imagination. 
While carnival has the potential to be a celebration of creativity, it has also 
become a form of narcosis. There is nothing awe-inspiring about the late modern 
inebriated fool with his unhinged tendency towards jouissance, celebrating in a 
culture devoid of death awareness and filled with the vacuity of materialism.  
That day, I developed a deep disdain for German carnival. Life felt like a bad 
joke with the power to wipe the smile off my face, and distort it into a rueful 
grimace. A heart that once beat by my side had stopped while my heart kept 
pounding and the world turning as if nothing had happened. For me this boozing, 
spitting fool will forever be the representative of death and our foolish blindness to it. 
But I am thankful for this fool who ignited my disdain, and with it initiated a 
realization that would slowly unfold in the years to come about my own and the 
world’s death illiteracy and its toxic impact on life. 
Our collective death illiteracy comes at a great cost for those experiencing loss, 
illness and the last stages of life. In a death-phobic culture death illiteracy further 
isolates and traumatizes people. This concluding chapter of this thesis addresses the 
manifestations and impact of our personal, cultural, and institutional death illiteracy. 
 
Personal death illiteracy  
 
Grief illiteracy comes hand in hand with death illiteracy and surfaces in the event of 
a terrifying illness. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kellehear’s concept of stigmatization 
and shame reveals that the sick and the dead are culturally perceived to be 
interruptions of the social flow, its conventions and norms. Havi Carel’s book Illness 
(2008) further extends the understanding of how stigma functions in a death-illiterate 
society. Carel suffered a debilitating lung disease that gave her a life prognosis of ten 
years from the onset of symptoms. With her life turned upside-down she turned to 
philosophy to make sense of her diagnosis and its impact. She points out that, once 
faced with illness, the current belief that “body and perception” is the “seat of 
personhood, or subjectivity” (Carel 2008: 20) becomes painfully clear. To be means 
having a body. That body is in dialogue with the environment and “embodiment is 
the background condition for a realm of subjectivity to exist” (Carel 2008: 23). In its 
ideal form the body is actively engaged in intelligent, meaningful interactions with 
the environment (Carel 2008: 25). Illness, however, is an “abrupt and violent way of 
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revealing the intimately bodily nature of our being” (Carel 2008: 27). A rift opens 
between the biological and lived body. Hence, for the ill and dying, the breakdown of 
friendships with people who lack the ability to deal with death anxiety is inevitable. 
The social architecture of illness is such that healthy people will experience 
great discomfort in the company of the sick. One is forbidden to discuss the messy 
truth about one’s illness or how one experiences it. The Parsonian “sick role”, so 
Carel writes, is only validated by society if one conforms to social expectations. 
Being a “good sick person” means conforming to expectations that the healthy must 
not be offended or polluted by illness:  
 
When you begin to get praise for your behavior, then you know you 
have achieved the status of a conformist. A sick conformist. An ill 
conformist conforming to the demands of the healthy majority, who 
cannot, will not, wills not to see the fate that awaits us all. (Carel 
2008: 56) 
 
Carel laments that there is a sheer “inability of healthy people to conceive the lives of 
others” (2008: 46). Instead, the sick and dying must ready themselves to combat the 
stigmatization of a culture which does not want to know. Inevitably, isolation and 
loneliness ensues. The sick and dying are reminders of the abject, which I discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4; it is the terror that must be avoided at all cost. 
A time will come in people’s lives when this denial or cultural blindness 
catches up with them, to their own detriment. Atul Gawande’s influential book Being 
mortal: medicine and what matters in the end (2014) raises awareness of the all too 
common story of life prolonged due to medical intervention, yet without bettering the 
quality of life (especially in old age). Likewise, the Dan Krauss Netflix documentary 
Extremis (2016) follows palliative care specialist Dr Jessica Zitter and her team at the 
Intensive Care Unit at Highland Hospital in Oakland, California, helping patients and 
their families prepare for death. This short documentary shows the heartbreak of 
families caught off-hand, who are forced to make decisions about life and death on 
behalf of a sick relative. The focus of Zitter’s work lies in helping families 
understand that there is no chance of recovery, yet she has to combat the appeal of 
exhausting all experts, machines, and treatments before approaching an end-of-life 
discussion. Zitter (2017) writes about the dangers of medical technologies that keep 
people alive despite their wishes. These protracted deaths are the consequence of 
inadequate communication between doctors and patients regarding treatment options. 
She stresses that, if people understood the impact of these technologies on life 
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quality, most would think twice before accepting such treatment. Those who are 
informed do indeed prefer less technological treatment. However, both the general 
public and doctors have to become more active and daring in acknowledging and 
planning for the end-of-life phase. 
The issue of how death and grief illiteracy has a snowballing effect on a 
culture’s ability to mourn (Devine 2017b; Klass, Silverman, and Nickman 1996) is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet it is important to point out, as many have argued, 
that the social clumsiness and prejudices that surround illness, death, and loss often 
contribute to the severe isolation of the bereaved and add unnecessary pain (Kübler-
Ross 1976; Elias 1985; Carel 2008; Kellehear 2007; Tick 2014; Gawande 2014; 
Jenkinson 2015). Denial can be a very logical step in a death-illiterate society for 
those faced with the death of a loved one. However, denial contributes negatively to 
the inevitable pain of loss. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 1, grief operates in the 
shadow of contemporary death illiteracy and is aligned with the idea that death needs 
to be tamed, and loss needs to be rationalized and worked through in order to get on 
with life (Silverman and Klass 1996: 3). In this climate, grief remains an ongoing, 
clandestine struggle.  
 
Cultural death illiteracy: terror management theory 
 
In a death-phobic society a terminal diagnosis and death awareness do not go hand in 
hand. I discovered this during seven years of working in aged care for the Red Cross 
in Germany and while working as a volunteer in the palliative care ward of the 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Adelaide. During this time I learnt that entering the last 
phase of life does not necessarily bring forth a change in attitude or a lucid 
realization that life is at an end, nor does it necessarily invoke a longing for peace 
with death. During my time in these roles I talked to numerous (hospice) nurses and 
palliative care doctors, many of whom shared the view that, for most of the dying, 
death awareness is something that comes very late, if at all. I heard many stories of 
people who only recognized in their very last days: “It’s me. It is actually me who is 
dying now.” As a palliative care volunteer, I spent a few hours weekly with patients, 
offering my company and the comfort of foot massages. In my observation, older 
single men were the most apprehensive about talking to me. Older women often 
happily took up my offer of going for little walk or having a massage. Death was 
never part of our conversation. Sometimes they shared a little of their lives but I was, 
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after all, just a friendly stranger. Becoming trusted, especially in such a vulnerable 
phase of life, takes time. What was clear, however, was that exposure to death and 
illness can undermine or, at the very least, challenge the concepts one has about 
oneself, the world, and others, and this in turn leads to death anxiety. Lehto and Stein 
(2009) have demonstrated that death anxiety is negatively related to perceptions of 
life satisfaction, meaning, and purpose. People have developed defence mechanisms 
to ward off death anxiety. For instance, high self-esteem, which has been associated 
with cultural belongingness, can be an effective buffer against death anxiety if it acts 
as a mechanism for reinforcing cultural beliefs rather than succumbing to challenges 
that require a transformation of those beliefs (Lehto and Stein 2009: 27).  
Terror management theory is another strand of empirical research within death 
scholarship that focuses exclusively on the impact of (unconscious) death anxiety in 
everyday life. The central thesis of terror management theory (TMT) is the idea that 
becoming aware of death has consequences for people (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 
2). TMT developed in the mid-eighties and is based on the work of cultural 
anthropologist Ernest Becker, discussed in Chapter 1. It draws its primary inspiration 
from Becker’s book The denial of death (1973) and pursues Becker’s idea that 
people are caught up in the inherent human paradox of being preoccupied with death, 
due to the species’ unique cognitive development of the ability to anticipate the 
future, through language and self-awareness. Paradoxically, the consequence of 
mortality awareness is an ever-present fear of death that needs to be kept at bay in 
order to maintain a productive and functioning world. Culture-building Eros has to 
keep Thanatos in reign. In Becker’s thinking, as adopted by TMT, cultures and 
societies are manifestations of the belief that human existence is meaningful, 
significant, and unending (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 2). By living up to the 
standards that society provides, one’s existence gains value because it connects the 
individual to something grander — Becker’s hero system theory — which is also a 
theory of self-esteem. As we saw in Chapter 1, Becker understands society as a 
codified system of ideological justification of one’s self worth. Since societies are 
heterogeneous there are many systems, which are defined as “the shared illusion of 
permanence and immortality among members of all cultures that gives the social 
myth its power” (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 2–3). 
TMT integrates Becker’s key ideas with contemporary social psychology in 
order to develop empirically testable hypotheses. The original concept of TMT 
addresses self-esteem, how it is acquired and maintained, and why it is needed. TMT 
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also incorporates research on self-esteem in order to better understand the importance 
of it for its own hypotheses. Becker understands the hero as a symbolic ideal, or 
symbolic standard, a representation of “cultural values condensed into an ideal form 
of humanity” (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 3). This archetypal role of the hero sets 
the measure (standards of shared social values and beliefs) against which an 
individual can compare him/herself. The closer one comes towards the hero 
archetype, the greater the level of self-esteem, which translates into individual 
feelings of emotional security strong enough to buffer existential fear, anxiety, or 
terror. 
According to TMT (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016), cultural perceptions provide 
a shared lens for viewing life and reality in a way that gives meaning and 
significance. These particular perceptions become permanent and enduring over 
time, thus establishing standards of value for individuals. Such solidified world 
views can provide some hope of immortality, yet these perceptions need to be 
sheltered from critique in order to assert the correctness and superiority of one’s 
view. What follows is that the individual will distance him/herself from others with 
different views, but seek out people with similar attitudes and cultural norms 
(Stillman and Harvell 2016: 80). 
Assessing the empirical evidence of twenty years’ research, with 500 
experiments conducted in over 30 countries (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 6), TMT 
research comes to the conclusion that close relationships, self-esteem, and world 
views play an important role as an anxiety buffer in the mortality-aware human. 
Thus, death awareness and anxiety enhances the commitment to romantic 
relationships, because close relationships work as a buffer against death anxiety 
(Lehto and Stein 2009: 34). Yet death is the Thing, the invisible elephant in the 
room. Darell and Pyszczynski argue:  
 
At its heart, TMT posits that people are consistently, and 
unconsciously, motivated to maintain faith in their cultural 
worldviews, self-esteem, and close relationships to protect themselves 
from the anxiety produced by the awareness that death is inescapable. 
(Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 6) 
 
One of the major lines of evidence that supports TMT is the mortality salience 
hypothesis. If cultural world views provide a buffer against the fear of death, then 
explicitly reminding people of death should increase the defence of world views, 
self-esteem, and attachment. This is called mortality’s salience. Darell and 
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Pyszczynski (2016: 6) argue that TMT has generated plenty of evidence that, when 
death is brought to the forefront of awareness, the psychological structures of cultural 
world view, self-esteem, and close relationship act as a barrier against death 
awareness. By extension, TMT has found that, if psychological structures shield 
against existential anxiety, strengthening these structures makes the individual less 
susceptible to death anxiety and anxiety in general. They call this the anxiety buffer 
hypothesis (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 10). 
Reverse logic suggests that challenges to cultural world views, self-esteem, and 
close attachments increase the accessibility of death-related thoughts. In TMT this is 
called the death-thought accessibility hypothesis and it shows that, with under-
perceived cultural threats, the subversion of one’s self-esteem, and especially the 
threat of separation from a close relationship, death-related thoughts are more 
accessible (Darell and Pyszczynski 2016: 9). (However, this does not increase other 
negative and adverse thoughts that are not related to death.) 
 
Marketing, money and mortality 
 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that capitalism’s seductive materialism throws a 
wrench into death awareness. Somewhat similarly Stephen Jenkinson, death educator 
and former director of the palliative care unit at Mount Sinai Hospital of Toronto, 
Canada, argues that embedded in current manifestations of death phobia is an 
addiction to unrestrained and untethered growth, progress, and anything that supports 
this ideology. Life is often misunderstood as a staging area for one’s genius 
(embedded in what Anthony Elliott (2013) has called narcissistic reinvention 
culture). As discussed in Chapter 4, narcissism is informed by elevating one’s self-
worth through affirming one’s status through material goods, health, and a polished 
outer appearance. The spirit of capitalism is that of endless inwards-engagement of 
the self in order to validate one’s worthiness through self-optimisation. This anxious 
self is in part an outcome of the emergence of Calvinism, which left people with a 
fundamental angst regarding their existential worth. Incorporating this into a 
Lacanian framework, consumer culture attempts to fills the emotional gap at the 
centre of our psyche by stimulation our desires in never-ending ways with never-
ending innovations and inventions that lose their appeal shortly after their purchase 
date. A narcissistic reflexivity is, therefore, the consequence of a self that needs to 
keep one’s appearance up to date. Mortality contemplation would be the opposite of 
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this maintained and defended narcissistic self. Jenkinson, too, identifies this link 
between narcissism, defence against death, and consumerism: 
 
Fear of death stalks hospital hallways, of course, but lifestyle 
advertising is rife with it, parenting carries it along, the fitness 
workout industry is carried by it, and so too the insurance business. It 
is usually unspoken, but the fear of death is traded on and counted on. 
(Jenkinson 2015: 220) 
 
Anxiety researchers Lehto and Stein conclude that conscious death anxiety leads to 
active defences in the form of distractions specifically designed to lower conscious 
death anxiety, albeit useless to manage unconscious death anxiety (Lehto and Stein 
2009: 27). It is not surprising that consumerism provides a bastion of meaning that 
strengthens social ties, reinforces the feeling of belonging, and enhances perceptions 
of self-worth and status (Lehto and Stein 2009: 34). There is empirical evidence that 
shows that people with mortality awareness prioritize wealth and luxurious brands, 
especially if they have a materialistic attitude (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 81–2). 
The TMT researchers Tyler Stillman and Lindsey Harvell argue that death 
awareness can explain consumer spending and marketing (Stillman and Harvell 
2016: 79). This echoes Žižek’s critique of a seductive yet aggressive capitalism as 
the backdrop against which everything relates (Žižek 2000b: 320–1). Capitalism 
presents itself as a form of freedom tied to the repetition and compulsion of 
consumption, leading to jouissance. The death-illiterate consumer seeks control and 
security through, as TMT researchers would say, materialism as world-view defence. 
Research on the link between materialism and well-being shows that materialists 
have diminished life satisfaction and greater neuroticism and depression (Rindfleisch 
and Burroughs 2004: 221). In the case of stressful and traumatizing experiences, 
highly materialistic people also tend towards greater levels of post-traumatic stress, 
compulsive consumption, and impulsive buying than less materialistic individuals. 
This suggests that materialists have lower levels of self-esteem which weakens their 
coping mechanisms (Ruvio, Somer, and Rindfleisch 2014: 90). However, there are 
so-called “happy materialists” who are not negatively affected by their consumer 
habits. These “happy materialists” are more likely to be highly educated men who 
place extra value in power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and security 
(Rindfleisch and Burroughs 2004: 221). In my words, these are the people on the top 
of the social pyramid who already benefit from the privilege and opportunities given 
to them due to socio-historic circumstances. These people already have high self-
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esteem, thus world-view defence does not increase through death awareness (yet they 
still prefer luxury goods) (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 83).  
Brands are a “culturally sanctioned symbolic testimony to one’s values” 
(Stillman and Harvell 2016: 83). Seeking out luxurious brands in order to 
communicate information about the self, as discussed in Chapter 4, helps to rebuild 
or showcase self-esteem within a social order that knows how to decipher the code of 
luxury brands. Self-esteem is built in the context of culture and what culture holds 
valuable and, since culture is not homogenous, the many diverse cultural values 
provide miscellaneous sources for different kinds of self-esteem. For instance, 
mortality salience prompts donations and product affinity only when consistent with 
people’s base values, and having these values confirmed provides a self-esteem 
boost, which alleviates death anxiety (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 84). Money can 
also be seen as an immortality strategy in which symbolic immortality is gained by 
having one’s accumulated wealth affect people even after death. In this sense, money 
provides a sense of continuity and ongoing connection to others (one’s children and 
so on). The feeling of having such high symbolic immortality also lessens the fear of 
death (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 84). Materialism therefore quenches one’s 
symbolic needs and desires rather than real needs. As TMT research suggests, 
archiving symbolic immortality is not innate but orchestrated by culture — hence 
Becker’s claim that culture is an immortality formula (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 
85).  
If this current culture of immortality fails to address existential worries, how 
can we deal with the legitimate fear of death? Stephen Jenkinson doubts that the fear 
of death comes from “the ability to understand finality or that it comes from any 
ability. … It might be that you have to learn to be afraid to die” (2015: 221). 
Exposure to death is minimal in our modern society and, therefore, the awareness of 
death is, and remains, minimal (Jenkinson 2015: 222). According to Jenkinson, what 
has gone wrong is a lack of culture: 
 
No, death phobia is an elephant in the hands of the blind man as long 
as we keep saying that it is an attribute of North American Culture, or 
any culture. It is truer to say that death phobia happens when culture 
doesn’t happen, or when it is imperiled in a fundamental way. Death 
phobia, I am asking you to consider, is not culture. It is anti-culture. It 
multiplies whenever culture is under attack, especially when it is 
failing from within. Death phobia begins to metastasize whenever our 
ability to make culture, to be deeply at home in our skin and in the 




In this sense, I would suggest that what is in play is the death drive itself, and its anti-
cultural flow, manifesting within the modern individual in the shape of death 
illiteracy and consumer escapism. As I argued in Chapter 4, it is no surprise that the 
dominant contemporary relationship to desire is instant gratification in the form of 
consumer goods or experiences. The pleasure principle now trumps the reality 
principle. However, this anti-culture of death illiteracy does not only express itself 
through the individual; it externalizes itself on an institutional level as well. 
 
Institutionalized death illiteracy 
 
A private person facing illness and death may struggle with isolation and the inability 
of others to address grief. At a collective level the impact of a death-phobic culture 
strains our social relationships. Sick people’s needs are shattered by institutionalized 
defensive mechanisms against death anxiety. Havi Carel describes breaking down 
crying at one of her many medical appointments and being met by the sternness of an 
uncaring nurse. During the course of her illness, she realized that only a few staff 
members were empathetic enough to care about their patients. In her words:  
 
I know I failed the unwritten law of the medical world, where 
everything is impersonal, where news of deterioration and terminal 
illness are to be met with dry eyes and a steady gaze. And within this 
world, my human failure will be held against me, while her failure to 
be human doesn’t even have a name. (Carel 2008: 39) 
 
Fear and anxiety are not spoken about within the medical setting, and the language 
doctors use is sanitized. Havi Carel’s experiences with her illness are examples of a 
death-phobic culture manifesting in crude and impersonal encounters with 
institutions that dehumanize the most intimate of experiences, just as Elisabeth 
Kübler-Ross (1976) noted forty years ago. Christopher Hitchens describes in his last 
book, Mortality (2012), the medicalised language he encountered during his end-of-
life struggle: 
 
The country has a language of its own — a lingua franca that manages 
to be both dull and difficult and that contains names like ondansetron, 
for anti-nausea medication — as well as some unsettling gestures that 




The patient is not allowed just to have cancer but is instead swept up in the language 
of “battling cancer”. Family, friends, well-wishers, and obituaries all tap into this 
lingua, where the image of struggle equals the bravery and strength of the ill. 
Hitchens reminds us, however, of the dreadful reality of going through medical 
treatment: “the image of the ardent soldier or revolutionary is the very last one that 
will occur to you. You feel swamped with passivity and impotence: dissolving in 
powerlessness like a sugar lump in water” (Hitchens 2012: 7). Grief, and death 
illiteracy, require the sick and dying to put on another persona, to not fall out of the 
social confines.  
Increasingly, articles, films, and blogs address these human and institutional 
shortcomings in understanding and helping the dying. There are individuals that offer 
consultancy, courses, and support such as Tim Lawrence (www.timjlawrence.com), 
Kristie West (kristiewest.com), Megan Devine (www.refugeingrief.com) and 
Stephen Jenkinson (orphanwisdom.com). The young mortician Caitlin Doughty has 
become quite a force in the world of “death-positive” activism. She gained popularity 
through her YouTube series “Ask a mortician” in which she blithely discusses topics 
around death and decay. Her bestseller Smoke gets in your eyes & other lessons from 
the crematory (2015) addresses her work in the morgue and gives an insider view 
into the mainstream death industry that is surprisingly death illiterate as well. She 
also founded a web forum called the “The order of the good death” 
(www.orderofthegooddeath.com) in which like-minded advocates such as academics, 
professionals, artists, and writers bring a death-positive message to a broader 
audience. More practical websites offer useful ways to make end-of-life discussions 
and planning easier (e.g. www.finalfling.com, http://theconversationproject.org and 
www.gyst.com). Websites such as impermanenceatwork.org, whatsyourgrief.com 
and modernloss.com discuss grief, isolation, and the shortcomings of culture in these 
areas.  
A common theme in this growing body of work is that death illiteracy is 
multiplied and intensified by a reciprocal reinforcement of death phobia through 
institutions designed to neglect addressing existential questions. Often patients and 
doctors alike dance around the elephant in the room with a language that is devoid of 
acknowledging human mortality and the existential Pandora’s box that opens up with 
it. In the case of disease the accurate prognosis of incurable cancer is crucial in end-
of-life decision making. A study by Sarguni Singh and her team (2017) analysed 64 
doctor–patient conversations and concluded that both patients and doctors tend to 
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avoid end-of-life discussions, even when patients have a terminal diagnosis. Further, 
these conversations follow the usual pattern of symptom discussion, revelation of 
scan results, and discussion of treatment. What is missing in most doctor–patient 
conversations is what the results actually mean. Prognosis conversations happen very 
rarely, and when they do they are often hastened without room for the patient to 
process the diagnosis. Singh et al. write:  
 
Oncologists and patients are complicit in constructing the typical 
encounter. Oncologists spend little time discussing scan results and 
the prognostic implications in favor of treatment-related talk. 
Conversational devices routinely help transition from scan-talk to 
detailed discussions about treatment options. We observed an 
opportunity to create prognosis-talk after scan-talk with a new 
conversational device, the question “Would you like to talk about 
what this means?” as the oncologist seeks permission to disclose 
prognostic information while ceding control to the patient. (Singh et 
al. 2017: e231)  
 
Both patient and doctor are often death illiterate. Atul Gawande experienced this 
quandary in his work as an oncologist and noted that there is a painful limit to 
language that would help navigate the anxiety-evoking meetings between doctors 
and patients. For instance, Gawande recalled upsetting patients with the terminology 
“to prolong life” (2014: 181). These words were too confronting but unfortunately 
such squeamishness often has dire consequences for patients. Although the majority 
of people want to die at home, only a small number actually do so. Furthermore, the 
effort to prolong life beyond what is sustainable brings extra anguish to families and 
extra pain to the dying. So much so that even advanced care directives, carefully put 
in place before old age and before illness is in its late stage, are often ignored. Ann 
Brenoff (2017), a columnist for the Huffington Post, describes the heartbreak 
following a course of exaggerated medical treatment for her husband. She describes 
how her husband’s advanced care directives were ignored by what she calls a “death 
defying culture” unable to talk about or acknowledge death. She remarks: 
 
We simply had no clue that dying and medicine, as it is commonly 
practiced, exist at cross purposes. And in my husband’s case, the 
engine of life-prolonging medicine decisively won. … I am bereft. I 
am grieving. And I am working hard to understand why medical teams 
feel they must chase life so relentlessly. … Medical good intentions 
notwithstanding, prolonging death is not the same as extending life. 
Death isn’t the boogeyman; turning the dying process into a torturous 
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experience is. And yet the medical establishment just can’t seem to 
help itself when it comes to dying. (Brenoff 2017) 
 
Stephen Jenkinson describes the end-of-life struggle that is enmeshed in this death 
illiteracy as almost amateurish; health institutions and language use are set up as if 
death does not exist. This unfortunately includes palliative care. Brenoff observes 
that even the “compassionate care team” (another label for the medical team that 
manages end-of-life treatment) convoluted the reality of mortality with words: 
  
Nobody wants to use the “D” word. When my husband and I met with 
the “compassionate care” team in his nursing home days before his 
death, I was corrected when I called it a “hospice” meeting. Besides, I 
was told, hospice is the “treatment plan” you choose when your 
“health care goal” is to accept that you will not recover and you 
merely want to be kept comfortable and emotionally supported. I 
rolled my eyes. (Brenoff 2017) 
 
To palliate, taking the word literally, is not the same as supporting a person in an 
existential crisis. On a personal note, my friend Sam remembers the last days of her 
father’s life in a palliative care ward in an Adelaide hospital. Dying of untreatable 
heart failure, he showed signs of agitation and was given palliative sedation, a 
decision that his wife felt pressured into making hastily — she did not want her 
husband to suffer more. The nurses simply assumed that anyone would want to die 
unconscious, and thereby relieve everybody concerned of a difficult end-of-life 
struggle. And, one can surmise, provide an easier workflow for the hospital staff. 
Sam and her sister, who were both experienced nurses themselves, were upset. They 
felt that their father, witty and outspoken his entire life and unafraid of pain, was 
robbed of his last conscious moments. Despite all odds, he kept living for days. Sam, 
probably a little more comfortable with death than the average person, pondered for 
days why he would cling to life. She decided she needed to give him the permission 
to leave and after assuring him that his wife (her mother) was cared for, he died 
minutes later. These anecdotal stories might sound fantastic but they are not unheard 
of in end-of-life care. The hospital did its best, that is, in as much as contemporary 
institutional care realizes the parameters of its death literacy. And yet, Sam’s mother 
is haunted by her decision to allow palliative sedation, which she now feels was 
against her husband’s wishes. No doctor talked to them about the consequences of 




Death anxiety and its institutionalized defence mechanisms 
 
Isabel Menzies’ research paper “A case-study in the functioning of social systems as 
a defence against anxiety” (1960) gives a brilliant analysis of death anxiety and its 
social defence systems operating within a general hospital’s nursing service. Her 
research revealed the strategies that denied the nurses deeper engagement with 
patients and, in turn, left both patients and nurses in distress. Menzies follows the 
work of Freud, particularly as it was developed and elaborated by Melanie Klein. She 
describes how a nurse is exposed to a number of distressing tasks while taking care 
of her patients, such as end of life issues, conflicting feelings towards the patient 
and/or their relatives, and difficulties with colleges and in the work situation. These 
encounters evoke feelings of anxiety and, due to the nature of the work, death 
anxiety in the nurse. Menzies sees infantile phantasies at the root of death anxiety. In 
her words:  
 
The objective situation confronting the nurse bears a striking 
resemblance to the phantasy situations that exist in every individual in 
the deepest and most primitive levels of mind. The intensity and 
complexity of the nurse’s anxieties are to be attributed primarily to the 
peculiar capacity of the objective features of the work to stimulate 
afresh these early situations and their accompanying emotions. 
(Menzies 1960: 98) 
 
To recap Klein’s death drive theory, in her theorization, the inner life of an infant is 
ruled by the inner tension of the life instinct (or the libidinal force) and the death 
instinct or aggressive impulses that deal with the matter of survival. These feelings 
are attributed to inner experiences as well as to other people. The infant’s 
experiences of the object reality are tightly interwoven with his/her own physical and 
psychical experiences, his/her mood, feelings, wishes, phantasies, and anxieties. 
Through this psychic experience the infant creates an inner world dominated by the 
self and the object of their feelings and impulses; the form and conditions of this 
inner world content are largely determined by phantasies. In the inner world of the 
infant many damaged, injured, or dead objects are to be found which constitute an 
experience of deathliness and destruction, which is indeed anxiety provoking. The 
constant fear of the self’s aggressive forces as well as those of others make for a very 
threatening world experience.  
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According to Menzies, death anxiety is constantly provoked in nurses, through 
the nature of their work. Furthermore, a nurse does not only deal with his or her own 
anxieties, but also the anxieties of his/her patients and relatives, who are often 
hesitant in acknowledging and taking on the responsibilities of the difficult situation. 
Menzies comments on a common method of dealing with this array of anxieties: 
 
The nurse projected infantile phantasy-situations into current work-
situations and experienced the objective situations as a mixture of 
objective reality and phantasy. She then re-experienced painfully and 
vividly in relation to current objective reality many of the feelings 
appropriate to the phantasies. In thus projecting her phantasy-
situations into objective reality, the nurse is using an important and 
universal technique for mastering anxiety and modifying the phantasy-
situations. Through the projection, the individual sees elements of the 
phantasy-situation in the objective situations that come to symbolize 
the phantasy situation. Successful mastery of the objective situations 
gives reassurance about the mastery of phantasy-situations. (Menzies 
1960: 99–100) 
 
If the objective situation becomes equated with the phantasy situation, greater 
anxiety ensues and the symbol can no longer perform its role in containing and 
modifying anxiety (Menzies 1960: 100). Menzies turns her focus on the adaptive and 
defensive techniques within the nursing service, which serve as an externalization of 
death anxiety in the shape of (often unconsciously) socially constructed defence 
mechanisms. In order to contain the struggle against anxiety the development of 
socially constructed defence mechanisms “which appear as elements in the structure, 
culture and mode of functioning of the organization” emerge (Menzies 1960: 101). 
These socially constructed defence mechanisms become an aspect of external reality 
in the form of regulations. Regulations such as splitting up the nurse–patient 
relationships with shift work and rotations, depersonalizing care through 
categorization, and denial of the significance of the feelings that emerge during the 
service and redistribution of responsibilities are integrated mechanisms of health 
institutions used to shelter their nurses and workers from their anxieties. The health 
care personnel and the patients are ensnared in a system that makes it hard to connect 
personally.  
Dull medical language serves to avoid the spiritual, emotional, and physical 
needs of patient and personnel. Atul Gawande remembers how, as a young doctor, he 
saw people die for the first time in his life. This was a huge shock to him and not 
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because he was forced to face his own mortality; this truth was as yet concealed from 
him. He struggled with imagining himself in the shoes of one of his patients:  
 
I had a white coat on; they had a hospital gown. I couldn’t quite 
picture it the other way around. … the shock to me was seeing 
medicine not pull people through. I knew theoretically that my 
patients could die, of course, but every actual instance seemed like a 
violation, as if the rules I thought we were playing by were broken. I 
don’t know what game I thought it was, but in it, we always won. 
(Gawande 2014: 7) 
 
When I worked in a nursing home, I too experienced a strict patient–nurse divide. 
Back then there was a weekly set schedule: Mondays: hairdresser; Wednesdays: 
activities; Tuesdays and Fridays: “lax-day” (short for laxative). On these days most 
people were given a laxative and put on a toilet after breakfast and left there while 
we rushed to other duties. The personnel were hard at work because on those days all 
beds were given fresh sheets, many people had to be assisted with showers and 
wounds had to be freshly bandaged while the halls filled with the stench of faeces. It 
was easier to administer an institutional day of “purging” than individually assisting 
the needs of the residents. Many of these suffered from dementia and presented their 
own challenges to this regime. The nursing home was chronically understaffed and 
the employers were pressured into checking things off the to-do list instead of tuning 
in to the individual needs of residents or questioning the status quo. In my 
experience, nursing homes can be inflexible, depressing places that contain ageism as 
well as prejudice towards illness.  
Still, most people I have met who worked in the health system have genuinely 
chosen this profession to help people. Unfortunately, the way these institutions are 
often set up does not wholly support the needs of either the patient or the caregiver, 
and thus they contribute to a culture of death and grief literacy. To protect against 
anxiety, guilt, and doubt, there is a resistance towards changing the given structures, 
as Menzies writes: 
 
Change is inevitably to some extend an excursion into the unknown. It 
implies a commitment to future events that are not entirely predictable 
and to their consequences, and inevitably provokes doubt and anxiety. 
Any significant change within a social system implies changes in 
existing social relationships and in social structure. It follows that any 
significant social change implies a change in the operation of the 
social system as a defence system. While this change is proceeding, 
i.e. while social defences are being restructured, anxiety is likely to be 
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more open and intense. … resistance to social change can be better 
understood if it is seen as the resistance of groups of people 
unconsciously clinging to existing institutions because changes 
threaten existing social defences against deep and intense anxieties. 
(Menzies 1960: 108) 
 
Hence, a culture of avoidance is created in which change can only be initiated at the 
pinnacle of a real crisis, despite the fact that this social defence system was 
established to help the individual avoid negative feelings such as conscious 
experience of guilt, doubt, and above all death anxiety. In Menzies’ reading, the 
psychic defence mechanisms operating within the institution are mostly based on the 
primitive psychic defence mechanisms typical of an infant. Thus, there is a risk that, 
once confronted with a triggering situation, individuals might regress to immature 
ways of dealing with extreme anxiety (Menzies 1960: 109). This is an important 
implication of the psychological interaction between the institution and the 
individual’s defensive mechanisms.  
To put this in Lacanian terms, the master signifier circulating in medical 
institutions might be “repair” or “mending” and, as Gawande’s experience testifies, 
this activates a game that cannot be won because the master signifier death is absent. 
Every time existential questions arise, as is regularly the case in the health-care 
system, one is sparring with the Thing. End-of-life care has fallen into medical hands 
and it causes a surplus of unnecessary suffering, as Gawande observes about the 
medical community: 
 
If your problem is fixable, we know just what to do. But if it’s not? 
The fact that we have had no adequate answers to this question is 
troubling and has caused callousness, inhumanity, and extraordinary 
suffering. 
This experiment of making mortality a medical experience is just 
decades old. It is young. And the evidence is it is failing. (Gawande 
2014: 8–9) 
 
As long as a death-phobic culture prevails, most people are likely to face death and 
illness unprepared and run the risk of suffering avoidable anguish. But there are signs 






Conclusion: becoming death literate 
 
Lisa Bonchek Adams, a woman who died of breast cancer in 2015, wrote a blog 
entitled “The stupid things people say to those with cancer & their families”. 
Examples of foolish utterances include: 
 
“When will your cancer be gone?” (to a stage IV) 
“But you don’t look sick.” 
“Lance Armstrong cured his stage IV cancer. You can too.” 
“All you need to do is think positive.” 
“Now that you’ve been through this you’re due for some good things 
to happen.” 
“I’m sure it’s fine/I’m sure it’s nothing.” 
“When my mother was diagnosed with breast cancer, I was a wreck. 
My (now ex) husband got tired of it really fast and made a rule to 
confine my sadness to one day per week: ‘you are only allowed to cry 
about this on Fridays’. If I felt like I absolutely had to cry Sat–Thur, I 
had to do it in private.” 
“People choose their sicknesses. He chose to have cancer by not 
managing his negative energy and he chose to die by not fighting.” 
(Adams 2013) 
 
Statements like these demonstrate how people avoid engagement with the sick and 
dying. Having had similar encounters like these in his last months, Christopher 
Hitchens saw a need for a “short handbook of cancer etiquette” (2012: 39) to combat 
painful statements like the above. He saw a “growing need for ground rules that 
prevent us from inflicting ourselves upon another” (Hitchens 2012: 44). He described 
his interaction with one friend who did not shy from pointing out that he was dying 
and would have to “let go” soon. Unsettled by this shocking bluntness he asked who 
should approach such a harsh reality (Hitchens 2012: 42). In my training as a 
palliative care volunteer, as well as in a special course I undertook on the spiritual 
needs of the dying, I was instructed repeatedly not to tear down the walls of hope, 
denial, or protection the patient and family have erected. You cannot force somebody 
to face death, and as a volunteer I was taught that this behaviour would be cruel, and 
a violation of my role. Indeed, as Hitchens observed: “But again there was the 
unreasonable urge to have a kind of monopoly on, or a sort of veto over, what was 
actually sayable. Cancer victimhood contains a permanent temptation to be self-
centered and even solipsistic” (Hitchens 2012: 42). 
Gawande recommends palliative care specialist Susan Block’s advice, namely 
take time to establish good communication with a patient, focus on helping people 
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with their many overwhelming anxieties, and learn what is most important to them. 
Taking time for patients, cultivating the skill of listening, and learning a language 
that helps establish rapport between doctor and patient is crucial for a death-literate 
doctor (Gawande 2014: 182). Since grief and death illiteracy is anchored in the 
pathologizing of death and grief, one can find a growing number of voices, such as 
those of Atul Gawande, Jessica Zitter and Stephen Jenkinson, to only name a few 
current death activists, calling for a different approach to death and grief, and an 
open discussion of people’s experiences. Megan Divine for example, widow and 
author of the website refugeingrief.com, urges people to acknowledge grief and halt 
the need to try to fix mourners and their emotions: “Some things in life cannot be 
fixed. They can only be carried” (Devine 2017b). The goal of moving on, through 
and away from loss is false: “Living alongside grief, caring for yourself inside grief 
— those are the real challenges to your heart and mind. Instead of talking about how 
to get out of grief, we need to be in here with grief. Not turn away” (Devine 2017a). 
Despite being surrounded by a death-illiterate community, people who have 
experienced the loss of a loved one claim certain ways to express their feelings and 
to make space for mourning. The Internet offers refuge for many bereaved people to 
exhibit their feelings sincerely. Young people, especially, value informal exchange 
via social media (Gibson 2016: 632). Margaret Gibson’s research on “YouTube as a 
site of public grieving” (2016: 633) reveals that this social media site (as well as 
many others) have become a primary social space that is used to connect with 
strangers even in the early days of loss. She observes:  
 
YouTube bereavement vlogs and response posts are channels of 
emotional supply on their own terms and not necessarily functioning 
to supplement emotional connections offline. Going online and on 
YouTube is not a delayed emotional process or last resort but part of 
an everyday space of media sociality where many and diverse 
platforms are spaces for announcing a death and discoursing about 
bereavement … YouTube, unlike other socially mediated mourning, 
creates a visually intimate scene of grief story-telling where vloggers, 
sometimes to their own surprise, trigger, mostly through unscripted 
speech, the flow of tears in themselves and others. These embodied 
emotions punctate the narrative, framing an intimacy of grief shared 
between strangers. (Gibson 2016: 642–3) 
 
These intimate spaces of mourning shared by strangers are not exclusively found 
online. Gibson observes how roadside memorials support individual lives and deaths. 
Unlike public memorials that stress the heroic past of an individual and the 
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“memorialization of collective loss” (Gibson 2011: 155), roadside memorials render 
heroicness obsolete but stress the randomness and fleetingness of life. They create a 
“memoryscape” not only for the bereaved in relation to this place of death but for all 
travellers: “The roadside memorial is not just an external form of memory, it has the 
potential to encrypt the memories that drivers have of the roads they come to know” 
(Gibson 2011: 159). 
Grief, of all things, might be an antidote to relentless and mindless capitalism. 
For this, one has to understand grief as form of perception and not as an unwelcome 
intrusion. Silverman and Klass observe: 
 
When we discuss the nature of the resolution of grief, we are at the 
core of the most basic questions about what it means to be human, for 
the meaning of the resolution of grief is tied to the meanings of bonds 
with significant people in our lives, the meaning of our membership in 
family and community, and the meaning we ascribe to our individual 
lives in the face of absolute proof of our own mortality. (Silverman 
and Klass 1996: 22) 
 
Jenkinson underscores that grief is a capacity that makes us human; however, it is a 
skill that needs to be obtained. Grief is not an intrusion into the flow of life that 
needs to be shaken off in order to return to an imagined life of uninterrupted striving. 
Grief is not something that happens to you but something that you practise. Grief is a 
deep recognition of the natural order of things and therefore it cannot be a temporary 
situation. It is a state that that has the potential to deeply inform each of us and affect 
our decisions, because it forces one to reconsider the meaning of central roles and 
relationships. In this view, grief becomes a capacity rather than a disability because it 
shapes the lens through which one views the world (Jenkinson 2015: 366).  
Informed by what he witnessed in the years accompanying and counselling 
people with terminal illnesses and their friends and relatives, Jenkinson argues that 
the real terror people face is of being conscious while knowing that they are dying 
(Jenkinson 2015: 33). Likewise, no one, no spouse, parent, daughter, mother, father 
would not be pained witnessing the death of somebody so significant to their bodies, 
lives, well-being, and, of course, the subject of their love. Herein lies the terror. 
Attached to it is the sadness of all that will be and now is lost to life. Yet this 
realization is blanketed by the quest for more time (often in the form of invasive 




[T]he More Time almost never looks or feels or goes the way people 
imagine it will when they are bargaining for it. More Time bears no 
resemblance to anything most people have lived. More time is a 
fantasy of the resumption of a life interrupted. But More Time, when 
it finally kicks in, is the rest of a dying person’s life, and the rest of 
that life will be lived in the never-before-known shadow of the 
inevitability of their dying. (Jenkinson 2015: 35) 
 
Strategies of immortality, which rise out of this agony, are then actually feelings of 
intense loneliness, isolation, sadness, and abandonment. Jenkinson instead advocates 
getting to the bottom of grief. According to him, grief is not an inner feeling or a 
conglomeration of inner feelings; in fact, grief is not a felt thing at all — and this 
distinguishes grief from feelings like sorrow and depression: 
 
Grief doesn’t come from nowhere, an intrusion in the natural order of 
things. It is the natural order of things. Grief is a recognition of how it 
is and must be, how it can be if we stay our hand long enough to let it 
be so. Grief: A sign of life stirring towards itself. … Grieving is being 
willing to see now what has become of us, what we have been and 
done. Grieving is understanding. It is knowledge. It isn’t how you feel 
about what you know. It is being a faithful witness to the story of how 
it has been with us and crafting a language that does it justice, and 
testifying occasionally. (Jenkinson 2015: 367–8) 
 
A life lived fully demands an honest examination of one’s own fears and reality. This 
does not mean that one has to dwell on death and grief in a nihilistic or fatalistic way. 
Interestingly, people who are terminally ill who have worked toward an acceptance 
of their fate have a relatively low death anxiety (Lehto and Stein 2009: 33). This is 
grief as capacity — or, if we extend a Lacanian understanding, death becomes a 
master signifier with the aura of the Real. Death always points to the horrors of what 
cannot be signified, cannot be known in culture. In this understanding there is no 
getting to the other side of the affliction, but grief has made a claim upon the self, a 
call to awaken from the slumber of living life as if death is not a part of it. For that, 
one must know how to navigate hope in the light of a terminal diagnosis. Hope, so 
Jenkinson suggests, is equal to a mortgage because one is constantly betting for a 
future that will not come, is caught in a past that has been, yet without the tools to 
face death as the present demands. “In a death-phobic culture … knowing you are 
dying is not as healthy as hoping you aren’t dying while you are” (Jenkinson 2015: 
132, original emphasis). That is, it is safer in our culture to pretend death does not 
exist than to face isolation and the potential of extra pain through acknowledgement 
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of one’s end. From this rises the language of battle and survival, since in times of 
death hope without death literacy is, to Jenkinson, an obscenity, “an anesthetic of the 
spirit” (2015: 133). In Jenkinson’s experience people are fearful of speaking of dying 
“at the wrong time” as if it could disarm people at the very time they are supposed to 
be fighting for life, and as if this could be seen as approving of their death. But this, 
so Jenkinson argues, is one of the ultimate failures of our death-phobic times. Dying, 
or accepting death and grief, is a skill that needs to be learned but it has the potential 
to enrich one’s life. Yet these death-illiterate mechanisms delay the realization of 
one’s mortality (Jenkinson 2015: 134). Learning about how to grieve and how to die 
under the burden of a terminal illness is an almost impossible undertaking. Yet this 




Concluding words: a future of renewed death awareness? 
 
The fact is the world is ageing rapidly, especially in Europe and South-East Asia. 
The Pew Research Center (2014) estimates that the global population of people aged 
65 and older will triple to 1.5 billion by mid-century. Japan, South Korea, China and 
Germany will be most strongly affected by this development and research shows that 
people have some awareness of the looming economic and social stresses this will 
bring (Stokes 2014). Americans are less worried about their ageing population, 
however, probably because the population of the USA will grow older at a slower 
rate, and thus, “they may not fully appreciate their aging challenge” (Stokes 2014). 
Despite this and shockingly, America is also the only country in the developed world 
where life expectancy is going backwards, due to a serious opioid crisis (Case and 
Deaton 2017). 
Most ageing countries have yet to find creative solutions that will support 
every member of society. With more reports coming out about the dire situation of 
nursing homes and elder abuse (United Nations for Ageing 2017), people continue to 
search for alternate ways of experiencing the end of their lives. An ageing society 
brings with it a rise in caregivers. In a private discussion with palliative care expert 
David Currow, Chief Cancer Officer of NSW and Chief Executive Officer of the 
Cancer Institute NSW, Australia, he pointed out that caregivers are an often 
overlooked segment of society that is terribly isolated and often traumatized. 
Narcissistic materialistic consumerism will bring little respite to this hardworking 
and under-appreciated segment of society. I anticipate we will hear many more 
stories of elder abuse and caregiver burnout, while the aged care and end-of-life care 
industry will have to redefine itself in the decades to come. If this new industry 
wants to be successful in serving people, working on death illiteracy is unavoidable 
while the current cultural necrophile traits are detrimental to its success. 
In summation, in this thesis I have asked how the individual approaches death 
and how the contemporary self is intertwined with and affected by death. Critical 
voices have long pointed out that contemporary Western civilization has a twisted 
relationship with death. Many scholars agree that we are living in a culture of death 
denial, death phobia and death illiteracy. Death has the gravity to break the cultural 
hypnosis of living a life without limits, thus it plays a central cultural role in 
meaning-making and identity-forming processes. However, in this thesis I have 
explored why the argument that a death-phobic culture has removed death from 
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everyday life is not wholly accurate. At the same time that physical death has been 
removed from everyday life, representations of death have become pervasive in 
contemporary culture with seemingly endless depictions of graphic violence and 
death. I have explored how this proliferation of images of death in the media brings 
into question the consensus over death denial as a central cultural attitude. Our 
relationship with death and violence and their interplay points to a schism between 
the private and public handling of death. 
I have argued that psychoanalytic theories of the death drive — or Thanatos — 
first introduced by Sigmund Freud and then further developed by scholars such as 
Herbert Marcuse and Jacques Lacan, offer an explanatory framework for 
understanding the ambivalent role of death and violence in contemporary Western 
society and provide insight into how this cultural framework shapes identity. 
Building on the psychoanalytic theory of the death drive, I argued that this schism in 
our relationship with death produces a trait within the individual that is constituted 
by our inability to think about death, coupled with an obsessional relationship with 
violent death and an excessive materialism. The constant reciprocity of the anxious 
individual and a death-phobic society creates a status quo in which the absence of 
mortality contemplation accelerates selves that yearn to generate meaning through 
materialism and yet are unable to meet the existential limits of life and environment. 
I have argued that consumerism is the prevalent death drive in contemporary culture 
and that it entails marginalizing authentic awareness of mortality for the sake of 
symbolic immortality. As Erich Fromm has suggested, the death drive is a character 
trait of malignant aggression, or what he calls necrophilia. In this thesis I have put 
forward the idea of the necrophile self — a cultural trait of death phobia within the 
individual — and argued that the sense of self in late capitalist society is constituted 
by the very thing we deny and most fear; death (deadness) becomes us. The 
necrophile self has fused reality with pleasure in the call to enjoy life in excess — 
jouissance. It is an attempt at obsessive meaning making anchored in capitalism but 
its unconscious drive is the achievement of cultural immortality. And yet, this very 
drive leaves the individual struggling to deal with death, mortality, and its 
implications, leading to negative effects ranging from unpreparedness in end-of-life 
decision making to an unsustainable consumption of global resources. 
In Chapter 1 I explored the classic literature of scholars who established the 
view that death, once seen as commonplace, has been replaced by a culture of death 
denial. Philippe Ariès and Allan Kellehear described the historic shifts that removed 
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the custody of the dying from the community and pushed death to the fringes of 
cultural awareness. After the Industrial Revolution a new anxiety and fear of death 
emerged, which, combined with the rise in life expectancy, led to the attitude that 
death had to be (medically) controlled and institutionalized. I then turned to Alan 
Kellehear’s argument that these historic developments generated stigma surrounding 
death and illness, which led to an erosion of death awareness. Death is seen as an 
interruption of the social flow, norms, and conventions. Yet for the ill, dying, and 
bereaved a chasm opens between a cold social response and painful personal 
experience. I then followed Zygmunt Bauman’s understanding of immortality 
strategies that aim to appease the terror death evokes. They also contain the hope of 
leaving behind one’s legacy in order to extend one’s life beyond the limits of mortal 
constraints. Culture as a factory of permanence brings with it the need to anchor 
one’s self in a wider field of meaning. Ernest Becker called this the hero system, in 
which individuals palliate their death anxiety through generating self-esteem by 
aspiring after seemingly meaningful ideologies. 
In Chapter 2 I shifted the attention from the exterior, cultural habits of death 
denial to the inner workings of the individual, namely the death drive, a concept 
established by Sigmund Freud. Freud’s argument is important here, not only because 
it sheds light on how death evokes existential questions and fears that have an impact 
on the psyche, but also because he addressed the human destructive potential. He 
first assumed that the inner drives of the individual constantly aim for satisfaction or 
pleasure, stifled by reality. After World War One he came to the conclusion that 
there must be an innate death drive aiming at destruction and violence. I then 
discussed Melanie Klein who conceived of the death drive as already innate in 
infancy, and Otto Kernberg who understood the death drive as a pathological, 
secondary phenomenon linked to malignant narcissism. I then moved the discussion 
to Herbert Marcuse who claimed that the death drive (or Thanatos), is not just a 
psychic impulse but imprints itself in the social arena through manipulating people’s 
desires and access to pleasure. In both his and Erich Fromm’s understanding, it is the 
socio-historic and economic environment that influences the individual (character) 
and either nurtures constructive (life-affirming) or necrophilic (destructive and 
narcissistic) traits within.  
In Chapter 3 I further underscored the concept of the death drive with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis by exploring desire as the underlying motor of the individual. In 
Lacan’s understanding desire is always defined through the concept of lack. The 
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genesis of the individual demands individuating away from unity with one’s primary 
caregiver and brings with it a loss that forever propels one’s yearning for something 
more than oneself. This primal desire cannot be symbolized within the social order, 
but can be attached to empirical objects that seduce with an impossible promise of 
satisfaction. The Lacanian death drive manifests in the repetitive urge to reach 
beyond the pleasure principle towards something that cannot enter the Symbolic 
Order, the Thing. This leads to jouissance, the Lacanian term for the pursuit and 
manifestation of desire beyond the point of moderation towards excess. Jouissance is 
ambiguous because it contains enjoyment and pleasure yet the obsessive pursuit of 
pleasure leads to suffering. Jouissance strives for the impossible, irrespective of its 
dire consequences. 
In Chapter 4 I argued that contemporary materialism is based on the fusion of 
the pleasure and reality principles, witnessed by the transformation of attitudes 
towards desire. I understood the pursuit of desire as a push towards immortality; a 
socially coordinated narcissistic orchestration of cravings, passion, looks, status, and 
other means of building self-esteem. This capitalistic net fosters fantasies of self-
expression that are constantly tweaked and “updated” with an ever-evolving range of 
products, experiences, and their incumbent promises. With a Sisyphus-like 
dedication, people go from one materialistic distraction to the other only to remain 
with the same emptiness and the same impossibility of fulfillment. This is jouissance, 
a cultural excess, that acts in utter disregard for environmental and personal 
consequences. It is the death drive at its most voracious acting through the individual 
in pursuit of manifold objects of desire. I characterized this trait as a culture of the 
necrophile and argued that it manifested a cultural blindness to, and ignorance of, the 
impact and long-term consequences of unchecked desire, a culture steeped in excess 
and tragically short-sighted in its capacity to negotiate existential matters.  
It is hard to envision a way out of this capitalist machinery. As TMT 
researchers speculate, as long that there is death anxiety, there will be “lavish 
spending” (Stillman and Harvell 2016: 85). Yet, at the same time, once people are 
privately confronted with such existential and formerly unsignified issues such as 
illness and death, they are challenged to let death become a master signifier that has 
the potential to restructure all their former beliefs and assumptions. All too often 




In Chapter 5 I then turned to the mediatisation of violent death and its 
perpetuation by consumer visual cultures. One way death is represented, or has 
gained a new visibility, is on screens in the form of increasingly graphic violent 
death. I argued that the necrophile self is expressed in the uncanny imperturbability 
in which people consume screen deaths by the hundreds a night while having little 
idea of how to be around somebody who is actually experiencing death and loss. I 
discussed death literacy advocates Stephen Jenkinson (2015), Atul Gawande (2014), 
and Jessica Zitter (2017) who argue that, once personally faced with illness and loss, 
people will waste precious time at the end of life clinging to a world that still has 
little to offer to support mourning and a good death. The necrophile media culture 
that hails hyper-real violence and makes depictions of grossly exaggerated violence 
accessible to mainstream viewers, I argued, is a symptom of a necrophilic culture. In 
arguing this, I did not mean to imply that people who enjoy gory entertainment are 
morally vacuous. Rather, what strikes me most (and this has been an underlying 
driver of this inquiry) is that there is a phlegmatic and apathetic public response to 
the widespread and increasing imagery of violent media while at the same time there 
is little acknowledgement of, and little preparation for, facing mortality in the private 
realm. Perhaps there is a deep-running need to have death represented in any form 
because it has had a special ritualized place in society since the dawn of civilization. 
Contemporary screen deaths might be the only reminders that are allowed to emerge 
within the parameters of a death-phobic society. It is worth pondering whether an 
increase in death literacy might lessen the current obsession with (and the apathy 
regarding) violent imagery in mainstream media. 
In Chapter 6 I then turned to different perceptions of death, and our rapport 
with it, in the work of a number of artists. I read Teresa Margolles’ art as a 
courageous confrontation and representation of the immediacy of death which 
evokes an encounter for its audience with the register of the Real that Lacan has 
named the Thing, and which I have understood here as death in the place of the Real. 
I argued that Margolles creates a space of contemplation in which the emotional 
integrity of both the audience and the human objects of her work are preserved.  
Photographers Sue Fox and Cathrine Ertmann provided an exemplification of 
art bearing witness to death through entering the tabooed space of the morgue. 
Claudia Biçen’s portraits of the dying, similarly, give intimate insights into the last 
days of the dying and of their perceptions of the world they soon will leave. In 
bringing their work to the public these artists re-introduce death as a signifier into the 
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social order. In contrast, Damien Hirst and the anatomist Gunther von Hagens create 
work that masks the abjectness of death while retaining and articulating an obsession 
with the theme of death. Both Hirst and von Hagens have gained huge commercial 
success by stripping life of decay and disavowing grief; a sign, I suggested, of a 
necrophilic, death-illiterate culture. 
While there are extreme examples of the necrophile self, such as Otto 
Kernberg’s malignant narcissist with his/her preference for luxury goods, power and 
a concomitant disdain for life, traits of cultural necrophilia can be seen in the 
inability of most of us to escape the consumerist machine, or to work towards death 
literacy before tragedy strikes. Too many people today experience a surplus of 
unnecessary suffering when confronted with illness and death. But to conclude this 
thesis on a brighter note, if capitalism has not weakened our collective ability to 
approach existential anxieties entirely we might well be on the brink of a death 
revolution, the seeds of which are already germinating. As I have argued in this 
thesis, raising death awareness has the potential to reshape our collective relationship 
to desire and to bring into question the validity of a culture driven by consumerism. 
Seldom does a life remain untouched by loss and death and thus we need to learn to 
meet grief in a sincere way that allows us to develop a practised understanding of life 
as fleeting, decaying, and impermanent. If this is done in a non-nihilistic, dignified 
way, grief can become a lens through which to review our lives and goals. This will 
perforce require re-setting cultural and personal priorities. I doubt that being a fool 
for the latest materialistic craze will provide an ideal to aspire to nor provide a 
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